United States v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 08 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 12–1400.,12–1400.
• Citation: 700 F.3d 329
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Thomas COLEMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

700 F.3d 329

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Thomas COLEMAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12–1400.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 30, 2012.

Filed: Nov. 8, 2012.

Matt R. Molsen, AUSA, argued, Lincoln, NE, for appellee.

Matthew Richard Kahler, argued, Omaha, NE, for appellant.

RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and BYE, Circuit Judges.

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Thomas Coleman conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Coleman reserved the right to appeal the district court's ¹ denial of his motions to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle. Coleman also appeals the armed career criminal sentence enhancement he received under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2010, Coleman was driving his motor home on Interstate 80 in Hall County, Nebraska. Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Jason Bauer observed two vehicles with Florida license plates traveling eastbound on Interstate 80 under the posted speed limit. Trooper Bauer began following the vehicles and observed the second vehicle, Coleman's motor home, swerve. The passenger-side tires of the motor home twice crossed over the fog line at the shoulder of the highway. Trooper Bauer stopped Coleman for driving on the shoulder.

Trooper Bauer asked Coleman to sit with him in his patrol car while the officer wrote a warning citation and checked Coleman's license status and criminal history. Trooper Bauer questioned Coleman about his travel plans and whether he had a criminal history, which Coleman denied. The state patrol dispatch was unable to check Coleman's criminal history with only a name and date of birth so Trooper Bauer relayed Coleman's social security number. Dispatch responded, and Trooper Bauer learned Coleman had an extensive criminal history, including drug, robbery, and weapons offenses. Trooper Bauer again asked Coleman if he had ever been arrested, and Coleman again said he had not. When Trooper Bauer questioned Coleman about drug use, Coleman admitted he used medically prescribed marijuana while in California a few months prior. Trooper Bauer inquired if Coleman had any medical marijuana with him. Coleman replied that he did in the front part of the motor home. Trooper Bauer then placed Coleman in the backseat of his patrol car while he entered the motor home.

Trooper Bauer entered the motor home through the passenger-side door where Coleman had exited the vehicle. Trooper Bauer conducted a sweep of the motor home to ensure it was unoccupied. In a large compartment under the bed, Trooper Bauer located a black weapons-type bag. Trooper Bauer opened the bag and discovered a high-point rifle and ammunition. Trooper Bauer confirmed with dispatch that Coleman was a convicted felon. Trooper Bauer then located marijuana in the front of the motor home.

On October 19, 2010, a grand jury charged Coleman with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Coleman moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the stop and the search of the motor home. After a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended denial of Coleman's motions ² because (1) Trooper Bauer had probable cause for the stop, or alternatively the stop was a lawful investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); (2) any extension of the stop was de minimis, and justified by reasonable suspicion; (3) the search of the motor home was justified by probable cause and also as a protective sweep necessary for officer safety; and (4) Coleman was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes when Trooper Bauer questioned him. On June 3, 2011, after de novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation and denied Coleman's motions to suppress in all respects. On September 29, 2011, Coleman entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court's suppression decision.

At sentencing, the district court applied an armed career criminal sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which mandates a minimum 15–year prison sentence. Coleman objected to each of the three prior convictions offered to support the enhancement. The district court overruled Coleman's objections, finding all three of the convictions met the statutory requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The district court sentenced Coleman to 180 months imprisonment.

On appeal, Coleman argues the district court erred in finding (1) probable cause existed for the stop; (2) reasonable suspicion supported extension of the stop; (3) Coleman was not subjected to custodial interrogation; (4) probable cause or concern for the officer's safety justified search the motor home; (5) Coleman's 1998 robbery and aggravated assault conviction qualified as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); (6) Coleman's 1999 possession of marijuana with intent to distribute conviction qualified as a serious drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); and (7) Coleman's 1994 attempted sale of a controlled substance conviction also qualified as a serious drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

II. DISCUSSIONA. Probable Cause for the Stop

“We review the district court's factual findings in support of its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal determination of probable cause de novo.” United States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir.2005). “A district court's findings regarding witness credibility are ‘virtually unreviewable on appeal.’ ” United States v. Taylor, 519 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Candie, 974 F.2d 61, 64 (8th Cir.1992)).

A traffic violation, no matter how minor, provides an officer with probable cause to stop the driver. See United States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir.2001). “An officer is justified in stopping a motorist when the officer ‘objectively has a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law.’ ” United States v. Mallari, 334 F.3d 765, 766–67 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir.1996)). The government argues Trooper Bauer observed Coleman violate Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60–6,142, which declares: “No person shall drive on the shoulders of highways,” with three narrow exceptions. The district court found credible Trooper Bauer's testimony that he twice observed Coleman swerve over the fog line separating the right lane of the highway from the shoulder. Coleman argues momentarily crossing onto the shoulder does not constitute a violation of the statute and therefore the trooper lacked probable cause to stop Coleman's vehicle. We disagree.

“[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law.” United States v. Adler, 590 F.3d 581, 584 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The magistrate judge's recommendation in this case noted there was little Nebraska case law specifically interpreting the statutory language at issue. What case law existed provided no authority to support Coleman's claim that momentarily crossing the fog line did not constitute a violation of the law. See State v. Davis, No. A–07–104, 2007 WL 2257886, at *3 (Neb.Ct.App. Aug. 7, 2007).

Coleman cites a federal district court case, United States v. Magallanes, 730 F.Supp.2d 969, 977 (D.Neb.2010), which held a driver violates Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60–6,142 only if he uses the shoulder as a “thoroughfare” and not by momentarily crossing onto the shoulder. However, Magallanes was decided a few days after Trooper Bauer made his stop of Coleman's motor home, and our court's interpretation of the Nebraska statute—then binding on the Magallanes district court—was that momentarily crossing the fog line was a violation. See Mallari, 334 F.3d at 767;United States v. Pollington, 98 F.3d 341, 342 (8th Cir.1996). Although Nebraska's highest court had not—and has not yet—issued an authoritative interpretation of the statute, ³ “this Court should not expect state highway patrolmen to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.” United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.1999). Considering the precedent at the time of the stop, Trooper Bauer had an objectively reasonable basis for believing Coleman violated the statute. The district court did not err in overruling Coleman's motion to suppress on the basis of a lack of probable cause to stop Coleman.

B. Reasonable Suspicion to Extend the Stop

“A constitutionally permissible traffic stop can become unlawful, ... ‘if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete’ its purpose.” United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)). An officer may detain the occupants of a vehicle while performing routine tasks such as obtaining a driver's license and the vehicle's registration and inquiring about the occupants' destination and purpose. See id. “[I]f the officer develops reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot, the officer may expand the scope of the encounter to address that suspicion.” Id. at 1120. Reasonable suspicion is “ ‘a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting criminal activity.” United States v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). We review de novo whether the facts of this case created a reasonable suspicion. See id.

Coleman argues Trooper Bauer's questioning regarding drug use improperly exceeded the scope of a normal traffic stop. We disagree. Trooper Bauer was justified in asking Coleman about drug use in order to eliminate drug use as a possible cause of Coleman's swerving. Thereafter, Coleman's dishonesty regarding his criminal history...