Aaron J., Matter of

• Decision Date: 24 November 1992
• Citation: 605 N.E.2d 330,80 N.Y.2d 402,590 N.Y.S.2d 843
• Parties: , 605 N.E.2d 330 In the Matter of AARON J., Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 843

590 N.Y.S.2d 843

80 N.Y.2d 402, 605 N.E.2d 330

In the Matter of AARON J., Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 24, 1992.

[80 N.Y.2d 403] [605 N.E.2d 331] Ardeth L. Houde, Rochester, for appellant.

Charles S. Turner, County Atty. of Monroe County, Rochester (Ronald A. Case, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

Section 340.1 of the Family Court Act provides that, in the absence of "good cause shown," the fact-finding hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding "shall commence not more than sixty days after the conclusion of the initial appearance" where the respondent is not in detention. However, the Family Court Act also authorizes the trial courts to refer cases involving juvenile delinquency charges for "adjustment services" (Family Ct.Act § 320.6) and provides for a period of up to 120 days for the completion of such services ( § 308.1[9]. The relationship between these separate limitations periods is the subject of this appeal.

The presentment agency commenced the present proceeding with a petition charging respondent with an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the third degree (see, Penal Law § 165.05[1]. Respondent, who was not in detention, made his initial appearance with counsel on September 24, 1990. At that time, over the objection of the presentment agency, the court granted respondent's request for a referral to the Probation Department for possible "adjustment" pursuant to Family Court Act § 320.6, adjourning the proceeding for a period of three weeks (cf., Family Ct.Act § 320.6[2] [requiring consent of presentment agency in cases involving certain designated felonies].

On October 16, 1990, the Probation Department reported to the Judge that respondent had agreed to seek employment with the aid of a local service agency so that the sum of $320 could be paid in restitution. The Department, however, expressed some skepticism about respondent's ability to pay that amount within the required period (but cf., Family Ct.Act § 308.1[2] [respondent's inability to make restitution may not be considered]. At respondent's request, the proceeding was adjourned for another 30 days.

On the next court date, November 15, 1990, respondent failed to appear, and the case was once again adjourned. When respondent finally appeared on November 20, 1990, the court was advised that he had failed to cooperate with the Probation Department and had not obtained employment. Consequently, the adjustment effort was abandoned, and the court set the matter down for a fact-finding hearing to commence on December 6, 1990.

On that date, respondent's counsel appeared and orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to comply with the speedy trial requirements of Family Court Act § 340.1(2). After considering written submissions from both sides, the court denied the motion, holding that the period during which respondent was receiving adjustment services should be excluded from the time in which the fact-finding hearing had to be commenced (see,150 Misc.2d 328, 568 N.Y.S.2d 260). Respondent was subsequently found guilty of the charges, adjudged a juvenile delinquent and placed on probation for an 18-month period. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court's dispositional order, 178 A.D.2d 1032, 580 N.Y.S.2d 668, and this Court granted respondent leave to take a further appeal. 79 N.Y.2d 758, 584 N.Y.S.2d 446, 594 N.E.2d 940.

Analysis in this case must begin with the provisions of Family Court Act § 340.1. That statute, which delineates the basic speedy trial rules applicable to respondent's case, provides: "If the respondent is not in detention the fact-finding hearing shall commence not more than sixty days after the conclusion of the initial appearance except * * * [t]he court may adjourn a fact-finding hearing: (a) on its own motion * * * for good cause shown for * * * not more than thirty days * * * or (b) on motion by the respondent for good cause shown for not more than thirty days" (Family Ct.Act § 340.1[2], [4]. The court must state the reasons for the adjournment on the record, and successive motions to adjourn are not permitted unless "special circumstances" are shown (Family Ct.Act § 340.1[5], [6]. As the Court held in Matter of Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408, 413, 522 N.Y.S.2d 89, 516 N.E.2d 1203, the goal of the statute is to "assure swift and certain adjudication." Consequently, in contrast to the analysis that is applied in CPL 30.30 cases (see, e.g., People v. Cortes, 80 N.Y.2d 201, 590 N.Y.S.2d 9, 604 N.E.2d 71; People v. Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333; People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558, 407 N.E.2d 405), the focus of the inquiry is not on whether the prosecuting agency was the source of the delay, but rather whether the statutory standards of "good cause" or "special circumstances" were satisfied (Matter of Frank C., supra; see also, Matter of Randy K., 77 N.Y.2d 398, 568 N.Y.S.2d 562, 570 N.E.2d 210).

In respondent's case, the fact-finding hearing was not commenced within the 60-day period specified by Family Court Act § 340.1(2). Moreover, neither the parties nor the court invoked the special provisions of the statute authorizing "good cause" or "special circumstances" adjournments (Family Ct.Act § 340.1[4], [6]. Accordingly, even though the petitioning agency was not responsible for the adjournments that delayed respondent's fact-finding hearing, the principles set forth in Matter of Frank C., supra could theoretically lead to dismissal. We conclude, however, that dismissal is not mandated under the circumstances presented here, since a total of 52 of the 72 days between respondent's initial appearance and the date the fact-finding hearing was scheduled to commence were absorbed in the provision of judicially ordered "adjustment services" pursuant to Family Court Act § 320.6.

The "adjustment services" contemplated by the statute entail "the informal consensual resolution of a case under probation service auspices" (Sobie, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 29A, Family Ct.Act § 308.1, at 320). Use of this nonadversarial dispute resolution mechanism can be highly beneficial to an accused juvenile because, if successful, it enables the juvenile to avoid the potentially harsher consequences of a formal fact-finding hearing and judicially imposed disposition (see, Family Ct.Act § 320.6[3].

The centerpiece of the legislation authorizing "adjustment services" is Family Court Act § 308.1, which provides a detailed description of the procedures to be followed and establishes the time limits that must be obeyed. Under subdivision (9) of that statute, "[e]fforts at adjustment * * * may not extend for a period of more than two months without leave of the court, which may extend the period for an additional two months." Thus, in contrast to section 340.1(2)'s restrictive 60-day period for the commencement of the fact-finding hearing, the period for adjustment may extend for up to 120 days.

Despite this difference in their prescribed time periods, there is no inherent conflict between section 308.1(9) and section 340.1. As is evident from several of section 308.1's other subdivisions, that statute is addressed primarily to situations in which "adjustment services" are to be provided before any juvenile delinquency petition is filed (see, Family Ct.Act §...