Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission of City of Danbury

• Decision Date: 01 December 1970
• Parties: , 2 ERC 1164, 1 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,192 AUNT HACK RIDGE ESTATES, INC. v. PLANNING COMMISSION OF the CITY OF DANBURY et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 880

273 A.2d 880

160 Conn. 109, 2 ERC 1164, 1 Envtl.

L. Rep. 20,192

AUNT HACK RIDGE ESTATES, INC. v. PLANNING COMMISSION OF the CITY OF DANBURY et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 1, 1970.

Louis A. DeFabritis, Danbury, for plaintiff.

Robert N. Talarico, Assistant Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Richard L. Nahley, Danbury, for defendants.

Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, COTTER, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

ALCORN, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff submitted a plan for a subdivision to the defendant commission which it refused to approve because the plan did not provide an open space for a park or playground. The plaintiff brought this action in the Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment and ancillary injunctive relief. The questions to which answers are sought are: (1) 'Whether Section 2.3 of the Regulations of the Planning Commission of the City of Danbury is unconstitutional'; and (2) 'Whether that portion of Section 8-25 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which pertains to open spaces for parks and playgrounds, which is quoted * * * in the Stipulation of Facts, is unconstitutional.' The case comes to us on a reservation by the Superior Court on stipulated facts.

The plaintiff acquired about 275 acres of undeveloped land in Danbury in 1958. The regulations of the planning commission of the city of Danbury then in force did not require that a subdivision plan show an area for a park or playground. In 1965, § 2.3 of the subdivision regulations was adopted, the material portion of which provides: 'The Commission may require that a plan of subdivision show an area for park or playground. Such an area, if required, shall be at a rate of not more than four percent of the total area to be approved for subdivision, but not less than 10,000 square feet. The area shall, in the opinion of the Commission, be suitable for recreational use and located so as to fit in with a city wide recreation plan; it may be required to be contiguous with open spaces of neighboring subdivisions. It shall in all cases be available and accessible to all residents of the subdivision.' Thereafter, on April 3, 1968, the plaintiff submitted a plan for a subdivision containing eleven lots which was complete in all respects except that the plaintiff refused to, and did not, comply with the requirement that an area for a park or playground be set aside pursuant to the quoted section of the regulations. The commission denied the plaintiff's application for a subdivision because the plan submitted did not make provision for a park or playground area.

Section 2.3 of the planning commission's regulations was adopted pursuant to § 8-25 of the General Statutes. The plaintiff claims that § 8-25 as it pertains to open spaces for parks and playgrounds is unconstitutional because it is vague and uncertain, lacks required standards, is an arbitrary and discriminatory abuse of the police power and amounts to an unauthorized tax for the use of the land. It claims that § 2.3 of the regulations is unconstitutional because it is vague and uncertain, lacks required standards, amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, is a deprivation of property rights without due process of law, is an arbitrary and discriminatory abuse of the police power and exceeds the legislative authority for its enactment.

A statute is not to be held unconstitutional unless its invalidity on that ground is established beyond reasonable doubt. Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 152, 251 A.2d 49. When the statute will serve to further the welfare of the citizens of the state, we must make every intendment in its favor. Legat v. Adorno, 138 Conn. 134, 145, 83 A.2d 185. 'Municipal planning is designed to promote, with the greatest efficiency and economy, the coordinated development of the municipality and the general welfare and prosperity of its people.' Kiska v. Skrensky, 145 Conn. 28, 32, 13, A.2d 523, 525. Section 8-25 is a part of chapter 126 of the General Statutes, which provides in general for the creation and functioning of municipal planning commissions. Section 8-23, which is also a part of chapter 126, authorizes a planning commission to adopt and amend a plan of development for the municipality embodying the commission's recommendation for the most desirable use of land, the most desirable dispersal of the density of population and, among other things, provision for streets, parks, playgrounds and utilities. The plan is required to be 'based on studies of physical, social, economic and governmental conditions and trends and shall be designed to promote with the greatest efficiency and economy the coordinated development of the municipality and the general welfare and prosperity of its people.' In short, the obvious legislative purpose disclosed by § 8-23 is to provide an agency to plan the coordinated development of the municipality in anticipation of changed conditions. Corona's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Conn. 244, 248, 259 A.2d 618. To that end chapter 126 continues with the provision in § 8-25 that no subdivision of land shall be made until a plan for such subdivision has been approved by the municipal planning commission, and it confers on the planning commission the power to adopt regulations covering the subdivision of land. Section 8-25 then directs that '(s)uch regulations shall provide that the land to be subdivided shall be of such character that it can be used for building purposes without danger to health or the public safety,' that provision be made for drainage, sewerage and flood control, the grading and improving of streets and the furnishing of the necessary public utilities. The section also provides that '(s)uch regulations shall also provide that the commission may provide open spaces for parks and playgrounds when, and in places, deemed proper by the planning commission, which open spaces for parks and playgrounds shall be shown on the subdivision plan.' In these days of burgeoning populations, critical housing problems and the incentive which they create for the activity of land developers, the need for parks, recreational areas and open space for the welfare of people looms large. Planning commission recommendations for recreational purposes, for controlling the density of population and for parks and playgrounds would be of little value if, as open spaces are built upon, reasonable provision to accomplish those purposes could not be required. 'All property is held subject to the right of the state to reasonably regulate its use.' State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 463, 165 A. 601, 604. Chapter 126 of the General Statutes has for its clear purpose such regulation in the public interest and its § 8-25 is obviously designed to implement that purpose. There can be no question that § 8-25 specifically empowers the commission to make provision in its regulations concerning open spaces for parks and playgrounds. Nor can there be any doubt that the regulations which are authorized are designed to implement the commission's planning, which 'shall be based on studies of physical, social, economic and governmental conditions and trends and shall be designed to promote with the greatest efficiency and economy the coordinated development of the municipality and the general welfare and prosperity of its people.' § 8-23.

Where a statute declares a legislative policy, establishes primary standards for carrying it out and lays down an intelligible principle to which an administrative body must conform, it may authorize the administrative body to fill in the details by prescribing rules and regulations for the enforcement of the statute. Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 340, 189 A.2d 399; Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 670, 103 A.2d 535; State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 628, 13 A.2d 586. It is clear that the Danbury planning commission can exercise only the powers which are expressly granted to it by statute or such as are necessary to enable it to discharge the duties and carry out the objects and purposes of its creation. Baker v. City of Norwalk, 152 Conn. 312, 314, 206 A.2d 428. Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court has said, the legislative process would frequently bog down if the General Assembly 'were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for each situation.' American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 142, 91 L.Ed. 103. Obviously, the General Assembly could not prescribe in detail for the countless conditions which might confront the planning commissions in the state's many cities and towns. 'As the complexity of economic and governmental conditions increases, the modern tendency is liberal in approving broad regulatory standards to as to facilitate the operational functions of administrative boards or commissions.' Forest Construction Co. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 669, 679, 236 A.2d 917, 923. In the light of the conditions to be met by the planning commission in carrying out its functions under chapter 126, § 8-25 cannot be said to be unconstitutional for vagueness or lack of standards to implement it.

The plaintiff also attacks § 2.3 of the commission's regulations on the ground that it lacks the requisite specificity and exceeds the legislative authority for its enactment. The principle that a regulation, like a statute, cannot be too general in its terms is clear. Powers v. Common Council, 154 Conn. 156, 160, 222 A.2d 337; ...