Bank of Willow Springs v. Lillibridge

• Decision Date: 14 March 1927
• Docket Number: 25955
• Parties: Bank of Willow Springs v. Inez Lillibridge, R. M. Lillibridge, Ed. Clingan, Lyman Clingan and Elizabeth Calhoun, Appellants
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

293 S.W. 116

316 Mo. 968

Bank of Willow Springs v. Inez Lillibridge, R. M. Lillibridge, Ed. Clingan, Lyman Clingan and Elizabeth Calhoun, Appellants

No. 25955

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 14, 1927

Motion for Rehearing Denied April 9, 1927.

Transferred from Springfield Court of Appeals.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

M E. Morrow for appellants.

(1) Defendant's demurrer to the petition should have been sustained because: (a) The circuit court had no original jurisdiction of the matters mentioned in the petition; (b) none of the defendants, except the two Lillibridges, as shown by the petition, claimed any interest in the subject-matter of the action, and such other "defendants were not necessary parties to a complete determination of the action;" (c) because the petition shows on its face that even if the facts be true as alleged in the petition, the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law. Secs. 62 to 65 1226, 1725, 2276, R. S. 1919. (2) Probate courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to probate business. Art. 6, Sec. 34, Mo. Constitution; Secs 189, 2542, R. S. 1919; Hammons v. Renfrow, 84 Mo. 332; Lietman v. Lietman, 149 Mo. 112; In re Hoffman Estate, 132 Mo.App. 44; Stanton v. Johnson Estate, 177 Mo.App. 54; Brewing Co. v. Steckman, 180 Mo.App. 320; McKee v. Allen, 204 Mo. 655; Clinton v. Clinton, 223 Mo. 388; Scott v. Royston, 223 Mo. 568; Hess v. Sanders, 198 S.W. 1125; Kerwin v. Kerwin, 204 S.W. 992; Vazis v. Zimmer, 209 S.W. 912; Beck v. Hall, 211 S.W. 127; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 227 S.W. 47. (3) The statutory proceeding to discover assets under Secs. 62 to 65, R. S. 1919, determines the title and rights of property in the thing involved, including commercial paper. Chandler v. Hedrick, 173 S.W. 93; Clinton v. Clinton, 223 Mo. 371. (4) And the settled and unreversed judgment of the probate court in matters within its jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, is conclusive on the parties and their privies, and all other courts, and cannot be attacked even in a direct proceeding in equity except for fraud in its procurement. Wilson v. Wilson, 255 Mo. 528; Desloge v. Tucker, 196 Mo. 601; Leahy v. Trust Co., 247 S.W. 404; Crump v. Hart, 176 S.W. 1089; Young v. Byrd, 231 Mo. 681; Smith v. Black, 231 Mo. 681; Peeters v. Schultz, 254 S.W. 182; Nelson v. Troll, 173 Mo.App. 70; Hamilton v. McLean, 169 Mo. 51; Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 587; Viehmann v. Viehmann, 250 S.W. 565; Harter v. Petty, 181 S.W. 39. (5) It is not necessary that a party must be a party to the record of a suit in order to be bound by the judgment therein. If he connects himself to the former litigation respecting the same subject-matter, employs and pays attorneys to attend to it, such acts will cause the judgment therein to bind him, even though he be not a party to the record. 23 Cyc. 1246; Wood v. Ensel, 63 Mo. 193; Young v. Byrd, 124 Mo. 590; Landis v. Hamilton, 77 Mo. 354. (6) The intentional cancellation by the holder of the note, executed by the Lillibridges to decedent, as found by the Probate Court of Howell County, was a discharge of said note. Sec. 905, R. S. 1919. (7) Pleadings in a circuit court case are not permitted to go behind a judgment of the probate court and destroy that judgment rendered on the validity of a promissory note. Clark v. Thias, 173 Mo. 643.

Green, Green & Green for respondent.

