Alvarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade Cnty.

Decision Date27 November 2019
Docket NumberNo. 3D18-0447,3D18-0447
Citation305 So.3d 63
Parties Lourdes ALVAREZ-MENA and Darren Todd Mena, Appellants, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, and Detective Miguel Garcia, and Detective Evelyn Guas, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Philip D. Parrish, P.A., and Philip D. Parrish, Miami, for appellants.

Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Rachel C.G. Walters, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees.

Before SALTER, and LINDSEY, JJ., and LEBAN, Senior Judge.

LINDSEY, J.

Darren Mena and Lourdes Alvarez-Mena appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of Miami-Dade County and Detectives Evelyn Guas and Miguel Garcia. Based on the record facts, which we view in a light most favorable to the Menas, we find the County and the Detectives entitled to final summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Darren's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims because there was probable cause for his arrest. But because we find there are questions of fact as to the probable cause for Lourdes's arrest, we reverse the summary judgment on her claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Moreover, we affirm the judgment with respect to the Menas' negligent reporting claim. Finally, as to the Menas' battery claim, we also reverse because there are genuine issues of material fact.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2012, Darren Mena and Lourdes Alvarez-Mena, arrived at PreTech Academy in Miami, along with two of their children, to pick up their youngest child after his first day of preschool. A sequence of unfortunate events, the consequences of which were undoubtedly not envisioned by the Menas when they woke up that morning, resulted in their being involved in an altercation with Detectives Miguel Garcia and Evelyn Guas.

There are wildly varying versions of what transpired, but the following are uncontested record facts. While Darren waited in the car, Lourdes went into the school to pick up their child. Detectives Garcia and Guas were also in the school parking lot that day in an unmarked vehicle and wearing civilian clothing. Someone behind the Detectives honked a horn, and the Detectives moved their vehicle and circled the parking lot. Darren was parked in a designated accessible parking space for persons with disabilities when Detective Garcia approached and asked to see his disabled parking permit and driver's license.1 Detective Garcia then asked Darren why he had honked his horn. The parties dispute exactly what transpired during this exchange, but Darren admitted that his vehicle, a Ford Expedition, was equipped with a "really loud" air horn, "one of those horns that you put on the 18-wheelers." Darren also admitted that he honked his horn while Detective Garcia was talking to him, and that Garcia "got shaken up by the sound of my horn ...."

Following a heated exchange, Detective Garcia removed Darren from the vehicle and placed him under arrest. As this was going on, Lourdes exited the preschool and saw her husband being removed from his vehicle. According to Lourdes:

I'm trying to ask this gentleman [Garcia], that's pulling [Darren] out of the car, what he's doing and why he's doing that, and while I'm asking him [Guas] accuses me of hitting her partner. Which is what she said "You just hit my partner, I'm arresting you too", and she threw me against the van was the first thing she did; the van was parked next to our vehicle.

Ultimately, both Darren and Lourdes were arrested and charged with battery on a law enforcement officer, resisting an officer with violence, disruption of a school function, and breach of the peace. Upon the State's dismissal of the charges, the instant lawsuit followed.2

In the operative amended complaint, the Menas alleged claims for malicious prosecution against Detectives Garcia and Guas and claims, vicariously, against the County for false arrest, battery, and negligent reporting of a crime based on Valladares v. Bank of America, 197 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016). The County and the Detectives moved for summary judgment on the basis that there was probable cause to arrest the Menas. As such, they argued, the Menas' claims necessarily fail as a matter of law. In opposition, the Menas, relying heavily on the testimony of Leslie Castro, the school security guard, contended that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed with the County and the Detectives, finding probable cause for the Menas' arrests. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Cascar, LLC v. City of Coral Gables, 274 So. 3d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citing Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) ).

Summary judgment is proper only where the moving party shows conclusively that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When the nonmoving party has alleged affirmative defenses, the moving party must conclusively refute the factual bases for the defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient. "The burden of proving the existence of genuine issues of material fact does not shift to the opposing party until the moving party has met its burden of proof."

Johnson v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. Americas, 248 So. 3d 1205, 1207-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (quoting Coral Wood Page, Inc. v. GRE Coral Wood, LP, 71 So. 3d 251, 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Detectives and the County contend there are no genuine issues of material fact as to there being probable cause for the Menas' arrests; therefore, the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Detectives and the County should be affirmed. We agree summary judgment was appropriate as to Darren's malicious prosecution and false arrest claims because, based on the undisputed facts, there was probable cause to arrest him. However, we disagree that summary judgment was appropriate as to Lourdes's malicious prosecution and false arrest claims. We also agree that summary judgment was proper as to the Menas' claim for negligent reporting of a crime. With respect to the Menas' battery claim, we reverse the final summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact.

A. Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest

A malicious prosecution action requires the plaintiff to prove, among other elements, the absence of probable cause. See Miami-Dade County v. Asad, 78 So. 3d 660, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ("The law in Florida is well settled that a malicious prosecution action requires the plaintiff to prove all of the following six elements: (1) a criminal or civil judicial proceeding was commenced against the plaintiff; (2) the proceeding was instigated by the defendant in the malicious prosecution action; (3) the proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (4) the proceeding was instigated with malice; (5) the defendant lacked probable cause ; and (6) the plaintiff was damaged." (second emphasis added) (citing Kalt v. Dollar Rent–A–Car, 422 So.2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) )). Similarly, it is well settled that the existence of probable cause is a defense to state law claims for false arrest. See id. at 669 ; Mailly v. Jenne, 867 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("Probable cause is an affirmative defense to a false arrest claim."). In short, the Menas' claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest live or die based on whether probable cause existed for their arrests.

Probable cause exists when "the totality of the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge sufficiently warrant a reasonable person to believe that, more likely than not a crime has been committed." State v. Blaylock, 76 So. 3d 13, 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting League v. State, 778 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ). Moreover, probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).3

Finally, when the facts material to a probable cause determination are undisputed, the court determines the existence of probable cause as a matter of law. City of Pensacola v. Owens, 369 So. 2d 328, 328 (Fla. 1979) ("Where the facts are undisputed, as is the case here, the court must determine probable cause."); LeGrand v. Dean, 564 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).

Here, the undisputed facts established the existence of probable cause for Darren's arrest. It is undisputed that Darren honked his air horn in Detective Garcia's presence while in the preschool parking lot. Darren admitted that his "really loud" air horn was the same type that is found on "18-wheelers" and that when he honked, Detective Garcia was "shaken up" by the sound. This was sufficient to give rise to probable cause to arrest Darren for a violation of the Miami-Dade County noise ordinance.4 See MIAMI-DADE CTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 21-28 (2019) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to make, continue, or cause to be made or continued any unreasonably loud, excessive, unnecessary or unusual noise."); see also § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (2019) ("A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when: (1) The person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or county ordinance in the presence of the officer.").

Although the undisputed facts establish probable cause to arrest Darren, we are unable to conclude that the undisputed facts establish probable cause to arrest Lourdes. According to the record facts, which we must view in a light most favorable to the Menas, when Lourdes exited the preschool with her children, she saw Detective Garcia, whom she did not know and who was not in uniform, pulling her husband from his truck....

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4 cases
  • Andrade v. Marceno
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • January 11, 2023
    ... ... probable cause to arrest” the plaintiff. Sosa v ... Martin Cnty. , 13 F.4th 1254, 1264 (11th Cir. 2021) ... Whether an officer possessed arguable probable ... prosecution.” ... Paez , 915 F.3d at 1292 (citing Miami-Dade Cnty ... v. Asad , 78 So.3d 660, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)). See ... also Alvarez-Mena ... ...
  • Irving v. John
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • August 9, 2022
    ...So.2d at 1165 (finding no duty when the plaintiff alleged negligent supervision of an investigation); Alvarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade County, 305 So.3d 63, 69-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (finding that no negligence claim could be brought against detectives for filing false police reports where the rep......
  • Anderson v. Ivey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • March 4, 2021
    ...are correct that the existence of probable cause bars claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution, Alvarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 305 So. 3d 63, 67-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), summary judgment cannot be granted on those claims where the facts regarding probable cause are disputed, id. at......
  • Roberson v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Fla.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 14, 2023
    ... ... malicious prosecution claims. See, e.g., ... Alvarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade County, 305 So.3d 63, ... 67-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ... ...
1 books & journal articles
  • Procedural torts
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Florida Causes of Action
    • April 1, 2022
    ...So.2d 862, 866 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). 6. Wolfe v. Foreman , 128 So.3d 67, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). 7. Alvarez-Mena v. Miami-Dade Cty. , 305 So. 3d 63, 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). §11:20.1.4 Elements of Cause of Action — 4th DCA The elements of a malicious prosecution claim are: 1. an original cri......

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