Barrett v. Barrett

• Decision Date: 23 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004-232-Appeal.,2004-232-Appeal.
• Citation: 894 A.2d 891
• Parties: Jane Sylvia BARRETT v. Mark H. BARRETT, alias, et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

894 A.2d 891

Jane Sylvia BARRETT v. Mark H. BARRETT, alias, et al.

No. 2004-232-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 23, 2006.

Mark A. Sjoberg, Esq., Warwick, for Plaintiff.

Nicholas Gorham, Esq., North Scituate, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

Was the illusory transfer test set forth by this Court in Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345 (R.I.1997), legislatively repealed by the enactment of G.L.1956 § 33-25-2(b), as enacted by P.L.1999, ch. 444, § 1?¹ The plaintiff, Jane Sylvia Barrett (Jane or plaintiff), contends that at the time of his death, her late husband, Horace M. Barrett (Horace or decedent), owned in fee simple certain real property on Prudence Island in Portsmouth. In accordance with § 33-25-2(a), Jane further contends that she was entitled to a life estate in the Prudence Island property upon Horace's death. According to Jane, despite Horace's conveyance of the property during his lifetime to a revocable trust, her statutory right to a life estate in the property survived because the conveyance was an illusory transfer under this Court's holding in Pezza.

In the alternative, notwithstanding the conveyance, Jane argues that Horace retained the rights incidental to ownership in fee simple such that her interest in the life estate was not defeated. She maintains that these issues should be remanded for a trial. Conversely, defendants, Mark H. Barrett and Karen B. Monahan, Horace's children and co-trustees of the "Horace M. Barrett Trust of February 22, 2000" (co-trustees), argue that § 33-25-2(b) abolished the illusory transfer test and thus, the hearing justice properly granted summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of defendants.

Facts and Travel

The decedent and his first wife, Nancy Halloran Barrett (Nancy), were married for fifty-two years when, in 1997, Nancy died. They had five children: Mark H. Barrett, Marilyn Whitney, Karen Monahan, Cathi Goulet and H. Mitchell Barrett. In 1976, Horace and Nancy purchased a single-family home on Prudence Island (Prudence Island property).²

In 1998, Horace married Jane Sylvia Barrett³ and on January 13, 1999, he executed his last will and testament. He bequeathed to Jane: (1) certain personal property; (2) a monetary bequest that varied in size depending upon the length of the marriage at the time of Horace's death; and (3) a proportional share in the residue of his estate. Also included in the will was the following statement addressing any perceived deficiencies in the bequests to his second wife:

"The relatively small size of the bequest does not reflect my lack of regard or affection for Jane but rather my prior obligation to the children and grandchildren of my first wife, Nancy Halloran Barrett, as I still feel that fifty percent of my estate is hers."

Shortly thereafter, by revocable trust agreement between himself as donor and his children, Mark H. Barrett and Karen B. Monahan, as cotrustees, Horace created the "Horace M. Barrett Trust of February 22, 2000" (trust). By quitclaim deed, Horace conveyed the Prudence Island property to the trustees, reserving for himself a life estate with "the full power to sell, mortgage, convey or otherwise encumber the life estate and the remainder." The trust agreement also provided that upon Horace's death, "the Trustee shall give to the persons administering Horace's estate such amounts as pursuant to Horace's will may be requested by such persons to satisfy any monetary bequest contained in Horace's will in favor of Horace's wife, Jane Sylvia Barrett." Thereafter, Horace's children and Jane would share equally in 40 percent of the remaining trust estate⁴ and Horace's grandchildren would receive 60 percent of the remaining amount.

On March 20, 2000, less than a month after executing the trust agreement, Horace amended its terms; he excluded Jane as a trust beneficiary and granted the trustees the option to retain the Prudence Island property for the general use of the beneficiaries, in lieu of liquidating it upon his death. However, the provision securing payment of Jane's monetary bequest remained unaffected.

