Ammons v. State
| Decision Date | 28 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-0109-CR-398.,49A05-0109-CR-398. |
| Citation | 770 N.E.2d 927 |
| Parties | Fermon L. AMMONS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Patricia Caress McMath, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Fermon Ammons ("Ammons") was charged by Information with possession of cocaine, a Class C felony,1 possession of cocaine and a firearm, a Class C felony,2 and carrying a handgun without a license, a class A misdemeanor.3 Ammons brings this interlocutory appeal following the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Ammons raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as follows:
On April 11, 2001, around 4:30 a.m., Indianapolis Police Department officer Ryan Clark ("Officer Clark") initiated a traffic stop of a car driven by Ammons. Ammons had failed to signal for a turn. Officer Clark approached the passenger's side of Ammons' car, while a back-up police officer, Officer Stout, approached the driver's side. Officer Stout asked Ammons for his driver's license and registration. Ammons did not have either. Ammons told the officers his name. Officer Stout asked Ammons to exit his vehicle so that he would not have to stand in the street while obtaining additional information. Ammons walked to the rear of his car where Officer Stout wrote down additional information.
When asked whether he possessed weapons or drugs, Ammons replied no. Officer Stout then asked Ammons "if he would mind if we searched his car?" Ammons stated "he didn't mind." Prior to searching the vehicle, Officer Stout conducted a pat-down of Ammons. During this pat-down, Officer Stout found cocaine in Ammons' left front pocket. At that point, Ammons was placed under arrest and Officer Clark began a search of the car. Officer Clark found a loaded handgun on the floor next to the center console on the driver's side.
Ammons was charged by Information on April 12, 2001. Prior to trial, Ammons filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine and gun. At the June 22, 2001 motion to suppress hearing, the trial court appeared to grant the motion with regard to the cocaine but deny the motion with regard to the gun. However, at the end of the hearing, the State raised the issue of whether the inevitable discovery rule was applicable, to which the trial court replied that the parties would be permitted to further brief the issue. On July 27, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to suppress as to both the cocaine and the gun. The trial court subsequently granted Ammons' petition to certify an order for interlocutory appeal and this Court accepted jurisdiction on October 5, 2001.
Ammons contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress "because the cocaine and the handgun were found pursuant to searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution." Appellant's Brief at 4. More specifically, Ammons argues that the arresting police officers exceeded the scope of a traffic stop, did not receive Ammons' voluntary consent to search his car, and that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to remedy these deficiencies. We address each of these arguments in turn.
Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is similar to other sufficiency issues. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.1997). We determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court's denial of the motion. Id. "We do not reweigh the evidence and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling." Id. However, this review is different from other sufficiency matters in that we must also consider uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Caudle v. State, 749 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. Wilson v. State, 754 N.E.2d 950, 954 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to a person's effects, which include automobiles, though to a lesser degree than it protects homes. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ind.1995) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-440, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973)). Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Automobiles are among the "effects" protected by Article I, Section 11. Brown, 653 N.E.2d at 79 (Ind.1995). "The purpose of Article One, section Eleven is to protect from unreasonable police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private." Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. (quoting Brown, 653 N.E.2d at 79). Both trial and appellate courts consider "each case on its own facts to decide whether the police behavior was reasonable." Id. Generally, a search warrant is a prerequisite to a constitutionally proper search and seizure. Ratliff v. State, 753 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ind.App.2001). In cases involving a warrantless search, the State bears the burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Under the Indiana Constitution the State must show that a search was reasonable in light of the totality of circumstances. Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ind.1999).
In the instant case, the intersection of law and fact takes place within the context of a traffic stop.
A traffic stop is more akin to an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than a custodial arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 334 (1984). The United States Supreme Court in Terry stated the issue of unreasonableness of an investigative stop properly considers whether the officer's actions were "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the Supreme Court observed that "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and that "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Id. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26, 75 L.Ed.2d at 238.
Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (Ind.2001).
Ammons was pulled over for failing to signal for a turn. Seated in his vehicle, Ammons was unable to produce his license or registration, but simply gave his name to Officer Stout. Officer Stout then requested that Ammons exit the vehicle.
A: Then I asked [Ammons] to walk back to the car with me so I wouldn't be standing out in the street writing the information down. We walked to the rear of the car and I obtained his information there.
(Tr. 16). In Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d at 542, the Indiana Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment permits requesting a motorist stopped for a traffic violation to exit a car. In Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 788 (Ind.2001), our supreme court held that "[a] reasonable search under [Article 1,] Section 11 [of the Indiana Constitution] would permit an officer to briefly detain a motorist only as necessary to complete the officer's work related to the illegality for which the motorist was stopped." As such, the pertinent issue remains whether Officers Clark and Stout used investigative methods that were reasonable, in scope, duration, and relation to the stop. Here, Officer Stout's request for Ammons to exit his car caused minimal intrusion, allowed Officer Stout to attain further necessary identifying information, and alleviated the need for him to continue to stand in the roadway. Accordingly, Officer Stout's request that Ammons exit the car was a reasonable one.
However, Officer Stout's subsequent pat-down of Ammons was not adequately supported by officer safety concerns and as such was unreasonable. "A routine traffic stop ... is a relatively brief encounter and `is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop" ... than to a formal arrest.'" Wilson, 745 N.E.2d at 791-92 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138)). Terry provides for a:
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely...
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