Arthur N., In re

• Decision Date: 21 May 1975
• Citation: 121 Cal.Rptr. 615,48 Cal.App.3d 359
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re ARTHUR N., a person coming under the juvenile court law. Leroy FORD, Probation Officer of the County of Yolo, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTHUR N., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 13875.

Page 615

121 Cal.Rptr. 615

48 Cal.App.3d 359

In re ARTHUR N., a person coming under the juvenile court law.

Leroy FORD, Probation Officer of the County of Yolo, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTHUR N., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 13875.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

May 21, 1975.

Rehearing Denied June 16, 1975.

Hearing Granted July 16, 1975.

Robert L. Walker, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., by Gregory W. Baugher, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.

Arthur N., a minor, having been found to be a person described by section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ¹ was declared a ward of the juvenile court in 1970. ² Thereafter, in hearings on supplemental petitions (§ 777) he was continued in that status. At the time of the offense here in issue, he was a ward of the court and in the physical custody of his mother pursuant to the court's most recent dispositional order.

This appeal arises from a proceeding initiated by supplemental petition filed by the probation officer on May 4, 1972, requesting that the previous disposition be changed, modified, or set aside (§ 775) because Arthur allegedly had committed a robbery (Pen.Code, § 211) on April 27, 1972.

After a contested hearing, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the supplemental petition, ordered that Arthur remain a ward of the court as a person continuing to be within the provisions of section 602, and committed him to the California Youth Authority. ³

The sole contention made by the minor on this appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to show 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that (1) he took property from (2) the person or immediate presence of the victim. (See Pen.Code, § 211; People v. Hornes (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 314, 319-321, 335 P.2d 756.) In response, the Attorney General argues that a proceeding on a supplemental petition to change a prior dispositional order is in the nature of a probation violation hearing and that even where the supplemental petition alleges a new crime, its allegations need only be proved 'clearly and satisfactorily' and not 'beyond a reasonable doubt.'

We reject the minor's contention that the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard was applicable to his 1972 dispositional hearing, but because the record is susceptible to the interpretation that an inappropriate standard of proof was applied by the trial court, we find it necessary to reverse the judgment.

The juvenile court law (ch. 2 of pt. 1 of div. 2 of the Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 500-945) is of scant assistance in divining the standard of proof applicable to hearings on supplemental petitions. The converse is true of hearings on original petitions, at least the first phase thereof in which jurisdiction is established.

Hearings on original petitions are governed by article 8 of the juvenile court law (§§ 675-708). As originally enacted section 701 provided that 'the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is a person described by [Section] . . . 602, and for this purpose, any matter or information relevant and material to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence; however, a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 602, . . .' (Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, p. 3482.) In 1969 the Supreme Court, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, held that the required standard of proof by 'a preponderance of evidence' to sustain a jurisdictional finding, did not violate due process or equal protection of the law. (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 460, 75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296.)

In 1970 the federal Supreme Court held that constitutional due process required proof beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the jurisdiction of a juvenile court over a minor charged with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 367, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.) The holding in Winship was expressly limited to the adjudicatory phase of juvenile court proceedings. (Id. at p. 366, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068; see also In re Kenneth W. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122, 91 Cal.Rptr. 702; In re Samuel Z. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 565, 569, 89 Cal.Rptr. 246; In re C. D. H. (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 230, 233-234, 86 Cal.Rptr. 565.) In response to Winship, the Legislature amended section 701 by striking the standard of proof by 'a preponderance of evidence' and substitution therefor the requirement of 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' (Stats.1971, ch. 934, p. 1833.)

The scope of the holding in Winship has arguably been extended to supplemental proceedings by two later decisions of the Court of Appeal (In re Donna G. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 890, 86 Cal.Rptr. 421; In re Francis W. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 117 Cal.Rptr. 277).

In earlier of the two cases, In re Donna G., supra, the court was confronted with the claim that the statutory provision governing supplemental petitions (§ 777) was unconstitutionally vague. Although rejecting the claim, the court, citing Winship and In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, stated that the test of vagueness applicable to a criminal proceeding must be applied to provisions governing supplemental proceedings, the result of which may be incarceration for treatment. (6 Cal.App.3d p. 894, 86 Cal.Rptr. 421.) However indisputable the principal enunciated, reliance upon Winship and Gault therefor cannot be construed as an extension by implication of the 'reasonable doubt' standard to supplemental proceedings. Gault, like Winship, is limited to the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile hearing, the decision expressly repudiating any concern with the post-adjudicative or dispositional process of juvenile proceedings. (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at p. 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428; see also In re Dennis M., supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 450, 75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296.) The sole significance of Donna G'. § reliance upon Winship and Gault to resolve a constitutional challenge to supplemental proceedings therefore is the recognition implicit therein that such proceedings must comply with 'constitutional; due process standards required of [adult] criminal proceedings.' (In re Donna G., supra, 6 Cal.App.3d at p. 894, 86 Cal.Rptr. at p. 423.)

Nonetheless, even in adult criminal proceedings 'the standard of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' applies only to the issue of guilt itself. A variety of lesser standards of proof governs other issues that may arise in the course of such proceedings: . . .' (In re Dennis M., supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 457, fn. 10, 75 Cal.Rptr. at p. 8, 450 P.2d at p. 304.) Thus to justify a revocation of probation the grounds therefor need not be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is sufficient if they are proved by clear and satisfactory evidence. (People v. Ruelas (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 71, 74, 106 Cal.Rptr. 132; People v. Youngs (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 180, 186, fn. 3, 99 Cal.Rptr. 901; People v. Hayko, 7 Cal.App.3d 604, at p. 609, 86 Cal.Rptr. 726; People v. Matranga (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 328, 333, 80 Cal.Rptr. 313.) Where the alleged violation of probation in itself constitutes a crime, circumstances not warranting conviction may justify revocation of probation. People v. Hayko, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 609, 86 Cal.Rptr. 726; People v. Matranga, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 333, 80 Cal.Rptr. 313.)

The case of In re Francis W., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d 892, 117 Cal.Rptr. 277, like the instant one, involved a hearing on a supplemental petition to modify the previous disposition of the juvenile court which had placed the minor on probation after he was adjudged a ward of the court. The supplemental petition alleged multiple violations of penal statutes. The juvenile court, in fact, conducted a two-stage hearing identical to that mandated by statute for original proceedings, the first phase of which was contested and culminated in a determination that the minor had committed violations of the criminal law. At the second or dispositional stage of the proceedings the minor was committed to the Youth Authority. On appeal the minor raised claims of constitutional dimension, attacking the admission of his confession (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694); the admission of certain physical evidence seized following a temporary detention (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889) and his judicial admission to an allegation charging excape from a boys' camp received and entered without first advising him of his rights (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274; In re Tahl (1960) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485). The Court of Appeal reasoned that where a supplemental petition charges acts which, if charged in the original petition, would call forth the protections subsumed under fundamental notions of due process, there is 'no basis in reason to distinguish between an original and a supplementary proceeding' and the minor is entitled in each proceeding to the identical constitutional rights. (In re Francis W., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 898, 117 Cal.Rptr. at p. 280.) For its holding the court relied among other authorities upon In re Winship, supra.

We can entertain no doubt that supplemental proceedings which may result in a substantial loss of personal freedom are circumscribed by the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution as well as by the requirements of due process under the state Constitution. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484; Cal.Const., art. I, § 13; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 455, 105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313.) Reliance on Francis W., however, for the...