82 Hawai'i 1, Iddings v. Mee-Lee
| Citation | 919 P.2d 263 |
| Decision Date | 20 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | D,MEE-LE,No. 17877,17877 |
| Parties | 82 Hawai'i 1 Barbara IDDINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennisefendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Hawai'i |
Francis T. O'Brien of Ashford & Nakamura, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant Barbara Iddings.
Richard K. Quinn and Timothy I. MacMaster, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee Dennis Mee-Lee, M.D.
Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.
In this case, dealing with the scope and requirements of the statutory "wilful[ 1] and wanton misconduct" exception to the co-employee immunity provisions of Hawai'i's workers' compensation scheme, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 386, plaintiff-appellant Barbara Iddings appeals from the First Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Dennis Mee-Lee, M.D. Iddings, a nurse in the Intensive Care Module of Castle Medical Center's (CMC) Human Services Unit, suffered injuries while she assisted other CMC staff members in subduing a violent patient. Iddings asserted that Dr. Mee-Lee, who was in charge of the Human Services Unit, engaged in "wilful and wanton misconduct" by allegedly allowing the Intensive Care Module to become overcrowded with patients and furniture, despite being aware of a risk of injury stemming from the alleged overcrowding.
On appeal, Iddings contends that the circuit court erred in granting Dr. Mee-Lee's motion for summary judgment because: (1) Dr. Mee-Lee could not be found to have engaged in "wilful and wanton misconduct" insofar as Iddings did not allege that Dr. Mee-Lee acted with an intent to injure Iddings; and (2) Hawai'i's workers' compensation scheme provided the exclusive remedy for her injuries.
We hold that the circuit court erred in granting Dr. Mee-Lee's motion for summary judgment because an actual intent to injure is not required in order for the injury-causing conduct of a co-employee to fall within the scope of the "wilful and wanton misconduct" exception of HRS § 386-8 (1993). 2 We therefore vacate the circuit court's order granting Dr. Mee-Lee's motion for summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.
At the time of Iddings's injuries, both Iddings and Dr. Mee-Lee were employed by the CMC. Dr. Mee-Lee was the Director of Psychiatry at the CMC and was in charge of the Human Services Unit. Iddings worked in the Human Services Unit as a psychiatric nurse. While on duty on October 12, 1991, Iddings assisted several CMC staff members in subduing a violent patient in the Human Services Unit. During the fracas, Iddings was thrown to the floor, became wedged between pieces of furniture, and suffered injuries to her head, neck, back, and knee.
After the incident, complaining of headaches, Iddings was hospitalized from November 1 to 5, 1991, and later received physical therapy for her neck, back, and knee injuries. Iddings applied for, and received, workers' compensation benefits for medical care and wage loss associated with her injuries.
On August 12, 1992, Iddings, who now resides in Virginia, filed a complaint in the First Circuit Court against Dr. Mee-Lee, alleging, inter alia, that: (1) Dr. Mee-Lee was an independent contractor; and (2) Dr. Mee-Lee, by allowing the CMC's Human Services Unit to become overcrowded with patients, acted both negligently and wilfully and wantonly in creating an unsafe work environment that caused the Intensive Care Module to become cluttered with furniture in order to accommodate the patients. The pertinent portions of the complaint specifically alleged that:
4. Upon information and belief, Defendant MEE-LEE is and was at all times material herein the Director of Psychiatry at Castle Medical Center. Upon further information and belief, Defendant MEE-LEE provided said services to Castle Medical Center as an independent contractor.
....
8. On or about October 12, 1991, Plaintiff IDDINGS was on duty as a psychiatric nurse within the Human Services Unit. At the above-described time and place, it was necessary for plaintiff, as a part of her duties, to enter the Intensive Care Module to subdue a violent patient.
9. In the course of subduing said patient, Plaintiff was injured as she was shoved against furniture which was within the Intensive Care Module in order to accommodate the overcrowded conditions within the unit.
10. Prior to October 12, 1991, Defendant MEE-LEE had been advised that excessive furniture within the Intensive Care Module posed a safety hazard, but Defendant MEE-LEE took no steps to remove the furniture or to reduce the patient population within the Intensive Care Module.
11. Defendant had the ability to control the patient population, as was evidenced by the fact that he caused said population to be reduced to within authorized numbers in anticipation of a hospital accreditation inspection, and, again, in anticipation of an inspection by the State Department of Health.
12. The actions of Defendant MEE-LEE in failing to take steps to provide for the safety of plaintiff IDDINGS and other staff members who were required to work within the Intensive Care Module with individuals who often were hostile and/or violent constituted negligence and/or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of Defendant MEE-LEE.
Subsequent discovery revealed that, at all times pertinent to the complaint, Dr. Mee-Lee had been an employee of the CMC and was not an independent contractor. Recognizing that her negligence claims against Dr. Mee-Lee would therefore be barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of HRS § 386-5 (1985), 3 Iddings stipulated to dismiss her negligence claims against Dr. Mee-Lee with prejudice on November 5, 1993. However, the claims that were based upon Dr. Mee-Lee's alleged wilful and wanton misconduct were preserved. The stipulation for partial dismissal provided in pertinent part that
On January 3, 1994, Dr. Mee-Lee filed a motion for summary judgment: (1) contending that Iddings's allegation that Dr. Mee-Lee intentionally allowed her to work in an unsafe working environment "is not sufficient to constitute the type of 'wilful and wanton misconduct' which is required to circumvent the exclusive remedy provision" of HRS § 386-5; and (2) asserting that "proof of an actual intent to injure is required to circumvent the exclusive remedy provision[.]" The circuit court agreed and granted Dr. Mee-Lee's motion by order filed February 8, 1994. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, an order of summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard applied by the circuit courts. Summary judgment is proper where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In other words, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Heatherly v. Hilton Hawaiian Village Joint Venture, 78 Hawai'i 351, 353, 893 P.2d 779, 781 (1995) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).
As a general rule in Hawai'i, workers' compensation is an injured employee's exclusive remedy for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. HRS § 386-5 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or the employee's dependents on account of a work injury suffered by the employee shall exclude all other liability of the employer to the employee[.]" Id. (emphasis added); see also Coates v. Pacific Engineering, 71 Haw. 358, 362, 791 P.2d 1257, 1259-60 (1990) .
HRS § 386-8, in like manner, extends immunity from suit to an injured worker's co-employees. HRS § 386-8 provides in pertinent part that:
When a work injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some person other than the employer or another employee of the employer acting in the course of his [or her] employment a legal liability to pay damages on account thereof, the injured employee or his [or her] dependents ... may claim compensation under this chapter and recover damages from such third person.
(Emphasis added.) HRS § 386-8 also provides, however, that "[a]nother employee of the same employer shall not be relieved of his [or her] liability as a third party, if the personal injury is caused by his [or her] wilful and wanton misconduct." See also Hirasa v. Burtner, 68 Haw. 22, 25, 702 P.2d 772, 775 (1985) ).
Iddings asserts that the...
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