Velázquez-Vélez v. Molina-Rodríguez
Decision Date | 29 August 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 15-1126 (FAB) |
Citation | 327 F.Supp.3d 373 |
Parties | Alicia VELÁZQUEZ-VÉLEZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carlos MOLINA-RODRÍGUEZ, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Israel Roldan-Gonzalez, Aguadilla, PR, Luis N. Blanco-Matos, Matos Robles & Blanco, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Andres Guillemard-Noble, Monique Guillemard-Noble, Nachman & Guillemard, PSC, Joel Torres-Ortiz, Melissa Massheder-Torres, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, Marcia I. Perez-Llavona, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Defendants Municipality of Arecibo ("Arecibo"), Carlos Molina-Rodríguez ("Molina"), Wesley Rivera ("Rivera"), Edgardo Pérez-Pérez ("Pérez"), Hiram Cruz-González, Luis Cruz-Nieves, and Janet Rodríguez-Colón ("Rodríguez") (collectively, "defendants"), in their official and personal capacities, move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (" Rule 56"). (Docket Nos. 111 and 112.) For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.
This litigation arises from allegations of political discrimination. (Docket No. 102.) The following facts are deemed admitted by both parties pursuant to Local Rule 56. Loc. R. 56(e) ; P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 130-31 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Loc. R. 56(e) ).1
Molina won the 2012 mayoral election in Arecibo as the candidate for the Partido Nuevo Progresista ("PNP"). (Docket No. 111, Ex. 30 at p. 5.)2 When Molina assumed office, plaintiffs Alicia Velázquez-Vélez ("Velázquez"), Emma Vélez-Serrano, Johanna Homs-Zeno ("Homs"), Luís Ocaña-Rivera ("Ocaña"), María Rivera-Román, Saúl Vélez-Rodríguez, Héctor Román-Ortiz, Edwin Denis-Mercado ("Denis"), Santos Tobi-Molina ("Tobi"), and Julissa Marrero-Román ("Marrero") (collectively, "plaintiffs") worked as transitory municipal employees pursuant to annual and semi-annual employment contracts.3 With the exception of Velázquez, every plaintiff claims to be affiliated with the PPD.4 Velázquez, however, maintains that "[t]here's a presumption she's a member of the [PPD] because her husband is a member of the [PPD]." (Docket No. 111, Ex. 6 at p. 17.)
During Molina's tenure as mayor, the plaintiffs' transitory employment contracts were not renewed. (Docket No. 112 at p. 3.) On February 13, 2015, plaintiffs commenced this civil action, contending that "the adverse employment actions executed by Defendants were motivated by Plaintiffs' political affiliation." (Docket No. 1 at p. 4.) The third amended complaint sets forth three causes of action pursuant to: (1) 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (" section 1983") for an alleged violation of the First Amendment, (2) sections 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7 of Article II of the Puerto Rico Constitution, and (3) Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, Laws of P.R. Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142. Id. at pp. 55—57. On July 2, 2018, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims set forth by the plaintiffs. (Docket Nos. 111 and 112.) The plaintiffs opposed summary judgment, and the defendants replied. (Docket Nos. 125 and 131.) Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a surreply with leave from the Court. (Docket No. 139.) The parties concur that the claims against Edgardo Pérez-Pérez are meritless. (Docket No. 112 at p. 38; Docket No. 125 at p. 2.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the claims asserted against Pérez. (Docket Nos. 111 and 112.) On November 1, 2016, plaintiff Ángel Oquendo-Maldonado ("Oquendo") moved to dismiss his claims against the defendants. (Docket No. 50.) The Court GRANTS Oquendo's motion, and will enter a partial judgment reflecting the dismissal of Oquendo's claims against the defendants.
Jurisdiction exists in this civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1331, because plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (" section 1983"), a federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
A court will grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Dunn v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 761 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
The role of summary judgment is to "pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Tobin v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 775 F.3d 448, 450 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). The party moving for summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of "demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" with definite and competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the burden shifts to the nonmovant "to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmovant's case rests merely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable references, and unsupported speculation." Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayagüez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006).
The plaintiffs assert that the Municipality of Arecibo, Molina, and other municipal employees are liable for political discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. (Docket No. 102 at p. 15.) Section 1983 establishes "a private right of action for violations of federally protected rights." Marrero-Gutiérrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 does not confer substantive rights, "but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Marrero-Sáez v. Municipality of Aibonito, 668 F.Supp.2d 327, 332 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ). Section 1983 imposes civil liability on state officials "acting under color of state law." Elena v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012). Puerto Rico is a state for the purpose of section 1983. Id. (citing Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 2002) ). A municipality is a "person" pursuant to section 1983.
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association provides non-policymaking public employees with protection from adverse employment decisions based on their political affiliation. Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000) ; see also, Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990).5 The Mount Healthy burden-shifting framework governs the Court's analysis. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) ( ); see also Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 74.
To establish a prima facie case pursuant to the First Amendment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiff's affiliation; (3) a challenged employment action occurred; and (4) political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged employment action. Martin-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 506 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).6 A plaintiff alleging political discrimination shoulders the threshold burden of producing sufficient evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that he or she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that his or her political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged employment action. González-De-Blasini v. Family Dept., 377 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2004) ; Rodríguez-Ríos v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1998). "The plaintiff must point to evidence on the record which, if credited, would permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that the challenged personnel action occurred and stemmed from a politically based discriminatory animus." González-De-Blasini, 377 F.3d at 85 (quoting LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).
The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse employment action and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she would have taken the same employment action regardless of the plaintiff's political affiliation. Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 74 ; Rodríguez-Ríos, 138 F.3d at 24. The Mt. Healthy defense, "ensures that a plaintiff-employee who would have been dismissed in any event on legitimate grounds is not placed in a better position merely by virtue of the exercise of a constitutional right irrelevant to the adverse employment action." Acevedo-Díaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). The evidence by which the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case may suffice for a fact-finder to infer that the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory ground for the adverse employment action is pretextual, and "check" summary judgment. Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 78.
Evidence of a highly-charged political environment coupled with the parties' competing political persuasions may suffice to show discriminatory animus. Rodríguez-Ríos, 138 F.3d at 24 ; see also Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 75-76 (...
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