Abrahamson v. the St. Louis County Sch. Dist., A10–2162.

Decision Date01 August 2011
Docket NumberNo. A10–2162.,A10–2162.
Citation270 Ed. Law Rep. 828,802 N.W.2d 393
PartiesSteven ABRAHAMSON, et al., complainants, Relators,v.The ST. LOUIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Independent School District No. 2142, et al., Respondents,Office of Administrative Hearings, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus by the Court

1. A school district, school board, and board members fall within the definition of “committee” in Minnesota Statutes, chapter 211A, and are subject to the chapter's campaign-finance reporting requirements.

2. A school district's use of public funds to influence or to promote the passage of a ballot question is an expenditure not authorized by law.

3. A school district's expenditures of public funds to promote the passage of a ballot question are not election-related expenditures required or authorized by law and therefore constitute “disbursements” under Minnesota Statutes, chapter 211A.

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman & Kaardal P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for relators.Stephen M. Knutson, Michelle D. Kenney, Knutson, Flynn & Deans P.A., Mendota Heights, MN, for The St. Louis County School District, et al.Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondent Office of Administrative Hearings.Considered and decided by MINGE, Presiding Judge; PETERSON, Judge; and SCHELLHAS, Judge.

OPINION

SCHELLHAS, Judge.

By writ of certiorari relators appeal from an administrative-law judge's dismissal of their complaint for failing to allege a prima facie violation of Minnesota Statutes chapter 211A or section 211B.06. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

On November 4, 2010, relators Stephen Abrahamson and Tim Kotzian filed with the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) a complaint against respondents St. Louis County School District, Independent School District No. 2142, and the seven members of its school board. Abrahamson is the mayor of the City of Tower, and Kotzian is chair of the coalition for community schools. Relators allege violations of the fair-campaign-practices and campaign-finance acts.

According to the complaint, the school district and board members caused a ballot-question election to be held on December 8, 2009. The ballot question sought voters' authorization to issue general-obligation school-building bonds in an amount not to exceed $78.8 million. Relators allege that, prior to the election, the school district and board promoted the passage of the ballot question through the use of public funds. Relators further allege that the school district and board allowed contributions, approved expenditures, and encouraged the district to incur expenses or to otherwise accept in-kind contributions. They generally allege that the public funds belonged equally to proponents and opponents of the ballot question and that the school district's use of funds to promote the passage of the ballot question was an unlawful expenditure not authorized by the legislature.

Relators specifically allege that the school district used public funds to pay Johnson Controls Inc. for its assistance in preparing and disseminating newsletters and other materials to residents of the school district to promote the passage of the ballot question. Relators allege that the school district and its board allowed, approved, and encouraged the costs with knowledge of the relevant financial-reporting requirements under Minnesota law. According to the complaint, neither the school district nor the board filed any financial reports relating to the ballot question.

Relators allege that the school district and board violated the following statutes: Minn.Stat. §§ 211A.02, .03, .05, and .06 (2010), by expending more than $750 related to the ballot question and knowingly failing to file financial reports; Minn.Stat. § 211B.06 (2010), by disseminating material that included false statements concerning the effect of the ballot question; and Minn.Stat. § 211B.15, subd. 9, (2010), by contributing to a media project controlled by the school district to encourage passage of the ballot question.

On November 9, an OAH administrative-law judge (ALJ) dismissed relators' complaint for failure to allege prima facie violations of Minn.Stat. §§ 211A.02, .03, .05, .06, 211B.06, or 211B.15, subd. 9. In a memorandum accompanying the order, the ALJ stated that, because neither the school district nor board members are a “candidate” or a “committee,” as defined in chapter 211A, they are not subject to the reporting requirements of chapter 211A. The ALJ further stated that, even if the district were subject to the filing requirements in chapter 211A, the expenditures at issue are election-related expenditures not within the definition of “disbursement” in chapter 211A, and therefore not subject to reporting. Concerning the alleged false statements, the ALJ concluded that the statements are either not demonstrably false or are opinion and not within the purview of section 211B.06. And, concerning relators' claim that the school district violated section 211B.15, subdivision 9, by contributing to a media project it controlled to encourage passage of the ballot question, the ALJ concluded that the claim failed because neither the school district nor its board members fall within the definition of “corporation” applicable to that section.

