State v. Bohannon

• Decision Date: 21 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 24095.,24095.
• Citation: 102 Haw. 228,74 P.3d 980
• Parties: STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alicia Anne BOHANNON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

74 P.3d 980

102 Haw. 228

STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alicia Anne BOHANNON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 24095.

Supreme Court of Hawaii.

August 21, 2003.

As Amended September 2, 2003.

Mangmang Qui Brown, deputy prosecuting attorney (Mangmang Qui Brown, on the brief), for the plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai`i.

Michael Green (Gary M. Levitt, on the brief), Honolulu, for the defendant-appellee Alicia Anne Bohannon.

LEVINSON, J., with whom MOON, C.J., Joins, and NAKAYAMA, J., Concurring

Separately and Dissenting, and ACOBA, J., Dissenting, and Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge BURNS, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy, Concurring Separately.

Opinion by LEVINSON, J., in which MOON, C.J., Joins, Announcing the Judgment of the Court.

The plaintiff-appellant State of Hawai`i [hereinafter, "the prosecution"] appeals from (1) the order of the district court of the first circuit, the Honorable Paula Devens presiding, file-stamped on January 25, 2001 but signed by Judge Devens on January 31, 2001, granting the defendant-appellee Alicia Anne Bohannon's motion to suppress items of evidence [hereinafter, "motion to suppress"] and oral motion to dismiss and (2) the order of the district court of the first circuit, the Honorable Paula Devens also presiding, file-stamped on December 11, 2000 but signed by Judge Devens on January 22, 2001, denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the oral order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss.

On appeal, the prosecution contends that the district court erred in granting Bohannon's motion to suppress on the alternative grounds (1) that Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Colby Kashimoto testified to sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to justify the investigative stop of Bohannon and (2) that the "public safety" and "community caretaking" exceptions to the warrant requirement justified the investigative stop because Officer Kashimoto had reasonable suspicion to believe that Bohannon was not operating her vehicle "in a safe and prudent manner." Bohannon responds that this court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of the prosecution's appeal, the prosecution having failed to file a timely notice of appeal in the district court.

We hold that this court has jurisdiction to address the merits of the prosecution's appeal, inasmuch as the prosecution filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the effective dates of both the written order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss and the written order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, which was therefore timely pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(b) (1999).¹ We further hold that Officer Kashimoto had reasonable suspicion to stop Bohannon and, therefore, that the district court erred in granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The present matter arises out of an incident that occurred on November 28, 1999, during which HPD Officer Kashimoto stopped Bohannon at the intersection of Kalakaua Avenue and Ala Wai Boulevard and subsequently arrested her for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-4 (Supp.1999).² The following evidence was adduced at the hearing on Bohannon's motion to suppress items of evidence obtained subsequent to the investigative stop (including the results of Bohannon's field sobriety test), conducted by the district court on May 26, 2000.

On November 28, 1999, at approximately 2:24 a.m., Officer Kashimoto was on routine patrol duty in the City and County of Honolulu. He stopped his vehicle, a three-wheeled Cushman, at the intersection of Kalakaua Avenue and Ala Wai Boulevard "in the makai³ most lane" and waited for the traffic light to turn from red to green. Officer Kashimoto testified that, at the time of the subject incident, the area was well lit— i.e., that the overhead street lamps and Officer Kashimoto's headlights, back lights, and brake lights were all illuminated—and that there was nothing in the area to obstruct Bohannon's view of Officer Kashimoto's vehicle or the traffic lights ahead of her.

