Ashley Hale v. Ronald King

• Citation: 624 F.3d 178
• Decision Date: 14 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. 07-60997.,07-60997.
• Parties: John Ashley HALE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald KING, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Margaret Bingham, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Mississippi Department of Corrections; Mike Hatten, Health Service Administrator of Wexford for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe, Physician at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Zandu, Psychiatrist at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility; Doctor Patrick Arnold, Physician for Correctional Medical Services at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Williams, Psychiatrist of Correctional Medical Services for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Trinca, Physician for Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Miriam Moulds, Kitchen Supervisor at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe 2, Chief Executive Officer of Correctional Medical Services for Mississippi Department of Corrections; John Doe 3, Chief Executive Officer of Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution for Mississippi Department of Corrections; Doctor McCleave; Doctor Woodall; Wexford Health Services, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

624 F.3d 178

John Ashley HALE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Ronald KING, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Margaret Bingham, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Mississippi Department of Corrections; Mike Hatten, Health Service Administrator of Wexford for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe, Physician at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Zandu, Psychiatrist at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility; Doctor Patrick Arnold, Physician for Correctional Medical Services at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Williams, Psychiatrist of Correctional Medical Services for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Doctor Trinca, Physician for Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; Miriam Moulds, Kitchen Supervisor at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; John Doe 2, Chief Executive Officer of Correctional Medical Services for Mississippi Department of Corrections; John Doe 3, Chief Executive Officer of Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution for Mississippi Department of Corrections; Doctor McCleave; Doctor Woodall; Wexford Health Services, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 07-60997.

United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 14, 2010.

624 F.3d 179

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

624 F.3d 180

Jeffrey Scott Levinger (argued) (Court-Appointed), Hankinson Levinger, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Hale.

Dirk Christian Phillips (argued), Diana Katherine Flynn, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Rights Div., App. Section, Washington, DC, for U.S.

Pelicia E. Hall, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Charles Baron Irvin, Jackson, MS, for King, Epps, Hatten and Margaret Bingham.

Katie Lofton Wallace, Brunini, Grantham, Grower & Hewes, P.L.L.C., Jackson, MS, for Arnold.

Joseph A. O'Connell, III, Vardaman Kimball Smith, III, Bryan Nelson, P.A., Hattiesburg, MS, for Trinca, McCleave, Woodall and Wexford Health Services.

Robert Lawson Holladay, Sr., Townsend, McWilliams & Holladay, L.L.P., Drew, MS, for Moulds.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Before JOLLY, SMITH and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The district court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to the claims of disabled inmates who were denied access to prison educational and work programs.

624 F.3d 181

Hale v. Mississippi, No. 2:06-CV-245, 2007 WL 3357562 (S.D.Miss. Nov. 9, 2007). Because Congress's authorization of those claims is not “congruent and proportional” to the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, we affirm.

I.

While a state prisoner, John Hale filed a pro se complaint in forma pauperis against prison officials in their official capacity, alleging violations of the ADA. ¹ Specifically, he claims they discriminated against him in violation of title II of the ADA ² because he suffers from Hepatitis C, post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic depression, intermittent explosive disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. Under prison regulations, those health problems required Hale to be classified as “medical class III,” a designation limiting his work and program assignments, thus giving him fewer opportunities to earn “meritorious earned time.” Hale maintains that because of his classification, the defendants prevented him from using the community work centers, accessing the satellite and regional prison facilities, working in the kitchen, and attending school.

The district court dismissed on the ground that the officials are entitled to state sovereign immunity. The court acknowledged that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it did so in the ADA. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Nonetheless, the court reasoned that Congress's § 5 powers do not extend to creating causes of actions for ADA violations that are not “congruent and proportional” to violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997).

After Hale filed his pro se brief on appeal, we appointed counsel to file a supplemental brief to address the question “whether Title II of the ADA validly abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for claims that violate Title II but are not actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The United States intervened and submitted a brief supporting Hale's position.

II.

The district court acted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which allows it to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” We review such dismissals de novo. Praylor v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir.2005).

The ADA provides that “[a] State shall not be immune” from suits under the act because of sovereign immunity. 42 U.S.C. § 12202. Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity with such unequivocal statements, but only where it “act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (alteration in original) (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)). There is only one source of such authority: the

624 F.3d 182

enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 364, 121 S.Ct. 955. “Accordingly, the ADA can apply to the States only to the extent that the statute is appropriate § 5 legislation.” Id.

Nonetheless, “no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to ‘enforce ... the provisions' of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158, 126 S.Ct. 877 (alteration in original). Thus, the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity insofar as it “creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 159, 126 S.Ct. 877.

The parties agree that none of the defendants' alleged misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Where there is no such violation, there is a three-step process for determining whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity with respect to that conduct. The court must determine,

on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.

Id.

A.

The defendants and the United States contend that the district court failed to apply the first step of the Georgia test because it did not determine whether Hale had established a prima facie title II claim. Thus, they argue that we should remand to complete that inquiry.

Step one of Georgia does not require a prima facie showing of a title II claim. The purpose of step one, understood in context, is to ensure that the court knows “precisely what conduct [the plaintiff] intend[s] to allege in support of his Title II claims.” Id. Remand was necessary in Georgia because the pro se litigant had pleaded a number of “ ‘frivolous claims'-some of which are quite far afield from actual constitutional violations ..., or even from Title II violations.” Id. Thus, it was not obvious which conduct the Court was supposed to evaluate as part of the sovereign immunity inquiry. By contrast, Hale's pleadings are pellucid, and the district court identified the precise conduct that he alleges violated the ADA. ³ Accordingly, “[w]e see...