Amen v. City of Dearborn

• Decision Date: 06 October 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 82-1281,82-1282,s. 82-1281
• Citation: 718 F.2d 789
• Parties: Katherine AMEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF DEARBORN, A Municipal Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 789

718 F.2d 789

Katherine AMEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF DEARBORN, A Municipal Corporation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

Nos. 82-1281, 82-1282.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 22, 1983.

Decided Oct. 6, 1983.

William C. Hultgren, Frank A. Guido (argued), Dearborn, Mich., for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.

Michael J. Barnhart (argued), Barnhart & Mirer, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants.

Before CONTIE, Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judges.

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is the second appeal in this class action brought on behalf of present and former residents of the South End and Eugene-Porath neighborhoods in the southeast section of Dearborn, Michigan. Senior District Judge Ralph M. Freeman held, inter alia, that the City of Dearborn had engaged in an unconstitutional course of conduct which deprived plaintiffs of their private property without just compensation. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F.Supp. 1267 (E.D.Mich.1973). On the prior appeal, this court remanded on jurisdictional grounds without addressing the substantive merits of the dispute. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.1976). On remand, the district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the City pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, and thereafter reinstated its former judgment. The present appeal followed, with the City challenging the decision of the district court on the merits and also the finding of jurisdiction under Sec. 1331. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the district court's refusal to find jurisdiction over the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C Sec. 1343(3). Reference is made to the reported decision of the district court for a detailed recitation of pertinent facts. See 363 F.Supp. at 1271-76.

For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the district court is affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The complaint in this case was filed in October 1971. Jurisdiction over the City was predicated upon two grounds, the general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, ¹ and the civil rights jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3). ² Relying upon City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973) and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 reh'g denied, 412 U.S. 963, 93 S.Ct. 2999, 37 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1973), the district court held that the City could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and its jurisdictional statute, Sec. 1343(3). See 363 F.Supp. at 1270. However, the court concluded that the City could be sued directly for fourteenth amendment violations under Sec. 1331. Id.

On appeal, this court affirmed the district court's conclusion that jurisdiction over the City could not lie under Sec. 1343(3). ³ See 532 F.2d at 558. Although noting that the City could be sued directly for fourteenth amendment violations under Sec. 1331, ⁴ this court found the record insufficient as to whether each plaintiff satisfied Sec. 1331's jurisdictional amount requirement. Id. at 559-60. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302 n. 11, 94 S.Ct. 505, 512 n. 11, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) (under Sec. 1331 each class member asserting "separate and distinct claims" had to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement). Accordingly, the cause was remanded "in order that the District Court may make specific and detailed findings of jurisdiction." 532 F.2d at 560, quoting Patrician Towers Owners, Inc. v. Fairchild, 513 F.2d 216, 222 (4th Cir.1975).

On remand, plaintiffs moved the district court for an order establishing procedures to be followed in determining the amount in controversy as to each class member. Additionally, plaintiffs requested the court to make a finding of jurisdiction under Sec. 1343(3) in light of the intervening decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). It was plaintiffs' position that if Sec. 1343(3) jurisdiction could be established in light of Monell, each member of the class would not have to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum since Sec. 1343(3) does not require any monetary amount to be in controversy.

In an unreported memorandum opinion Judge Freeman denied plaintiffs' bid to establish jurisdiction under Sec. 1343(3), holding that consideration of Monell would be to act "far beyond the scope of the Court of Appeals' mandate." Amen v. City of Dearborn, No. 37242, slip op. at 6 (E.D.Mich. Dec. 26, 1979). In an unpublished order, this court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend the mandate for consideration of Monell. ⁵ Amen v. City of Dearborn, No. 74-1650 (6th Cir. March 21, 1980).

