Anonymous v. People
| Decision Date | 27 February 1964 |
| Citation | 20 A.D.2d 395,247 N.Y.S.2d 323 |
| Parties | In the Matter of ANONYMOUS adjudicated a person in need of Supervision and Lillian V. Fish, as Superintendent of Westfield State Farm, Bedford Hills, N. Y., Appellants, v. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent. In the Matter of Lillian V. FISH, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Hon. Peter M. HORN, Respondent-Appellant, for an order restraining respondent from exceeding his authority as a Judge of the Family Court. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Philip Weinberg, New York City, of counsel (Irving Galt, New York City, with him on the brief; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen.), for petitioner-respondent.
Annette Pinsky, Brooklyn, of counsel (Charles Schinitsky, Brooklyn) for appellant 'Anonymous'.
Edward J. Bloustein, New York City, for appellant Peter M. Horn.
Before BOTEIN, P. J., and VALENTE, EAGER, STEUER and WITMER, JJ.
These two appeals present questions concerning the validity of orders of disposition of the Family Court--pursuant to Sections 754 and 756 of the Family Court Act--placing 17-year-old girls in Westfield State Farm, a women's reformatory under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction.
In Anonymous v. People, the appeal is by the Superintendent of Westfield State Farm from an order of the Family Court, Bronx County, directing the placement of a 17-year-old girl in Westfield for a period not to exceed 18 months. (Matter of 'Anonymous', 40 Misc.2d 8, 242 N.Y.S.2d 571.)
In Fish v. Horn, the appeal--transferred to this Court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department, pursuant to § 5711, CPLR--is from an order of prohibition entered in an Article 78 proceeding. The order restrained a judge of the Family Court, Queens County, from holding the Superintendent of Westfield State Farm in criminal contempt for refusing to accept as an inmate a 17-year-old girl adjudicated 'a person in need of supervision' under Section 754 of the Family Court Act. (Matter of Fish v. Horn, 39 Misc.2d 121, 240 N.Y.S.2d 179.) The appeal was transferred to this Court because of the identity of legal issues with the appeal in Anonymous v. People herein.
The two girls--the subjects of the orders of the Family Court--are represented by Law Guardians, appointed pursuant to Section 242 of the Family Court Act. The Superintendent of Westfield State Farm appears by the Attorney General of the State of New York and the two Judges of the Family Court appear by private counsel.
Fish v. Horn poses two threshold procedural questions distinct from the concurrent issues in both appeals of the power of the Family Court to place persons in need of supervision in Westfield. One is the propriety of the remedy of prohibition, and the other, the power of the Family Court to punish for contempt for failure to comply with an order of disposition.
It is well settled that prohibition is the traditional remedy to determine whether a lower court is exceeding its jurisdiction. (Matter of Hogan v. Court of General Sessions, 296 N.Y. 1, 68 N.E.2d 849; People ex rel. Jerome v. Court of General Sessions, 185 N.Y. 504, 78 N.E. 149; Matter of Martinis v. Supreme Court, 20 A.D.2d 79, 244 N.Y.S.2d 949. The remaining question of the power to punish for contempt in the premises will be dealt with in the subsequent portion of this opinion.
The new state-wide Family Court Act (L.1962, ch. 686) which became effective September 1, 1962, gives the Family Court exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile delinquents and introduces a new category of a 'person in need of supervision'. Section 712, subd. (a), narrows the definition of a 'juvenile delinquent' to a 'person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime'. Subdivision (b) of the same section defines a '[p]erson in need of supervision' as 'a male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than eighteen years of age who is an habitual truant or who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority'.
Section 754 of the Family Court Act provides that upon an adjudication of a 'person in need of supervision', the Court shall enter an order of disposition which may discharge the person with a warning, may suspend judgment, may place the person on probation or may place such person in accord with section 756. The latter section (subd. a) provides for placement of the child 'in its own home or in the custody of a suitable relative or other suitable private person or an authorized agency, or a youth opportunity center * * *.'