Horace died on January 24, 2003. His estate was probated in the Town of Portsmouth and his son, Mark H. Barrett, was appointed executor. Dissatisfied with the bequests made to her under Horace's will, Jane waived and renounced the bequests in accordance with § 33-25-4⁵ and exercised her statutory right to a life estate in the property allegedly owned by Horace in fee simple at the time of his death. Jane brought suit against the trustees in Superior Court seeking a declaration of her rights in the Prudence Island property and an injunction against any alienation, encumbrance or waste by the trustees until her rights and interest were determined by the Court.

According to Jane, Horace's conveyance to the trust was illusory and was aimed at defeating her statutory right to a life estate. The trustees responded that Jane had no rights in the property because Horace did not own it in fee simple at the time of his death and further, that the application of § 33-25-2(b) effectively overruled the illusory transfer test set forth in Pezza.

The trustees moved for judgment on the pleadings that was ultimately treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 20, 2004, the hearing justice issued a written decision granting summary judgment in favor of the trustees. Relying on § 33-25-2(b), the hearing justice found that Horace effectively divested himself of fee simple ownership of the Prudence Island property before he died, thus defeating Jane's statutory rights as a surviving spouse.⁶ Jane appeals this decision.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a decision granting summary judgment de novo. United Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 (R.I.2003). When performing this review, our task is to examine the admissible evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether the evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact. Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I.1999). Once the party seeking summary judgment has alleged the absence of any disputed issues of material fact, the opposing party, to avoid summary judgment, must come forward with proof sufficient to establish the existence of a specific, material, triable fact. Providence Journal Co. v. Convention Center Authority, 774 A.2d 40, 46 (R.I. 2001) (citing Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I.1998)).

Analysis

We first must discern the intended effect of § 33-25-2(b) to determine whether it was intended to supplant the illusory transfer test announced in Pezza. The illusory transfer test and § 33-25-2(b) contain conflicting criteria about what is required to defeat a surviving spouse's statutory right to a life estate in the decedent's real property. If these inconsistencies cannot be reconciled, the more recent legislative pronouncement, § 33-25-2(b), will trump the earlier judicially crafted illusory transfer test. This would not be the first time the General Assembly enacted legislation in response to a judicial pronouncement.

For instance, the General Assembly's enactment of the Public Employee Pension Revocation and Reduction Act, G.L.1956 chapter 10.1 of title 36 supplanted this Court's holding in In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1388-89 (R.I.1992), in which we declared that honorable service was a necessary prerequisite for vesting of pension rights. See Smith v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, 656 A.2d 186, 190 (R.I.1995).

On another occasion, after this Court abolished the common-law distinctions between the duty of care a landowner owes to licensees, invitees, and trespassers and substituted the tort test of reasonableness, in Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 307, 333 A.2d 127, 133 (1975), the General Assembly enacted G.L.1956 chapter 6 of title 32, entitled "Public Use of Private Lands—Liability Limitations," in an effort to resurrect the common-law immunity of landowners as to trespassers. See Tantimonico v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., 637 A.2d 1056, 1060-61 (R.I. 1994).

Further, the codification of an exclusionary rule in this state, G.L.1956 § 9-19-25, that prohibits the introduction of illegally seized evidence, came as a legislative response to this Court's split decision in State v. Olynik, 83 R.I. 31, 39, 113 A.2d 123, 127 (1955), in which a majority of the Court declined to adopt an exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law under article 1, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. See State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56, 75 n. 17 (R.I.1998) (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

On many occasions, the General Assembly codifies rules of law developed through judicial opinion. One such instance involved the abrogation of the interspousal immunity. At common law, a husband and wife were prohibited from bringing suit against each other for tortious injuries. However, this doctrine was strictly limited by judicial opinion. In 1978, we concluded "that actions sounding in tort by one spouse against the other, at least as to claims arising out of motor vehicle collisions, should no longer be barred." Digby v. Digby, 120 R.I. 299, 305, 388 A.2d 1, 4 (1978). Soon thereafter, we decided that the interspousal immunity no longer was available in a tort action in which one or both spouses were dead. Asplin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 121 R.I. 51, 54, 394 A.2d 1353, 1355 (1978). Eventually, in 1987, the General Assembly "explicitly and totally abrogated" the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity. G.L.1956 § 15-4-17.

As we shall explain herein, it is the opinion of this Court that the General Assembly intended for § 33-25-2(b) to supplant the...