Allen v. Califano

• Citation: 452 F. Supp. 205
• Decision Date: 08 February 1978
• Docket Number: 73-1142-B and B-75-462.,Civ. No. 73-1095-B
• Parties: Vernon ALLEN et al. v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary, Department of Health, Education & Welfare. Rodney L. WILSON, etc. v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., etc. Robert A. JOHNSON, etc. v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., etc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

452 F. Supp. 205

Vernon ALLEN et al. v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr.,¹ Secretary, Department of Health, Education & Welfare.

Rodney L. WILSON, etc. v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr.,¹ etc.

Robert A. JOHNSON, etc. v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr.,¹ etc.

Civ. Nos. 73-1095-B, 73-1142-B and B-75-462.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

February 8, 1978.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

C. Christopher Brown, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Randolph W. Gaines, Chief of Litigation, Office of Gen. Counsel, Social Security Div., Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., Jervis S. Finney, U. S. Atty. for the District of Maryland, Baltimore, Md., Virginia S. Draper, Asst. U. S. Atty. for the District of Maryland, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BLAIR, District Judge.

The infant plaintiffs in these three cases seek social security benefits as children of deceased, insured wage earners. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). They seek judicial review under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare disallowing the benefits sought.

Because of the nature of the issues raised in these cases a brief review of the statutory scheme providing benefits to the children of deceased individuals is essential. Generally speaking, those children who meet the age, filing and non-marriage requirements of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), and who have not been legally adopted by another, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(B),² are eligible for benefits if they were dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C)(ii). A child is deemed dependent if he was (1) living with or supported by the wage earner at the time of his death, or (2) is the legitimate child of the wage earner. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3). If a child is illegitimate, he may nonetheless be deemed legitimate for purposes of the Act (and hence deemed dependent and thus entitled to benefits) if he can make one of four showings:³

1) That the infant would be entitled to inherit personal property from the deceased wage earner under the law that would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the wage earner's state of domicile at death,⁴

2) That the deceased wage earner and the other parent of the infant went through a marriage ceremony rendered invalid by some legal insufficiency,⁵

3) That the deceased wage earner had a) acknowledged the infant claimant in writing as his or her son or daughter or b) been decreed by a court to be the claimant's parent, or c) been ordered by a court to support the claimant on the basis of parenthood,⁶ 4) That the deceased wage earner was actually living with or contributing to the support of the infant claimant at the time of the wage earner's death.⁷

Plaintiffs, all minor children born out of wedlock, contend that the Secretary erred as a matter of law in finding them ineligible for benefits. They argue first that current Maryland law⁸ should be applied to their cases and that under that law they are legitimate and therefore entitled to benefits due to the presumption of dependency found in 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3). See Massey v. Weinberger, 397 F.Supp. 817 (D.Md.1975). This contention is without merit. The choice of law rule applicable to child benefit cases is found in 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A):

In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual was domiciled . . . at the time of his death . . ..

Regulations promulgated by the Secretary serve to further define what law applies in determining the status of a child:

The relationship is determined by "applicable State law." By this is meant the law the court of the State of the domicile of such insured individual would apply in deciding who is a . . . child of such individual, when determining the devolution of such individual's intestate personal property. The domicile of such insured individual, if deceased, is determined as of the date of his death.

