Anderson v. City of Springfield
Decision Date | 12 February 1990 |
Citation | 406 Mass. 632,549 N.E.2d 1127 |
Parties | William ANDERSON et al. 1 v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Mary Anne Stamm, Springfield, for plaintiffs.
Patricia T. Martinelli, Asst. City Sol., for defendant.
Peter Antell and Robert A. Cohen, Asst. Corp. Counsels, for City of Boston, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Present LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.
The plaintiffs appeal from the entry of summary judgment in the Superior Court in favor of the defendant. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion, and affirm.
The plaintiffs' action alleged that William Anderson was injured as a result of a defect in home plate on a softball diamond in a public park, and that the defendant's negligence caused the defect. The other plaintiffs claim loss of consortium and mental anguish derived from the injuries sustained by William Anderson.
The city relies on the Commonwealth's recreational use statute, G.L. c. 21, § 17C (1988 ed.), as an affirmative defense. General Laws c. 21, § 17C, provides:
The motion judge noted that it was undisputed that the city was the owner of the field where the injury occurred, and that it permitted the public to use the field for recreational purposes without charging a fee. He ruled, therefore, that G.L. c. 21, § 17C, applied, and since no wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct was alleged, he granted the city's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the Legislature did not intend to include the Commonwealth or any of its subdivisions within the meaning of the term "owner[s] of land" in G.L. c. 21, § 17C. In support of this contention, the plaintiffs point to the fact that G.L. c. 21, § 17C, was passed prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258, and that Massachusetts governmental entities were therefore already largely immune from civil liability at the time when the statute was passed.
General Laws c. 21, § 17C, has not been interpreted in any previous decision of this court or the Appeals Court. The United States Court of Appeals for the First...
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