Bank v. Airline Union's Mortgage Co.

• Decision Date: 27 April 2011
• Docket Number: 2010–0511.,Nos. 2010–0508,s. 2010–0508
• Citation: 947 N.E.2d 672,128 Ohio St.3d 529
• Parties: FLAGSTAR BANK, F.S.B., Appellant,v.AIRLINE UNION'S MORTGAGE COMPANY et al.; Reinhold, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

128 Ohio St.3d 529
947 N.E.2d 672
2011 -Ohio- 1961

FLAGSTAR BANK, F.S.B., Appellant,
v.
AIRLINE UNION'S MORTGAGE COMPANY et al.; Reinhold, Appellee.

Nos. 2010–0508

2010–0511.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Feb. 1, 2011.Decided April 27, 2011.

[947 N.E.2d 673]

[Ohio St.3d 529] Syllabus of the Court

A cause of action for professional negligence against a property appraiser accrues on the date that the negligent act is committed, and the four-year statute of limitations commences on that date. (R.C. 2305.09(D) and Investors REIT One v. Jacobs (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 206, followed.)

Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Scott A. King, and Terry W. Posey Jr., Dayton, for appellant.

Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., Brian E. Hurley, and Robert J. Gehring, Cincinnati, for appellee.Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., and Thomas R. Houlihan, Akron, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., John H. Burtch, and Gregory R. Flax, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Realtors.Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Ralph E. Burnham, and Matthew E. Stubbs, Cincinnati, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Pamela J. Lawrentz.

[947 N.E.2d 674]

LANZINGER, J.

Lanzinger, J.

{¶ 1} We have accepted a certified-conflict question asking when the statute of limitations begins to run against a property appraiser in a case involving professional negligence. We hold that the four-year statute of limitations for professional negligence, R.C. 2305.09(D), starts to run on the date of the alleged negligent act, the date of accrual of the cause of action against the appraiser.

[Ohio St.3d 530] Factual Background

{¶ 2} The relevant facts of this case are not disputed. Appellee, John Reinhold, was an appraiser.¹ In 2001 and 2002, he performed appraisals on three properties that served as collateral for three separate mortgage loans made by Airline Union's Mortgage Company (“AUM”). The last of these appraisals was completed on June 12, 2002.

{¶ 3} In various transactions in 2001 and 2002, appellant, Flagstar Bank, FSB (“Flagstar”), purchased the mortgage loans from AUM after having received and reviewed Reinhold's three appraisals. According to Flagstar, it sold on the secondary market two of the mortgage loans on two of the properties that Reinhold had appraised. These properties were later subjected to foreclosure after the owners defaulted, leaving deficiency balances on both loans. The secondary creditors sought reimbursement from Flagstar, which paid the deficiencies on the two loans. Flagstar kept the mortgage loan on the third appraised property in its portfolio. After this property burned down, the owner defaulted, and the insurance proceeds from the fire left a deficiency balance on the third loan.

{¶ 4} On April 28, 2008, Flagstar filed a complaint against the initial lender, AUM, and the appraiser, Reinhold, alleging that the three property appraisals were materially inaccurate and that the actual fair market value of each property was significantly less than the appraised value.² Reinhold denied any negligence and filed a motion for summary judgment. He argued that the bank's claims were barred by the statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09 because the complaint was filed more than four years after the appraisals were performed. Flagstar responded that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until after the bank sustained a compensable injury. The bank contended that it did not suffer actual damages until the properties were sold at foreclosure and there was a deficiency balance or until the receipt of the insurance proceeds that were insufficient to cover the balance of the loan. Because the complaint was filed within four years of those dates, Flagstar maintained that the complaint was timely.

{¶ 5} The trial court determined that Flagstar was requesting that the court adopt a discovery rule with regard to claims for professional negligence. Citing cases in which courts had rejected a discovery rule for such claims, the trial court granted summary judgment to Reinhold. Flagstar appealed, but the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.