20 C.F.R. 404.1101(a).

In the instant cases two of the deceased wage earners died outside the State of Maryland. Clifton Berry, Jr., the alleged father of plaintiff Wilson, died in Mississippi in 1971 (Wilson R. 39); Austin Croom, the father of plaintiff Johnson, died in Pennsylvania in 1972 (Johnson R. 126). Accordingly, this court is bound by the above quoted choice of law provisions to look first to the laws of Mississippi and Pennsylvania to determine the status of Wilson and Johnson, respectively. As to plaintiffs Vernon Allen and Verzena Morris,⁹ their father, Charles W. Morris, died in Maryland in 1964 (Allen R. 47-50, 56). However, at that time the applicable Maryland law was Annotated Code of Maryland, Art. 46, § 6, a provision substantially different from its successor, Annotated Code of Maryland, Est. & Trusts Art., § 1-208, which did not go into effect until January 1, 1970. See Annotated Code of Maryland, Art. 93, § 12-101 (1969 Repl. Vol.). While both of these provisions are discussed in more detail below, at this time it is sufficient to say that the Allen plaintiffs would not be considered legitimate under Art. 46, § 6. Because that was the applicable law in the domicile of their father's death at the time of his death, it is the appropriate law to be applied by this court. Therefore, the first argument of plaintiffs in all three cases, i. e., that the children should be considered legitimate under current Maryland law, must be rejected for the reason that current Maryland law is not applicable unless it would be employed by the courts in the State of the fathers' domicile at death.¹⁰

Plaintiffs set forth a number of additional arguments which require full development of the facts in each of the three cases. Hence, these arguments are addressed separately below.

Wilson v. Califano

In 1971 Ethel G. Wilson filed an application for child insurance benefits for her son, plaintiff Rodney Wilson, on the wage record of Clifton Berry, Jr., a fully insured individual for social security purposes. (Wilson R. 27-30, 38). Her initial claim was denied as was her request for reconsideration. (Wilson R. 33-36). On October 17, 1972 she filed a request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which was held on February 26, 1973. (Wilson R. 13-14). On March 19, 1973, the ALJ rendered his decision, finding, inter alia, that Ms. Wilson had not satisfied her burden of establishing Clifton Berry's paternity of her son. (Wilson R. 9). Refusal by the Appeal Council to alter this decision (Wilson R. 3) rendered it the final decision of the Secretary. On November 21, 1973, plaintiff filed the present action in this court.

The function of this court on review is to determine whether, based on the entire record, the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and must be based on the record as a whole. Blalock v. Richardson, supra at 776. It is also a function of the court to determine whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standards, Knox v. Finch, 427 F.2d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1970), and whether his conclusions have a reasonable basis in law. Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1968).

Preliminarily, the court notes that plaintiff's mother proceeded below without benefit of counsel. As a consequence, an extremely meager record was developed. For example, the transcript of the entire hearing before the ALJ is a mere 11 pages in length. Notwithstanding this, certain matters are clear. The wage earner was found by a Maryland court to be the father of Ms. Wilson's first child, Donald Wilson, and was required to support him. (Wilson R. 23, 45-46). Ms. Wilson also filed a petition for support of Rodney, which named the wage earner as the father; this petition was filed on August 21, 1963, before Rodney was born. (Wilson R. 23, 51). According to Ms. Wilson, the wage earner admitted paternity of Rodney, as yet unborn, at some type of hearing¹¹ in January of 1964. (Wilson R. 54-55, 58-59). However, before any action could be taken on the paternity petition relating to Rodney, Berry had left the State. (Wilson R. 23, 54-55). As a result, no disposition was had on the petition. In any event, there are numerous statements in the record by Ms. Wilson asserting that Berry was the father of Rodney. (Wilson R. 28, 29, 51, 55, 58, 61). The record also contains written statements from Clotee Stewart, sister of the wage earner, and Carolyn Eddington, niece of the wage earner, stating that he had indicated to them that he was the father of Rodney.¹² (Wilson R. 62-64). Additionally, Rodney's birth certificate lists Berry as the father. (R. 56). There is no evidence in the record that Berry was not Rodney's father. In light of these factors, it cannot be said that the ALJ's finding that Berry had not been shown to be Rodney's father is supported by substantial evidence. Nor does the government seriously so contend. Therefore, for purposes of this review it must be assumed that Rodney was the child of Clifton Berry and Ethel Wilson.

Because Rodney was born out of wedlock (Wilson R. 21), his biological relationship to the wage earner will avail him nothing at this stage of the proceeding unless he can show that he is entitled to benefits under one of the four showings required of illegitimates as discussed above. Unquestionably, Berry and Ms. Wilson did not go through a marriage...