Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 07 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. B101751,B101751
• Citation: 54 Cal.App.4th 53,62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2603, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4547 LOS ANGELES LINCOLN PLACE INVESTORS, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 600

62 Cal.Rptr.2d 600

54 Cal.App.4th 53, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2603,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4547

LOS ANGELES LINCOLN PLACE INVESTORS, LTD., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. B101751.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

April 7, 1997.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1997.

Review Denied July 9, 1997.

James K. Hahn, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Anthony Saul Alperin, Assistant City Attorney, and Jeri L. Burge, Deputy City, for Defendants and Appellants.

Irell & Manella and Allan J. Abshez, Elizabeth A. Camacho, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

TURNER, Presiding Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The City of Los Angeles ("city") appeals from a judgment declaring Los Angeles Municipal Code section 91.0303(a)(5) ¹ unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs, Los Angeles Lincoln Place Investors, Ltd. ("Lincoln") and Elkgrove Investors, Ltd. ("Elk"). The trial court found that the ordinance was preempted by Government Code section 7060 et seq. (commonly known as the "Ellis Act") and ordered the city to issue a demolition permit to plaintiffs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Plaintiffs cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment which concludes the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to them. Plaintiffs seek a clarification declaring the ordinance invalid as to any owner seeking to withdraw accommodations within the meaning of the Ellis Act. In the published portion of this opinion, we address the issue of whether the Ellis Act prohibited the city from imposing the disputed conditions on the issuance of a demolition permit. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

The mandate petition, which was filed on October 19, 1995, sought: a declaration that former section 91.0303(a)5, was invalid; an injunction prohibiting the city from enforcing former section 91.0303(a)5; and a writ of mandate compelling the city to issue a demolition permit to plaintiffs for a two-story, seventeen-unit apartment building, a laundry room and two detached garages, on lot 7 of tract 15124, commonly known as 960 Elkland Place. The petition alleged Lincoln was the beneficial owner of the property while Elk held the legal title. Plaintiffs sought to exercise their rights to demolish the building pursuant to Government Code section 7060 et seq., commonly known as the "Ellis Act." Acting through their demolition contractor, Sovereign Contractor, Inc., plaintiffs attempted to obtain a permit to demolish the building beginning in August 1995. Sovereign filed and sought to process a standard demolition permit application with the city's Department of Building and Safety ("department"). Section 91.0303(a) provides the department shall issue a demolition permit once it has determined the plans are in conformity with relevant city codes and ordinances. Plaintiffs complied or offered to comply with the codes and ordinances. The department refused to further process the permit based on section 91.0303(a)(5). That provision of law provides that a demolition permit shall be withheld until any plans to construct a condominium, stock cooperative or community apartment project are approved by the city. Also, section 91.0303(a)(5) provided a demolition permit could be withheld if the owner waived "the right to construct on the subject lot, a condominium, stock cooperative or community apartment project for a period of ten years from the date of the demolition...." The city answered the petition and asserted a number of affirmative defenses including plaintiffs' alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the claims for declaratory relief and writ of mandate on December 20, 1995. They asserted former section 91.0303(a)(5) was unlawful and invalid because it conflicted with the Ellis Act. The city opposed the motion on the following grounds: plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies in that they could have but did not seek a "slight modification" and obtained a waiver or alternation of the requirements pursuant to section 98.0403.1(a)(10); the Ellis Act did not preempt enforcement of section 91.0303(a)(5) because pursuant to Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (1) the act did not intend to "[i]nterfere with local government authority over land use, including regulation of the conversion of existing housing to condominiums or other subdivided interests"; section 91.0303(a)(5) did not impose substantive barriers to a landowner's right to go out of business but only constituted a procedural requirement; section 91.0303(a)(5) related to the future uses of the property on which the demolition was sought as a factor in maintaining the consistency of the city's general plan as mandated by Government Code section 66474.61; and the Ellis Act was inapplicable to this case pursuant to Government Code section 7060.7, subdivision (3) because plaintiffs were only seeking to withdraw 17 of 795 residential units which was fewer than all accommodations from the housing market.

After taking the matter under submission, the trial court granted the writ of mandate and declared that section 91.0303(a)(5) was invalid as applied to plaintiffs' demolition permit applications in that it conflicted with the Ellis Act. The trial court concluded the ordinance improperly sought to restrain plaintiffs from obtaining demolition permits by requiring future land use approvals and by imposing penalties for the lack of such approval. The trial court further determined that plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies. The trial court ordered the city to issue the demolition permits. The trial court entered judgment on April 4, 1996. The city filed a timely appeal. Plaintiffs filed a timely cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to them seeking clarification that the ordinance was invalid on its face.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Standard of Review

The city argues the trial judge erred in declaring section 91.0303(a)(5) unconstitutional and issuing a writ of mandate compelling the city to issue the demolition permits pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The Supreme Court has held: "Generally, a writ will lie when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy; the respondent has a duty to perform; and the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to performance. [Citations.]" (Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 925, 132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565.) When there is review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, courts apply the following standard of review: " ' "[J]udicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the [agency] to determine whether [its] action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether [it] has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law." ' [Citations.]" (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 34-35, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29; accord, California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212, 157 Cal.Rptr. 840, 599 P.2d 31.) Because the present case involves the interpretation of a statute, we engage in de novo review of the trial court's determination to issue the writ of mandate. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 828 P.2d 672; California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; e.g., Riveros v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349-1350, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 238; Jefferson v. Compton Unified School Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 32, 37-38, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 474.)

B. The Preemption of The Ordinance

The city does not argue that plaintiffs were not qualified to receive the demolition permit. Rather, the city contends the trial court erroneously concluded it was required to issue the demolition permit because section 91.0303(a)(5) was preempted by the Ellis Act. Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution provides: "A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." Where a local ordinance or regulation conflicts with general laws, the municipal law is void. (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 747, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143; accord, Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534; Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 290, 219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840.) A conflict exists where the local legislation " 'duplicates [citations], contradicts [citation], or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication [citations].' " (People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 484, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150.) The Supreme Court has held: "Local legislation is 'duplicative' of general law when it is coextensive therewith. [Citation.] [p] Similarly, local legislation is 'contradictory' to general law when it is inimical thereto. [Citation.] [p] Finally, local legislation enters an area that is 'fully occupied' by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to 'fully occupy' the area [citation], or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent: '(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or...