Bank v. Mich. Educ. Ass'n-NEA

• Decision Date: 26 May 2016
• Docket Number: Docket No. 326668.
• Citation: 892 N.W.2d 1,315 Mich.App. 496
• Parties: BANK v. MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION–NEA.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

315 Mich.App. 496

892 N.W.2d 1

BANK

v.MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION–NEA.

Docket No. 326668.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 3, 2016, at Detroit.

Decided May 26, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.

Mackinac Center Legal Foundation (by Patrick J. Wright and Derk A. Wilcox ), for plaintiff.

White, Schneider, Young & Chiodini, P.C., Okemos (by Jeffrey S. Donahue and Catherine E. Tucker), for defendants.

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and CAVANAGH and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.

RONAYNE KRAUSE, J.

Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court's dismissal of her claims on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We agree and affirm.

Plaintiff is a teacher in the Novi Community School District and was a member of defendants, the Michigan Education Association and the Novi Education Association, both of which are unions. When plaintiff became a member in 2002, she signed a "Continuing Membership Application" authorizing the deduction of dues and fees "unless I revoke this authorization in writing between August 1 and August 31 of any year." Plaintiff's collective-bargaining agreement expired on June 30, 2013, but defendants deemed the Continuing Membership Application as a separate basis for ongoing membership and payment of dues or fees. Plaintiff attempted to resign her membership in September 2013, outside the August window, without sending a letter of resignation. Defendants rejected that resignation, but accepted plaintiff's subsequent letter of resignation in August 2014.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action, seeking several items of declaratory and injunctive relief, all premised on the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq., as amended in 2012 by the law called, in the vernacular, the "right to work" law, which permits employees to take advantage of collective-bargaining agreements without actually paying any collective-bargaining units for their collective-bargaining efforts. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the changes in the law rendered any contractual agreement to pay dues or resign only during August illegal or unenforceable, so she, therefore, was entitled to resign at any time and owed no outstanding fees or dues. Plaintiff also contends that defendants breached their duty of fair representation by failing to advise her of the change in the law and its relevant effect. The trial court concluded that plaintiff's PERA claims were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), her claims of breach of the duty of fair representation should be heard by MERC pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and the remainder of her claims were either outside the court's jurisdiction or were "hypothetical and moot." The trial court therefore granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.

A grant or denial of summary disposition is reviewed de novo on the basis of the entire record to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). "[A] challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even if raised for the first time on appeal." Smith v. Smith, 218 Mich.App. 727, 729–730, 555 N.W.2d 271 (1996). "Whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Rudolph Steiner Sch. of Ann Arbor v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 237 Mich.App. 721, 730, 605 N.W.2d 18 (1999). We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature. Weakland v. Toledo Engineering Co., Inc., 467 Mich. 344, 347, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003). We, likewise, review de novo as a question of law the propriety of a trial court's decision regarding equitable relief on the facts as found by the court, but we will disturb those factual findings only if we find them clearly erroneous. McDonald v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 480 Mich. 191, 197, 747 N.W.2d 811 (2008). A trial court's decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v. City of Pontiac, 482 Mich. 1, 8, 753 N.W.2d 595 (2008).

Plaintiff contends that she alleged a valid contract claim. We disagree. Her complaint asserts no such claim. The gravamen of her claims as articulated in her complaint is that PERA, as amended in 2012, absolved her of any obligations to defendants, and defendants should have both advised her of that fact and honored it. Plaintiff articulates an argument to the general effect that no other contractual clauses or agreements to which she assented exist that alternately bind her to any dues or membership obligations. However, it appears plaintiff raised those arguments not for the purpose of asserting a claim based on contract, but rather to rebut an argument made by defendants. A contractual argument does not necessarily transform any of plaintiff's claims into contractual claims.

PERA governs public-sector labor relations, and "MERC alone has jurisdiction and administrative expertise to entertain and reconcile competing allegations of unfair labor practices and misconduct under the PERA." Rockwell v. Crestwood Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 393 Mich. 616, 630, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975) ; see also Kent Co. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Kent Co. Sheriff, 463 Mich. 353, 354–364, 359, 616 N.W.2d 677 (2000) (distinguishing a FOIA request made to a union from a request "to remedy a violation of the PERA or of the collective bargaining agreement"). Pursuant to MCL 423.216, "[v]iolations of the provisions of [MCL 423.210 ] shall be deemed to be unfair labor practices remediable by [MERC]." One such provision, MCL 423.210(2)(a), prohibits labor organizations or their agents from "[r]estrain[ing] or coerc[ing] public employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 9 [i.e., MCL 423.209 ]."

Plaintiff's claims particularly pertain to the rights contained in MCL 423.209(2) as amended by the 2012 right-to-work law; the statute now¹ states in relevant part:

No person shall by force, intimidation, or unlawful threats compel or attempt to compel any public employee to do any of the following:

(a) Become or remain a member of a labor organization or bargaining representative or otherwise affiliate with or financially support a labor organization or bargaining representative.

(b) Refrain from engaging in employment or refrain from joining a labor organization or bargaining representative or otherwise affiliating with or financially supporting a labor organization or bargaining representative.

We note that MCL 423.210(3) contains another, similar prohibition against requiring membership in a collective-bargaining organization, and MCL 423.209(3) provides an express fine for violation of MCL 423.209(2). However, neither of those provisions affects the plain language of MCL 423.210(2)(a) or MCL 423.209(2). Notably, the Legislature did not change MCL 423.210(2)(a) when it enacted the right-to-work law in 2012. We conclude that the plain language of MCL 423.210(2)(a) makes all the provisions of MCL 423.209, including MCL 423.209(2), "rights guaranteed in section 9." Therefore, the violation thereof by defendants as alleged by plaintiff is an "unfair labor practice[ ]" pursuant to MCL 423.216.

Because MERC has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim regarding a PERA violation, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). Furthermore, because it dismissed the claims on jurisdictional grounds, the trial court did not err by denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) ; indeed, it could have done nothing else. See Fox v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 375 Mich. 238, 242–243, 134 N.W.2d 146 (1965).

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her claim of breach of the duty of fair representation. We disagree.

A person may assert a claim that a labor organization has breached its duty of fair representation in either an administrative or a judicial proceeding. Demings v. Ecorse, 423 Mich. 49, 63–64, 377 N.W.2d 275 (1985). However, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction can be raised " ‘whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.’ " Attorney General v. Diamond Mtg. Co., 414 Mich. 603, 613, 327 N.W.2d 805 (1982), quoting United States v. Western P.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956). The doctrine requires the trial court to stay further proceedings to permit the parties a reasonable opportunity to obtain an administrative ruling. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 465 Mich. 185, 207, 631 N.W.2d 733 (2001).

Our Supreme Court has set forth a three-part test for courts to consider in determining the question of primary jurisdiction:

First, a court should consider the extent to which the agency's specialized expertise makes it a preferable forum for resolving the issue[.] Second, it should consider the need for uniform resolution of the issue[.] Third, it should consider the potential that judicial resolution of the issue will have an adverse impact on the agency's performance of its regulatory responsibilities. [Rinaldo's Constr. Corp. v. Mich. Bell. Tel. Co., 454 Mich. 65, 71, 559 N.W.2d 647 (1997) (quotation

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