In both cases considered here, there had been an adjudication that each of the 17-year-old girls was a 'person in need of supervision' in proceedings initiated by a parent of each of the girls (pursuant to Section 732, Family Court Act) charging that the girls were incorrigible, ungovernable and habitually disobedient. Following a 'dispositional hearing' (Section 743), the court in each case directed that the girl be 'placed' in Westfield State Farm for a period not to exceed 18 months.
In each instance, the Superintendent of Westfield State Farm refused to accept the girl because of lack of jurisdiction. Westfield is a women's reformatory under the jurisdiction of the State Correction Department. Under Section 2187-a of the Penal Law, dealing with commitments of female persons to reformatories, only females convicted of crimes or adjudicated to be wayward minors or juvenile delinquents can be sentenced to a reformatory. Relying on that section, the Superintendent of Westfield refused to receive girls who had been adjudicated only as 'persons in need of supervision'.
Following the rejection by the Superintendent, the girl in theBronx County case was eventually placed in the New York Training School at Hudson, New York, and the Queens County girl was remanded to the Women's House of Detention in New York City (from which she was subsequently discharged).
In each case, the Family Court Judge Justified the placement of the girl in Westfield by construing the term 'authorized agency' as used in Section 756 of the Family Court Act as an institution supported or controlled by the State or political subdivision thereof. But such a broad construction--which would include penal institutions--would be at cross purposes with the underlying design of the new Family Court Act in setting up the category of a 'person in need of supervision'.
In our view, the term 'authorized agency' as used in Section 756 of the Family Court Act, does not include the Westfield State Farm reformatory. The Legislature, in establishing a new class of persons, whose conduct--though not criminal--nevertheless required some court action, specifically differentiated such persons from the 'juvenile delinquent'; and carefully made the distinction between 'placing' persons in need of supervision in the custody of an authorized agency and 'committing' juvenile delinquents.
The impelling considerations which led to this differentiation are not matters of pure conjecture. In the Second Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization dealing with the proposed new statewide Family Court Act (McKinney's 1962 Session Laws, Vol. 2, p. 3428 et seq.) it was pointed out that the decision not to authorize a commitment in the case of a person 'in need of supervision' rested upon the knowledge that '[a]ny commitment--whether 'civil' or 'criminal', whether assertively for 'punitive' or 'rehabilitative' purposes--involves a grave interference with personal liberty and is justified only by urgent reason' (p. 3435). The report continues with the observation that urgent reason has not been shown in the instance covered by the statutory definition of 'person in need of supervision'.
In unambiguous language, the Joint Legislative Committee expressed its intent regarding placement in the Westfield State Farm Reformatory. It said (p. 3439): 'The Committee does not believe that girls who have not committed any crime should be sent to such an institution'.
On the other hand, when treating with commitments for juvenile delinquency, Section 758 of the Family Court Act authorizes in specific language a commitment to Westfield State Farm. When it is considered that Sections 2187 and 2187-a of the Penal Law provide for commitment to a reformatory--such as Westfield State Farm--females convicted of felonies and misdemeanors, and adjudicated to be wayward minors or youthful offenders, the reluctance of the Legislature to allow placement of persons in need of supervision in such an institution is quite understandable.
Further evidence of legislative intent can be spelled out from the repeal (L.1962, ch. 688) of the Girls' Term Court Act (L.1951, ch. 716) under which females between 16 and 18 years of age, could, under certain conditions, be committed to Westfield. The Family Court Act did not re-enact those repealed provisions which empowered Magistrates to commit girls, not convicted of a crime, to a reformatory.
The argument that the acts of the girls involved herein fall within the definition of a wayward minor is completely demolished by the record showing that the girls were adjudicated to be 'persons in need of supervision' and not wayward minors under Title VII-A of Part VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, Sections 913-c and 913-d of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly refer to persons 'committed' to institutions, and not 'placed' as provided for in Section 756 of the Family Court Act.
That 'authorized agency' would not include a reformatory is further demonstrated by the enactment of an amendment to Section 756 by the Legislature in 1963 (L.1963, c. 809, § 10) which added subdivision 'd' expanding the term 'authorized agency' to include until July 1, 1964 the state training schools established under Article Seven of the Social Welfare Law....
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