(1) The circuit court had original jurisdiction to try the cause, the probate court being a court of limited and inferior jurisdiction, having no power except that expressly conferred by statute, which power must be exercised in the manner prescribed by statute and therefore had no jurisdiction to try this cause. Secs. 62 to 66, R. S. 1919; Estate of Glover, 127 Mo. 153. (2) Probate courts possess no inherent powers, have no equitable jurisdiction, and exercise such powers only as are conferred by or implied by legislation. Estate of Glover, 27 Mo. 153. (3) In an equity case the admission or exclusion of evidence is rarely reversible error on appeal. Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256. (4) If the transfer was made for a consideration, part of which is fictitious or in excess of the amount due, then the entire conveyance is void as to creditors, if such conveyance made the intestate insolvent. Klauber v. Schloss, 198 Mo. 503; Inhoff & Co. v. McArthur, 146 Mo. 371; Erkhart v. Deitrich, 168 Mo. 298; National Bank v. Fry, 168 Mo. 492. (5) No conveyance or payment for future support is valid as against existing creditors. Massey v. McCoy, 79 Mo.App. 169; Bank v. Guthrey, 127 Mo. 193; Walther v. Null, 233 Mo. 104. (6) Neither an absolute conveyance without consideration or a voluntary gift can convey title against the existing creditors of grantor. Shanklin v. McCrackin, 151 Mo. 588; Sneider v. Free, 114 Mo. 372. (7) A conveyance in fraud of creditors can only be attacked by creditors. It is valid as to all others. Davidson v. Dockery, 179 Mo. 21; Lionberger v. Baker, 88 Mo. 661. (8) An administrator of an intestate is the personal representative of the intestate and he cannot attack any transaction of the intestate. Lewis v. American Life Ins. Co., 7 Mo.App. 114; Merry v. Fremont, 44 Mo. 518; Smith v. Smith, 183 Mo. 471; Graham v. Stafford, 171 Mo. 693; Davidson v. Dockery, 179 Mo. 687. (9) The probate court has no power to set aside a conveyance of deceased on the ground of fraud. Merry v. Fremont, 44 Mo. 518; Smith v. Smith, 183 Mo. 471.

OPINION

White, J.

This case is here on certification of the Springfield Court of Appeals, because that court deemed its decision in conflict with the ruling of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Brewing Company v. Steckman, 180 Mo.App. 320. The suit is in the nature of a creditor's bill seeking to set aside the transfer of a promissory note by C. C. Clingan, deceased, to Mrs. R. M. (Inez) Lillibridge.

C. C. Clingan died at Willow Springs, Missouri, in January, 1922. The defendant, Mrs. R. M. Lillibridge, was his daughter, R. M. Lillibridge her husband, and the other defendants his remaining children.

At the time of his death C. C. Clingan was indebted to the Bank of Willow Springs on several promissory notes aggregating $ 2411. He had been the owner of a tract of land consisting of ten acres in Howell County, described in the petition. On June 8, 1920, he conveyed that land to the defendants, Mrs. R. M. Lillibridge and her husband, for a consideration of $ 3250, of which consideration one thousand dollars was paid at the time of the conveyance, and the balance of $ 2250 was evidenced by a promissory note executed by Mrs. R. M. Lillibridge and her husband. Afterwards the Lillibridges paid part of the note until the balance due was $ 1400. It is mentioned as the $ 1400 note. Prior to his death in January, 1922, C. C. Clingan had been living with his daughter Mrs. Lillibridge, and was cared for by her throughout his last illness. Before his death he marked the note "paid" and delivered it to her for such care and attention. At the time the note was delivered to Mrs. Lillibridge, she had not rendered services equal to $ 1400, but the consideration included her care of him for the rest of his life.

At that time the debt due by C. C. Clingan to the bank was unpaid, and the transfer of the note to Mrs. Lillibridge rendered him insolvent. After his death those notes to the bank were allowed against his estate in the probate court, where administration was had. There was no property belonging to the estate with which to satisfy the claims.

The trial court found that at the time of the transfer of the $ 1400 note by Clingan to his daughter she had rendered services worth $ 600; that the balance of $ 800 was a transfer made for services to be thereafter rendered; that such transfer was voluntary, and void as to existing creditors. The judgment was that the Bank of Willow Springs recovered against Mrs. Lillibridge and her husband and the other defendants, the heirs of C. C. Clingan, the sum of $ 800, and that Mrs. Lillibridge recovered against the estate of C. C. Clingan the sum of $ 600; that the judgment be a special lien upon the real estate mentioned above, and that the same be sold for the payment of said judgment and costs. This seems to be on the theory that, the note being for part of the purchase price, the holders of the same should have a vendor's lien on the property sold by Clingan to his daughter. No question is raised as to the form of the judgment, if in fact the circuit court had jurisdiction of the cause.

Upon the death of C. C. Clingan, and before this suit was brought, R. F. Holloway was appointed administrator of his estate. He filed an affidavit in the probate court alleging that R. M. Lillibridge and his wife wrongfully had possession of certain property belonging to the estate of C. C. Clingan, and prayed that they might be ordered to appear and answer under oath the questions that might be put to them concerning the same, the purpose being to discover the ownership of the $ 1400 note.

Interrogatories were propounded and answered by Mrs. Lillibridge. The probate court thereupon tried the issues before a jury, which found that the defendants were not guilty of wrongfully withholding any assets belonging to the estate. Judgment accordingly was rendered June 2, 1922, in the probate court. That judgment was unappealed from. Subsequently this suit was brought, and R. M. Holloway, administrator, was made party plaintiff with the Willow Springs Bank. Afterwards the cause was dismissed as to Holloway, and the cases proceeded to judgment with the bank as the only plaintiff.

It is claimed by the appellant that the proceeding in the probate court is res adjudicata as to the matter involved here, and that the plaintiff...