Barry v. ST. ANTHONY-NEW BRIGHTON INDP.
| Citation | 781 N.W.2d 898 |
| Decision Date | 20 April 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A09-1093.,A09-1093. |
| Parties | Paul A. BARRY, et al., Relators, v. The ST. ANTHONY-NEW BRIGHTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 282, et al., Respondents, Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings, Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Minnesota |
Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman & Kaardal, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for relators.
James E. Knutson, Knutson Flynn Deans & Olsen, Mendota Heights, MN, for respondents school district, Jane Eckert, David Evans, Barry Kinney, Don Siggelkow, Leah Slye, Mike Volna.
Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings, St. Paul, MN, respondent.
Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; PETERSON, Judge; and SHUMAKER, Judge.
In this appeal from an administrative law judge's dismissal of relators' complaint for failing to allege a prima facie violation of the Minnesota campaign-finance statutes, relators argue that the administrative law judge improperly construed the statute and erroneously found that the complaint failed to state a prima facie case. We affirm.
Relators Paul Barry and David Spano reside within the St. Anthony-New Brighton Independent School District 282 (the school district). Relators filed a complaint with the office of administrative hearings (the OAH) alleging that the school district and its six school-board members violated Minnesota's Campaign Financial Reports Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 211A.01-.14 (2008), and Fair Campaign Practices Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 211B.01-.37 (2008).
Relators' complaint alleges that respondents caused an election to be held on May 20, 2008, on four separate ballot questions regarding four separate bond issues. Three of the ballot questions were defeated in the election, and one passed. The complaint alleges that, before the election, the school district and the school board "promoted the passage of all ballot questions through the use of public funds, including salary or hourly-paid employees of the School District." The complaint states that in response to relators' request, the school district provided relators with the following list of expenditures that the school district made during the campaign that preceded the election:
Tracy Printing $ 3,879
Synergy Graphics $ 1,377
Dustin Deets (video) $ 18,500
Wold Architects (referendum $ 8,670.45
planning)
School Finances (demographics) $ 3,000
Decision Resources (survey) $ 10,000; and
Schroeder Comm. (referendum $23,037.20.
assist.)
The complaint also alleges that school-district officials met with the public during business hours to promote the ballot questions. As an example of these meetings, the complaint states that on April 21, 2008, the school-district superintendent and a high-school principal spoke to a group called the Vital Aging Council. The complaint alleges that although this event occurred during the school business day, the superintendent's and principal's time was not listed on the district's list of expenditures as an in-kind contribution or other type of expense.
The complaint alleges that the school district or the school board allowed the contributions, approved the expenditures, and encouraged the school district to incur the expenses to promote the passage of the ballot questions in the May 2008 election and that at all times the school district and school board knew that Minnesota law required the filing of financial reports for ballot-question referendums. Based on these allegations, the complaint claims that the school district or the school board violated (1) Minn.Stat. § 211A.02 by failing to file a financial report after spending more than $750 in a calendar year relating to the May 2008 ballot question; (2) Minn. Stat. § 211A.03 by failing to file a financial report; (3) Minn.Stat. § 211A.05 by intentionally failing to file a financial report; (4) Minn.Stat. § 211A.06 by failing to report or keep an accurate account of salary expenditures for each time a school-district official attended a public or private forum during business hours and by failing to account for public funds transferred as contributions to the school district's campaign to promote passage of the ballot questions; and (5) Minn.Stat. § 211B.15, subd. 9, by contributing to a media project to encourage people to vote for the passage of the ballot questions.
An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued an order dismissing relators' complaint for failing to allege a prima facie violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 211A.02, .03, .05,.06, or Minn.Stat. § 211B.15, subd. 9. This certiorari appeal followed.
Did relators' complaint set forth a prima facie violation of chapter 211A or 211B?
A complaint alleging a violation of Minnesota Statutes chapter 211A or 211B must be filed with the OAH. Minn.Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 1 (2008). "The complaint must ... detail the factual basis for the claim that a violation of law has occurred." Id., subd. 3 (2008). The administrative law judge assigned to review the complaint must make a preliminary determination for its disposition. Minn.Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 1 (2008). "If the administrative law judge determines that the complaint does not set forth a prima facie violation of chapter 211A or 211B, the administrative law judge must dismiss the complaint." Id., subd. 2(a) (2008).
"A party aggrieved by a final decision on a complaint filed under section 211B.32 is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in Minn.Stat. §§ 14.63 to 14.69...." Minn.Stat. § 211B.36, subd. 5 (2008).
Minn.Stat. § 14.69 (2008).
St. Otto's Home v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 39-40 (Minn.1989) (citations omitted). This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Risk Level Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn.App.1998).
The ALJ determined that relators' complaint failed to allege a prima facie violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 211A.02, .03, .05, .06, or Minn.Stat. § 211B.15, subd. 9, and, therefore, as required under Minn.Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(a), the ALJ dismissed the complaint. The statute does not define "prima facie violation." "In construing the statutes of this state, ... technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning, ... are construed according to such special meaning," unless doing so "would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute." Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2008). Both the supreme court and this court have considered what it means to set forth a "prima facie case."
In State v. Larson, the supreme court considered what a defendant must set forth to establish a prima facie case of jury misconduct before a Schwartz hearing1 is mandated. 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1979). The supreme court concluded: "To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must submit sufficient evidence which, standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct." Id. In Geibe v. Geibe, this court considered what a moving party must set forth to obtain a hearing on a motion to modify a child-custody order. 571 N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn.App.1997). The applicable statute in Geibe required the party seeking modification to submit an affidavit asserting the facts on which the motion was based. Id. This court explained:
Id. (citations omitted).
Under Larson and Geibe, to set forth a prima facie case that entitles a party to a hearing, the party must either submit evidence or allege facts that, if unchallenged or accepted as true, would be sufficient to prove that the party is entitled to the requested relief. If the evidence or factual allegations set forth a prima facie case, a hearing is held to evaluate the credibility of the evidence or the truth of the allegations.
Applying the meaning of "prima facie case" under Larson and Geibe, we conclude that the phrase, "set forth a prima facie violation of chapter 211A or 211B," in Minn.Stat. § 211B.33, subd. 2(a), means to include evidence or allege facts that, if accepted as true, would be sufficient to prove a violation of chapter 211A or 211B. Because Minn.Stat. § 211B.32, subd. 3, expressly requires that a complaint alleging a violation of chapter 211A or 211B must "detail the factual basis for the claim that a violation of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Abrahamson v. St. Louis Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. A10–2162.
...reporting requirements. See Barry v. St. Anthony–New Brighton Indep. Sch. Dist. 282 (OAH) (May 21, 2009), aff'd on other grounds,781 N.W.2d 898 (Minn.App.2010); Wigley v. Orono Pub. Sch. (OAH) (May 1, 2008). Finally, the ALJ held that none of the four allegedly false statements recited in t......
- Francis v. State
-
Abrahamson v. the St. Louis County Sch. Dist., A10–2162.
...that, if accepted as true, would be sufficient to prove a violation of chapter 211A or 211B.” Barry v. St. Anthony–New Brighton Indep. Sch. Dist. 282, 781 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Minn.App.2010). If an ALJ determines that the complaint does not set forth a prima facie violation, the ALJ must dismis......
-
Minn. Voters Alliance v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist.
...voter but on the nature of the statements in question. See Abrahamson, 819 N.W.2d at 136 ; Barry v. St. Anthony–New Brighton Indep. Sch. Dist. 282, 781 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Minn.App.2010). The ALJ panel did not err in concluding that the school district's failure to submit affidavits as to vote......