Arcelona v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 18 December 1980
• Citation: 169 Cal.Rptr. 877,113 Cal.App.3d 523
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert ARCELONA et al., Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 48625.

Page 877

169 Cal.Rptr. 877

113 Cal.App.3d 523

Robert ARCELONA et al., Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 48625.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 18, 1980.

Margaret Ryan, Marilyn A. Waller, San Francisco, for petitioners.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gloria F. DeHart, Kristofer Jorstad, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for real party in interest.

George P. Colbert, Patricia A. Byrne, San Francisco, for amicus curiae.

RACANELLI, Presiding Justice.

This is a proceeding for writ of mandate to compel discovery of certain police records. Petitioners Robert Arcelona, Anthony D. Bishop, Robert A. Firestine, Gabriel A. Griego, Kenneth Lundgreen, Peter Plate, Paul Charles Stevens and David A. Waddle have been charged in various felony actions with acts committed on the night of May 21-22, 1979, during a civil disturbance which followed the announcement of the jury verdict in the trial of former San Francisco Supervisor Dan White for the killings of Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. On October 23, 1979, petitioner Lundgreen filed a motion seeking discovery of information contained in the police personnel files of the arresting officers, David Fontana and Charles Warren, including any citizen complaints against those officers of use of excessive force or aggressive conduct or bias against homosexuals. Soon after petitioner Lundgreen filed his motion, the remaining petitioners filed similar motions. A hearing was held before the municipal court at which the parties agreed that the court would dispose of all the motions on the basis of petitioner Lundgreen's "representative" motion.

Petitioner Lundgreen's discovery motion was accompanied by a supporting declaration of counsel stating on information and belief that petitioner Lundgreen had been arrested and criminally charged in connection with the May 21-22 riot; ¹ that Lundgreen was the victim of excessive force applied by the arresting officer; that the riot was an intense confrontation between the police department and the homosexual community; that the arresting officers misperceived Lundgreen as a member of the homosexual community; that the arresting officers were biased against the homosexual community; that Lundgreen's arrest took place in the context of a series of unprovoked attacks against members of the homosexual community by police officers on the night of the riot; that it was likely that citizen complaints charging bias against homosexuals and use of excessive force had previously been filed against the arresting officers. Counsel further declared that petitioner Lundgreen's defenses to the criminal charges included 1) self-defense based on the officers' aggressive conduct and 2) false arrest based on the officers' bias against homosexuals. The information sought to be discovered included citizens' complaints of excessive force, internal investigatory information and the results of the officers' psychological stress tests. ² Respondent court denied the discovery motions on the grounds of an insufficient factual showing and concluded that a more detailed statement of facts was required relating to the circumstances of the arrest, the alleged assaults by the arresting officers and of their anti-homosexual remarks. Following petitioners' unsuccessful application for relief in the superior court, these proceedings were initiated resulting in the issuance of an alternative writ. (See Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149, 155, 118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529 P.2d 46; Brown v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 509, 515, 96 Cal.Rptr. 584, 487 P.2d 1224.) Accordingly, we turn to the merits.

I

The sanction for criminal discovery concerning the past conduct of an arresting officer finds its genesis in Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, where the court noted that, unlike the statutory development in the civil area, discovery in criminal proceedings "is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation.... Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information." (Id., at p. 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.) Thus, in contrast to the rules of civil discovery which require a showing of good cause based upon specific facts justifying discovery (Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1985, 2036), "an accused in a criminal prosecution may compel discovery by demonstrating that the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. (Citations.) The requisite showing may be satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for discovery other than 'a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.' " (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 536-537, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.)

The Pitchess court held that a defendant who claims self-defense to a charge of battery upon a police officer is entitled to discover materials in possession of the police department concerning any propensity of the officer to commit acts of violence. The defendant in Pitchess was found to have demonstrated good cause for discovery where the information sought was 1) relevant to his defense of self-defense (see Evid. Code, § 1103 regarding admissibility of prior acts), 2) necessary in that the defendant could not readily obtain the information through his own efforts, and 3) described with adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that the defendant was engaging in a "fishing expedition." (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 537-538, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.)

As noted, the standards of criminal discovery enunciated in Pitchess evolved "in the absence of legislation." (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 535-536, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305; see also Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816, 112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353.) However, in 1978 the Legislature ended its silence in this area of criminal discovery by enacting legislation providing that "peace officer personnel records and records (of citizens' complaints) ..., or information obtained from such records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Section 1043 of the Evidence Code...." (Pen. Code, § 832.7.) The companion enactment requires a written motion supported by affidavits showing "good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof ... and stating upon reasonable belief that such governmental agency ... has such records or information ...." (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) Access to such information is expressly assured provided it is "relevant to the ... pending litigation." (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (a).) But in determining relevancy of the requested information, the court must conduct an in-camera examination and shall exclude from disclosure, inter alia, "(i)n any criminal proceeding the conclusions of any officer investigating a (citizen's) complaint ...." (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b)(2).) The record manifests a failure to comply with the prescribed statutory procedure.

II

In determining whether "good cause" is shown within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1043, we are guided by the definitive interpretations provided by Pitchess and its progeny since we may presume that the Legislature used that term in the precise sense which had been already placed upon it by the courts. (People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 355, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33.)

There is no doubt that petitioners' requests for records of citizens' complaints and the names and addresses of the complainants and witnesses will facilitate the ascertainment of facts concerning prior conduct of the arresting officers. Petitioners would have no feasible way of ascertaining whether any complaints had been made against the officers except by obtaining such information from the police department. We therefore conclude that petitioners demonstrated good cause for discovery of the requested information relating to citizens' complaints and witnesses (see fn. 2, items 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6). (Cadena v. Superior Court (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 212, 220, 146 Cal.Rptr. 390; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 828, 133 Cal.Rptr. 325; Caldwell v. Municipal Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 377, 380, 129 Cal.Rptr. 834; Hinojosa v. Superior Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 692, 697, 127 Cal.Rptr. 664; In re Valerie E. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 213, 219, 123 Cal.Rptr. 242.) Contrary to respondent court's ruling, counsel's supporting declaration outlining the events of May 21-22 provided adequate factual details demonstrating the manner in which the requested records pertained to his client's possible defenses. Thus, the declaration provided an adequate factual foundation establishing a plausible justification for discovery. (Cf. Tyler v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 82, 88, 162 Cal.Rptr. 82.)

However, with respect to information regarding civil lawsuits by citizens who may not have lodged an administrative complaint, we conclude petitioners have failed to demonstrate good cause since there is no showing...