[Ohio St.3d 531] {¶ 6} We accepted the certified-conflict question and ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether under R.C. 2305.09(D) a cause of action for professional negligence accrues on the date that the negligent act is committed or on the date

[947 N.E.2d 675]

that the negligent act causes actual damages. 125 Ohio St.3d 1436, 2010-Ohio-2212, 927 N.E.2d 9. We also accepted Flagstar's discretionary appeal and consolidated it with the certified conflict. 125 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2010-Ohio-2212, 927 N.E.2d 10.

Basic Principles for Statutes of Limitations

{¶ 7} Before addressing the specific statute of limitations in this case, we turn to basic principles that guide our analysis. Statutes of limitations serve a gate-keeping function for courts by “ ‘(1) ensuring fairness to the defendant, (2) encouraging prompt prosecution of causes of action, (3) suppressing stale and fraudulent claims, and (4) avoiding the inconveniences engendered by delay—specifically, the difficulties of proof present in older cases.’ ” Pratte v. Stewart, 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860, 929 N.E.2d 415, ¶ 42, quoting Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491, 2006-Ohio-2625, 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 10. That being said, statutes of limitations are remedial in nature and are to be given a liberal construction to permit cases to be decided upon their merits, after a court indulges every reasonable presumption and resolves all doubts in favor of giving, rather than denying, the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate. Draher v. Walters (1935), 130 Ohio St. 92, 94, 3 O.O. 121, 196 N.E. 884, overruled on other grounds, Peters v. Moore (1950), 154 Ohio St. 177, 42 O.O. 254, 93 N.E.2d 683.

R.C. 2305.09(D)—Professional Negligence

{¶ 8} The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for the claim of professional negligence is R.C. 2305.09(D), which provides:

{¶ 9} “Except as provided for in division (C) of this section, an action for any of the following causes shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued:

{¶ 10} “ * * *

{¶ 11} “(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections 1304.35, 2305.10 to 2305.12, and 2305.14 of the Revised Code.”

{¶ 12} The parties disagree about when the statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(D) begins to run. The statute itself states only that an action must be brought within four years “after the cause thereof accrued.” Because the legislature did not define “accrue,” we must determine when a cause of action accrues. See [Ohio St.3d 532] O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 87, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727, citing Harig v. Johns–Manville Prods. Corp. (1978), 284 Md. 70, 75, 394 A.2d 299, 1 A.L.R.4th 105.

{¶ 13} The general rule is that a cause of action exists from the time the wrongful act is committed. Id.; see also Kerns v. Schoonmaker (1831), 4 Ohio 331, syllabus (“Statute of limitations commences to run so soon as the injurious act complained of is perpetrated, although the actual injury is subsequent, and could not immediately operate”). However, in certain circumstances this court has determined that applying the general rule “ ‘would lead to the unconscionable result that the injured party's right to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is even aware of its existence.’ ” O'Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 87, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727, quoting Wyler v. Tripi (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168, 54 O.O.2d 283, 267 N.E.2d 419. As a result of these concerns, this court created an exception to the general rule, commonly known as the discovery rule.

Discovery Rule

{¶ 14} The discovery rule provides that a cause of action does not arise

[947 N.E.2d 676]

until the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he or she has been injured by the conduct of the defendant. Collins v. Sotka (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 506, 507, 692 N.E.2d 581. The rule entails a two-pronged test—i.e., actual knowledge not just that one has been injured but also that the injury was caused by the conduct of the defendant. O'Stricker, 4 Ohio St.3d at 90, 4 OBR 335, 447 N.E.2d 727. A statute of limitations does not begin to run until both prongs have been satisfied.

{¶ 15} The discovery rule was first applied in Ohio in a case involving medical malpractice. Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 198, 61 O.O.2d 430, 290 N.E.2d 916. Since then, it has been employed in a number of areas of the law. See e.g., Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 210, 5 OBR 453, 450 N.E.2d 684 (legal malpractice); Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Found. (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 111, 5 OBR 247, 449 N.E.2d 438 (medical malpractice); O'Stricker (bodily injury caused by exposure to asbestos); Burgess...