Thereafter, the district court began developing procedures to determine whether the individual class members could satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. During this process, however, Congress amended Sec. 1331 to eliminate the jurisdictional amount requirement. ⁶ See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendment Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (Supp. IV 1980)). Relying upon the explicit language of Sec. 4 of the Act, which states that the Act shall apply immediately to any "pending" civil action, the district court held that it had jurisdiction under Sec. 1331 notwithstanding the amount in controversy.

On appeal, the City contends that the district court violated this court's mandate and the law of the case doctrine in finding subject-matter jurisdiction under Sec. 1331, as amended. Plaintiffs cross-appeal the district court's refusal to consider jurisdiction under Sec. 1343(3). We find these claims to be without merit and hold that the district court properly found jurisdiction over the City under the amended version of Sec. 1331.

The district court did not go beyond the terms of the mandate on remand. The mandate directed the district court to make findings of jurisdiction under Sec. 1331. This is precisely what the district court did in analyzing and applying the amended version of Sec. 1331.

The Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendment clearly applies to the instant case. The effective date of the Act was December 1, 1980. Section 4 of the Act provides that the Act "shall apply to any civil action pending on the date of enactment of this Act." It is evident that the issue of jurisdiction under Sec. 1331 was "pending" on the effective date of the Act since it was under further consideration pursuant to this court's mandate. The courts have applied the Act retroactively and to actions pending appeal. See, e.g., Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 732 & n. 12 (7th Cir.1982); Eikenberry v. Callahan, 653 F.2d 632, 635, 636 (D.C.Cir.1981); Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68, 85 (2d Cir.1981); Theriault v. Brennan, 641 F.2d 28, 29 n. 1 (1st Cir.1981).

Our decision is supported also by the legislative history of the Act. Congress stated unequivocally its intent "that this bill shall apply to any civil action pending in Federal court on the date of enactment. By putting congressional intent into immediate effect, this provision will eliminate on-going jurisdictional battles, thus saving valuable court time." H.R.Rep. No. 96-1461, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5063, 5066 (emphasis added). In the instant case it is undisputed that the parties have been engaged in an on-going jurisdictional battle. This battle was resolved by the application of Sec. 1331, as amended. To ignore the amended version of Sec. 1331 not only would frustrate the intent of Congress, but would result in an unnecessary and unreasonable expenditure of time and money in this protracted litigation.

The City argues further that the district court violated the law of the case doctrine in applying Sec. 1331, as amended. See In re United States Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 493-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 71, 38 L.Ed.2d 110 (1973), for a discussion of the law of the case doctrine. The short answer to this claim is that the law of the case doctrine does not foreclose reconsideration of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Green v. Department of Commerce, 618 F.2d 836, 839 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1980); Potomac Passengers Assoc. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 520 F.2d 91, 95 n. 22 (D.C.Cir.1975). Moreover, the doctrine is not so rigid as the rule of res judicata, Southern Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319, 43 S.Ct. 126, 126-27, 67 L.Ed. 283 (1922), and there is a well-recognized exception that the doctrine must yield to an intervening change of controlling law between the date of the first ruling and the retrial. See EEOC v. International Longshoremen's Assoc., 623 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 1997, 68 L.Ed.2d 310 (1981); In re United States Steel Corp., supra, 479 F.2d at 494; 1B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 0.404, at 575-76 (1982).

Accordingly, we hold that the district court acted properly in finding jurisdiction over the City under the amended version of Sec. 1331.

Plaintiffs' sole contention in their cross-appeal is that the district court erred in refusing to apply Monell, supra, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), on remand to establish jurisdiction over the City through 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343(3). Plaintiffs' claim for relief under Sec. 1983 was dismissed by the district court in 1973 and this court affirmed the dismissal two years before the Supreme Court decided Monell. The merits of the cross-appeal are largely irrelevant in light of our holding that jurisdiction over the City exists under Sec. 1331. Accordingly, we need not decide whether Sec. 1343(3) would be an additional and proper jurisdictional bases for this action. Cf. Moore v. Zarra, 700 F.2d...