While Officer Kashimoto waited at the intersection, he heard the "screeching of tires coming from behind [his] vehicle"; the screeching sound persisted for approximately two seconds. Officer Kashimoto "immediately looked into [his] rear view mirror [and] observed [Bohannon's] vehicle trying to come to a screeching halt [in order] to avoid colliding into [his] vehicle."⁴ Based on the fact that Bohannon's vehicle was close enough to Officer Kashimoto's vehicle that he was unable to see Bohannon's headlights, Officer Kashimoto surmised that Bohannon's vehicle had stopped "within two feet" of his vehicle. Officer Kashimoto further noted that there were no other vehicles in the immediate vicinity; for that reason, he activated his siren and "blue flashing" lights and circled around to Bohannon's vehicle in order to investigate whether she was operating her vehicle "in a safe and prudent manner."⁵ Bohannon did not immediately respond to Officer Kashimoto's signal for her to pull over—i.e., the flashing lights and siren—but "stayed exactly where she was [when] she came to a stop." Officer Kashimoto testified that Bohannon appeared to be "trying to figure out what was going on." After approximately ten seconds had elapsed, Bohannon maneuvered her vehicle around the corner onto Ala Wai Boulevard and stopped to speak with Officer Kashimoto.

At the hearing, the prosecution argued that, based on "specific and articulable facts"—i.e., the good lighting, the screeching of Bohannon's tires for approximately two seconds, and her abrupt stop within two feet of Officer Kashimoto's vehicle—Officer Kashimoto had reasonable suspicion to believe that Bohannon was not operating her vehicle "in a safe and prudent manner" and, thus, was justified in stopping her to investigate the situation. The prosecution reminded the district court that, further to the "reasonable suspicion" standard applicable to investigative stops, Officer Kashimoto "did not have to actually see ... a crime being committed." The district court granted Bohannon's motion to suppress, reasoning that "[t]he screeching of tires alone was not enough to justify [an investigative stop by] the police officer." Based on the district court's ruling, Bohannon orally moved to dismiss the case against her; the district court granted the motion.

It appears that, on May 26, 2000, the district court clerk recorded the foregoing dispositions on the traffic calender, the notation stating in relevant part as follows:

THE COURT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO ... REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP. ATTY PHILLIPS FOR DISMISSAL—GRANTED BY THE COURT.

On June 13, 2000, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting Bohannon's motion to suppress [hereinafter, "motion for reconsideration"].⁶ On July 17, 2000, the district court conducted a hearing on the matter, during which the prosecution argued, for the first time, that the "public safety" exception to the warrant requirement applied to Officer Kashimoto's investigative stop. The district court denied the motion, remarking as follows:

Alright. Well, the problem that the Court has is that the observation by [Officer Kashimoto] was ever so brief. He only testified to observing the two-minute [sic] screeching of tires and then observing [Bohannon] come to a screeching halt, stopping two feet behind [Officer Kashimoto's] vehicle. Had the officer continued to observe [Bohannon's] driving instead of pulling [her] over after the initial episode or had ... [Officer Kashimoto] witnessed other actions that would have led a reasonable person to believe that [Bohannon] was a hazard to the public, perhaps[, under the] public safety justification[,] [Officer Kashimoto] could [have] stopped [Bohannon]. But what we have here is such a brief observation that ... these facts could not lead a reasonable person to believe [that] there was reasonable concerns for public safety or that this vehicle was being driven... unsafe[ly] or [in an] imprudent manner.

On these facts, the Court finds that a man of reasonable caution ... would not be warranted in believing that criminal activity was afoot and the action taken was appropriate. The stop of [Bohannon] was not based on reasonable suspicion. The stop was improper. Reconsideration denied.

It appears that, on the same day, the district court clerk recorded the foregoing disposition on the traffic calender, the notation stating in relevant part as follows:

HRG ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS ITEMS HAD .... MOTION DENIED BY THE COURT.

On December 11, 2000, the district court clerk file-stamped a written order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, although the order reflects that Judge Devens signed it on January 22, 2001. On January 25, 2001, the district court clerk file-stamped a written order granting Bohannon's motion to suppress, although the order reflects that Judge Devens signed it on January 31, 2001.⁷ On February 15, 2001, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal. Oral argument in the present matter was conducted on September 4, 2002.⁸

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Jurisdiction

"The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo under the right/wrong standard." Amantiad v. Odum, 90 Hawai`i 152, 158, 977 P.2d 160, 166 (1999) (quoting Lester v. Rapp, 85 Hawai`i 238, 241, 942 P.2d 502, 505 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding appellate jurisdiction, this court has noted,

[J]urisdiction is "the base requirement for any court resolving a dispute because without jurisdiction, the court has

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