State v. Missouri Tie & Timber Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1904
• Citation: 80 S.W. 933,181 Mo. 536
• Parties: THE STATE v. MISSOURI TIE & TIMBER COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

80 S.W. 933

181 Mo. 536

THE STATE v. MISSOURI TIE & TIMBER COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 11, 1904

Transferred from St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Reversed.

J. C Sheppard and Dinning & Hamel for appellant.

Revised Statutes 1899, art. 3, chap. 121, is in conflict with the Constitution of this State, in this: It violates that part of section 4, article 2, which says: "That all persons have a natural right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that to give security to these things is the principal office of government, and that when government does not confer this security, it fails of its chief design." Article 3, also violates section 30 of article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, which says "That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Article 3 also violates that part of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; 2 Story on the Constitution (5 Ed.), secs. 1590 and 1943; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (6 Ed.), 430 and 434; Bank v. Okeley, 4 Wheat. 235; Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554; Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179; State v. Coal & Coke Co., 33 W.Va. 188; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294; Frover v. People, 141 Ill. 171; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389; Tilt v. People, 27 Chicago Leg. News 270.

Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam. B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

(1) The statute does not invade the constitutional right to contract. Appellant insists, with considerable force, but with scarcely any reason, that the act is unconstitutional because it deprives a person of the right to dispose of his labor in whatsoever way he chooses; that by its term he is not permitted to sell "the sweat of his brow" as he himself may see proper, and that appellant is deprived of the right to contract for labor freely and as it may desire. It may be said that the object of the law is to place and keep all men in parallel positions, giving them equal rights, privileges and power before the law. When they are placed and kept in equal positions, it may be held with perfect justice that full protection is granted them by the provisions of our State and federal constitutions insofar as the "right to enjoy the fruits of their own labor," and the right to be secure in the possession of their property is concerned. It would not do to allow the strong to take advantage of the weak, or to oppress them under the pretense of a license granted by a fancied construction of our organic law. Nor will one be permitted to say he can not be restrained by a general statute from entering into a contract with a laboring man, which would be oppressive to the laborer, for the sole reason that it would impair the laborer's right to contract, or would be depriving him of his property without due process of law. To thus hold would turn that which was intended as a blessing into a constant and ever-continuing curse. While these great constitutional safeguards must be preserved, yet an impartial and practical interpretation should be given them. One man, because of his financial power and standing, should not be permitted to prey upon the innocent and unfortunate and justify his conduct under the pretense that the Constitution, either federal or State, has granted the right to do so. Legislation of this kind has been upheld in a number of courts in this country, including the Supreme Court of the United States. People v. Lochner, 75 N.Y.S. 396; People v. Construction Co., 77 N.Y.S. 16; Winham v. State, 91 N.W. 421; Iron Co. v. Harbison, 103 Tenn. 421; Dugger v. Ins. Co., 95 Tenn. 245; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366; Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557; Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96; Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13. (2) The natural right of persons to contract is subject to wholesome legislation. In the light of recent decisions it must be taken as an accepted principle that the natural right of all persons to contract, as guaranteed by our Constitutions, is subject to wise and wholesome legislative restrictions and regulations growing out of the proper exercise of the police powers of the State. These regulations may place restrictions on the right to contract, yet they are held valid. Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557; People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396; Lawton v. Steel, 152 U.S. 133. While the strict letter of our Constitution indicates that the natural person shall not be deprived of the right to contract as he may see proper, yet in civilized society there is no such thing as an unrestrained power on the part of the individual to contract. The right of the individual is subject to wise and beneficial police regulations, and when a certain act harmful to the people is prohibited by a general statute, it will be upheld. Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo. 186; State ex rel. v. Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1; Karnes v. Ins. Co., 144 Mo. 413; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 543. (3) Let the sections in question be applied to a corporation, as in the case at bar, and there can be no question as to their constitutionality. A corporation has no natural right; it is an artificial person and can enter into only such contracts and transact only such business as is expressly granted by its charter or such as is necessarily implied therefrom. Huntington v. Bank, 96 U.S. 388; Thomas v. Railroad, 101 U.S. 71; Railroad v. Railroad, 118 U.S. 290; Railroad v. Railroad, 130 U.S. 1; Head v. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127; Matthews v. Skinker, 62 Mo. 329; Carroll v. Campbell, 108 Mo. 550.

OPINION

In Banc

BURGESS J.

The defendant is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of this State, and was, at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses of which it was convicted, engaged in the tie and timber business in Ripley county. It had in connection with its timber business a general supply store for the purpose of furnishing supplies to its employees.

The information upon which this prosecution is based contained four counts, which, leaving off the formal parts, are as follows:

"Now comes Thomas F. Lane, prosecuting attorney within and for the county of Ripley, in the State of Missouri, and informs the court, under his oath of office and upon his own information and belief, that the Missouri Tie and Timber Company is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri, and was such during all the times mentioned in this information; that said defendant corporation, the Missouri Tie and Timber Company, and T. J Henderson, its servant, agent and officer, on the . . . day of December, 1901, at the said county of Ripley, in the State of Missouri, did then and there unlawfully and wrongfully issue, pay out, and circulate, for the payment of wages for certain labor done and performed by one H. A. Sweeney for the Missouri Tie and Timber Company, a certain order, check, memorandum, token, evidence of indebtedness and obligation of the said Missouri Tie and Timber Company, which said order, check, coupon, memorandum, token, evidence of indebtedness and obligation so paid out and circulated for the payment of the wages of labor of the said H. A. Sweeney is described as follows:

"'Order for merchandise, $ 5.

"'To Missouri Tie and Timber Co.

"'Acct. Order of H. A. Sweeney.

"'O. K. T. W. Beauchamp. No. 1761C.

"'Merchandise order.

"'Amounting to five dollars, at the store of Missouri Tie & Timber Co., upon conditions named on back of this book and made a part thereof.

"'Missouri Tie & Timber Co., please furnish myself or . . . goods at your store to the amount of $ 5 and charge same to my account as per coupons contained in this book. These coupons to be detached only by the authorized employees of the Missouri Tie & Timber Co., and if otherwise detached, to be worthless.

"'H. A. Sweeney.'

"Said order book, coupon, token, check, memorandum, evidence of indebtedness and obligation, containing between the covers thereof, one hundred five-cent mercantile coupons, each of which is described as follows:

"'Mercantile Coupon 5 Cents.

"'Mo. Tie & Timber Co.

"'No. 1761C.'

"That said check, coupon, token, memorandum, evidence of indebtedness and obligation, so paid out for the wages of labor as aforesaid, by the said Missouri Tie & Timber Company, and J. T. Henderson, as aforesaid, is not redeemable in lawful money of the United States, at its face value. Contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State.

"Now comes Thomas F. Lane, prosecuting attorney, within and for the county of Ripley, in the State of Missouri, and informs the court under his oath of office and upon his own information and belief, that the Missouri Tie and Timber Company is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Missouri, and was such during all the times mentioned in this information; that said defendant corporation, the Missouri Tie and Timber Company, and J. T. Henderson, its servant, agent and officer on the . . . day of December, 1901, at the said county of Ripley, in the State of Missouri, did then and there unlawfully and wrongfully issue, pay out, and circulate, for the payment of wages for certain labor done and performed by one E. H. Day for the said Missouri Tie and Timber...