Alvis v. State
Decision Date | 19 June 1998 |
Citation | 740 So.2d 459 |
Parties | Gary Dewayne ALVIS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Gordon H. Warren, Birmingham, for appellant.
Gary Dewayne Alvis, appellant, pro se.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Joseph G.L. Marston III, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Alabama Supreme Court 1972156.
The appellant, Gary Dewayne Alvis, pleaded guilty to rape in the first degree and to sodomy in the first degree. He was sentenced to 18 years on each count, each sentence to run concurrently with the other and with a third sentence, an appeal from which is now pending before this court. Acting pro se, he filed a "Motion to Withdraw Plea Agreement," which the trial judge denied.
The appellant first asserts that the trial judge committed reversible error by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He argued that his pleas of guilty were defective because, he says, the trial court failed to establish a factual basis for these pleas. According to Rule 14.4(e), Ala.R.Crim.P., "The court shall allow withdrawal of a plea of guilty when necessary to correct a manifest injustice." However, we will not overturn a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea unless there is a showing that the trial judge has abused his discretion. Alford v. State, 651 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Ala.Cr.App.1994).
During the hearing at which the appellant entered his pleas, the following exchange occurred between the trial judge and the appellant:
According to the appellant, this exchange was not sufficient to establish a factual basis for the plea because the trial judge, in effect, improperly took judicial notice of testimony from proceedings in another case.
The reference to the alleged victim's testimony in the appellant's prior trial and the appellant's acknowledgement of the truth of that testimony, however, was sufficient to establish a factual basis to support his guilty plea. The appellant correctly states that this Court cannot take judicial notice of other proceedings involving an appellant unless certain conditions are present and may generally consider only matters contained within the record of the case before it. See Nesby v. City of Montgomery, 652 So.2d 784, 786 (Ala.Cr. App.1994); Ex parte Cade, 521 So.2d 85, 87-88 (Ala.1987). However, the mere failure to include in the plea colloquy the detailed facts of the crimes admitted to by the appellant does not render the plea invalid. Rule 14.4(b), Ala.R.Crim.P., provides, "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court shall not enter a judgment upon such plea without being satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." Rule 14.4(b) focuses upon the satisfaction of the trial court rather than upon any requirement that certain events be described in the record. We stated in Alderman v. State, 615 So.2d 640, 647 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), Such factual basis may be shown through "several sources." Alderman, 615 So.2d at 645, citing Yamada v. State, 426 So.2d 906, 909 (Ala.1982). Not only is the reading of the indictment sufficient to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea in certain cases, but in those cases it is not required that the indictment be read into the record during the guilty plea hearing. Alexander v. State, 488 So.2d 41, 44 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). Therefore, in Alabama the factual basis for a guilty plea may be established through methods other than having the defendant, the district attorney, the trial judge, or someone else recite during the plea hearing the facts of the crimes admitted to.
Although we cannot find an Alabama case in which a factual basis for a guilty plea was established through reference to other proceedings, an Illinois court has explicitly accepted this method as valid. In People v. Ritchie, 25 Ill.App.3d 875, 877-878, 323 N.E.2d 432, 433-434 (1975), the Appellate Court for the Third District of Illinois held that the factual basis for the guilty plea could be established through the trial judge's hearing of testimony in the trial of codefendants. The court stated:
"...
(Citations omitted.) Like Illinois courts, Alabama courts have focused on the trial court's satisfaction that the defendant understands the nature of the crime to which he or she is pleading guilty rather than on whether the record contains any detailed description of the crimes. Therefore, following the reasoning of...
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Scott v. State
...[and] in those cases it is not required that the indictment be read into the record during the guilty plea hearing." Alvis v. State, 740 So.2d 459, 461 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998). It is clear from our review of the record that Scott was aware of the nature and elements of the charges against him ......
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Ex Parte State (in Re G.E.G. v. State ).
...[and] in those cases it is not required that the indictment be read into the record during the guilty plea hearing.” Alvis v. State, 740 So.2d 459, 461 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). “A guilty plea, if entered voluntarily and with understanding of the consequences, waives all non-jurisdictional defec......
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G.E.G. v. State
...[and] in those cases it is not required that the indictment be read into the record during the guilty plea hearing.’ Alvis v. State, 740 So.2d 459, 461 (Ala.Crim.App.1998).”Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2005); see also, Sellers v. State, 935 So.2d 1207, 1214–15 (Ala.Crim.......