Adoption of Taylor, In re
Decision Date | 06 July 1984 |
Citation | 678 S.W.2d 69 |
Parties | In re ADOPTION OF Daniel Bert TAYLOR. 678 S.W.2d 69 |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Carl R. Ogle, Jr., Jefferson City, for appellants Kenneth and Mary Elizabeth Arnold.
Richard L. Colbert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellee Atty. Gen., for the State of Tenn.
The Appellants have appealed from a decree of the chancery court denying their petition to set aside an order allowing the adoption of their grandson by his stepfather.
On September 21, 1982, Tommy Lynn Taylor filed a petition in the chancery court of Jefferson County pursuant to T.C.A. Sec. 36-108, et seq., to adopt Daniel Bert Taylor. The petition alleged the petitioner is married to Nancy Irene Johnson, the natural mother of the child, and she joined in the petition consenting to the adoption. The court entered a decree authorizing such adoption.
On October 21, 1982, the petitioners, Kenneth Arnold and wife, Mary Elizabeth Arnold, filed a petition seeking to set aside the order allowing the adoption. The petition alleged they are the natural grandparents of the child and, since their son (who was the natural father of the child) is deceased, they should have been given notice of the petition to adopt. The petition then alleged, in broad and all-inclusive terms, that the adoption is not in the best interest of the child since no guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the child; the court was not fully advised of all relevant facts concerning the best interest of the child; the petition for adoption did not contain all facts or information required by T.C.A. Sec. 36-106; and all necessary parties were not given notice.
It is observed that the petition is totally lacking in any specifics that would alert the court to the fact there may be cause for concern about the welfare of the child or the failure of the proceedings to conform with the statute.
The petition concludes with the statement that "in the event that the Court finds that the natural grandparents have no right to notice under the circumstances contained herein or that the child has no right to representation, then Petitioners would allege that the Tennessee Statutes which deal with Adoption and the manner in which Adoptions are handled in Tennessee are contrary to the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and the United States."
The chancellor, in his determination of the case, held the petitioners were not necessary parties to the adoption proceeding nor were they entitled to notice under the statute. He also found there was no constitutional infirmity in regard to the statutory provisions relating to stepparent adoption.
Although the Appellants have presented five issues, they appear to have waived all except numbers 3 and 4. They first say, in their brief, they have been unable to find any cases which directly support the issues raised in their brief. They then say, "The issues addressed here will be whether or not Appellants are entitled to notice of a Petition for Adoption in the circumstances that are involved in this case, and whether or not they should be allowed to intervene once a Petition for Adoption has been filed." They further say, "The Appellants are not here attempting to state that they are entitled to the adoption of the child or that they are entitled to stop the adoption of the child, but simply that they should be entitled to notice and the right to intervene simply to speak to the narrow issue of 'what is in the best interest of the child.' "
Aside from the broad statement in their petition that the adoption "is not in the best interest of the minor child," there is nothing in the record to indicate that the adoption is not in the child's best interest. The petitioners have not pointed to any fact or circumstance which they contend is contrary to the child's best interest. In light of their statement that they are not now contending they "are entitled to stop the adoption of the child," it is difficult indeed to know what relief they seek. The following statement in their brief appears to express their real concern:
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the natural grandparents are entitled to notice of the adoption. We think the answer to that issue is in the negative. Since adoptions are governed by statutes which are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed. Delamotte v. Stout, 207 Tenn. 406, 340 S.W.2d 894 (1960); Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874 (1956). T.C.A. Sec. 36-108 requires the consent of the natural parents but there is nothing in the statute which could be construed to require the consent of or notice to the grandparents. In the case of In Re: Knott, 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S.W. 1097 (1917) our Supreme Court addressed the issue of notice to natural parents in adoption cases. As pertinent here, the court said:
Since our adoption statute provides for notice to and consent by the natural parents of the child to be adopted, we find no infirmity in the statute, constitutionally or otherwise, in its failure to extend that notice or consent to the grandparents.
For constitutional construction of T.C.A. Sec. 36-108, see State Dept. of Human Services v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn.App.1980).
The Appellants also insist that once they learned of the adoption they should have been permitted to intervene.
Had the petitioners shown to the satisfaction of the court that it was not in the best interest of the child to be adopted, and it was in the child's best interest for them to be permitted to intervene, the court, no doubt, would have permitted them to do so. There is nothing in the statute which provides...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
YH v. FLH
...do not have standing in adoption proceedings....") (citing In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359, 1360 (R.I.1983)); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) ("There is nothing in the statute which provides for the intervention of grandparents [in the adoption proceeding] an......
-
Mullins v. State of Or.
...that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 71-73 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (surveying law of other states and concluding that grandparents have no constitutionally protected interest in the......
-
In re: M. J. S. Adoption
...constitutionality of a statute in the absence of a showing that he or she has been adversely affected by it." In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). In In re Adoption of Taylor, for example, we held that an adoptive child's grandparents lacked standing to challen......
-
In re Adoption of D.M.
...the correctness of the mother's consent, but only the question of whether the grandparents have a preference"); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (concluding that "[t]here is nothing in the statute [that] provides for the intervention of grandparents [in the ......