Relators petition for a writ of certiorari.

ISSUES

I. A school district, school board, and board members fall within the statutory definition of “committee” under Minnesota Statutes, chapter 211A?

II. Are the school district's expenditures made in connection with the ballot-question election “disbursements” subject to campaign-finance-reporting requirements under chapter 211A?

III. Does relators' complaint set forth a prima facie violation of Minnesota Statutes section 211B.06?

ANALYSIS

To set forth a prima facie violation of chapter 211A or 211B, a complaint filed with the OAH must “include evidence or allege facts that, if accepted as true, would be sufficient to prove a violation of chapter 211A or 211B.” Barry v. St. Anthony–New Brighton Indep. Sch. Dist. 282, 781 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Minn.App.2010). If an ALJ determines that the complaint does not set forth a prima facie violation, the ALJ must dismiss the complaint. Minn.Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(a) (2010). A reviewing court may affirm a decision dismissing a complaint, remand for further proceedings, or “reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are” affected by error of law or “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record.” Minn.Stat. § 14.69 (2010).

In this case, the ALJ concluded in his order memorandum that “the St. Louis County School District and its Board members are neither a candidate nor a committee within the meaning of chapter 211A, and are not required to report contributions or disbursements through the reporting requirements of that chapter.” “When a decision turns on the meaning of words in a statute or regulation, a legal question is presented. In considering such questions of law, reviewing courts are not bound by the decision of the agency and need not defer to agency expertise.” St. Otto's Home v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39–40 (Minn.1989) (citations omitted).

I. Application of Reporting Requirements in Chapter 211A

The ALJ acknowledged in his order memorandum that if the school district and board members “fall within the statutory definition of a ‘committee’ as either a corporation or an association, the reporting requirements of chapter 211A may apply,” but the ALJ concluded otherwise as quoted above. On appeal, both relators and respondents argue that the statute is clear and unambiguous, but their interpretations are opposite. Relators argue that the school district, school board, and board members are included in the unambiguous meaning of “committee,” while respondents argue that neither the school district, school board, nor its members are included in the plain meaning of “committee.”

We review the ALJ's statutory interpretation de novo. See Barry, 781 N.W.2d at 901 (stating that this court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo). “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010). “Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Id. “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Id. Courts presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2010). If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court must give effect to its plain meaning and refrain from engaging in any further interpretation. State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn.2004). A statute is ambiguous if the language used in the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn.2003).

In relevant part, chapter 211A defines “committee” broadly as a “corporation or association or persons acting together to ... promote or defeat a ballot question.” Minn.Stat. § 211A.01, subd. 4 (2010). The legislature did not qualify the general terms or explicitly exclude any types or categories of corporations, associations, or persons acting together. The general terms and the disjunctive “or” in the statutory language provide a broad and expansive definition of “committee,” not a narrow and restrictive definition. We address separately whether the school district and its board members are included in the definition of committee under section 211A.01, subdivision 4.

A. School District

The ALJ concluded that the school district is not a “committ...

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2 cases
  • Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. A10–2162.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • 10 Agosto 2012
    ...the complaint to have been false. The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., 802 N.W.2d 393, 406 (Minn.App.2011). The court reversed the ALJ's holding that a school district does not qualify as a committee under chapter 2......
  • Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., A15-1024
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • 4 Abril 2016
    ...a school district did qualify as a "committee" and was therefore subject to the reporting requirements. Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cty. Sch. Dist., 802 N.W.2d 393, 406 (Minn. App. 2011), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 819 N.W.2d 129 (Minn. 2012). We also reversed thejudge's alternative holding t......

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