Barrow v. State
| Decision Date | 15 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. A13–1520.,A13–1520. |
| Citation | 862 N.W.2d 686 |
| Parties | Abshir Abtidon BARROW, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and G. Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant Rice County Attorney, Faribault, MN, for respondent.
Appellant Abshir Abtidon Barrow pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree sale of a narcotic drug, Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2014), and was sentenced to 15 months in prison. The factual basis for Barrow's plea was his admission that he gave cocaine to C.C., his wife, to hide when police officers pulled over the car in which he was a passenger. Barrow later filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea for lack of an adequate factual basis. Barrow argued in his petition that the statutory definition of “sell” requires the actor to intend to relinquish possession of the controlled substance. The postconviction court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Barrow's actions constituted a sale. Barrow appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that Barrow's admitted conduct does not fit within the definition of “sell” in Minn.Stat. § 152.01 (2014), we reverse.
This case arises from a traffic stop in Faribault of a car that C.C. was driving and in which Barrow was a passenger. Agents with the Rice County Drug Task Force (DTF), who were conducting an investigation of crack cocaine trafficking in Faribault, obtained information that Barrow was dealing crack cocaine from his Faribault residence. Barrow reportedly left his residence in a car C.C. was driving in order to obtain more cocaine from his source. DTF agents spotted Barrow in the car, and after the driver made an improperly signaled left-hand turn, the agents asked uniformed Faribault police officers to conduct a traffic stop. After police stopped the car, a DTF agent frisked Barrow and discovered 0.7 grams of crack cocaine in Barrow's pocket. Another agent asked C.C. where the additional cocaine was hidden in the car. C.C. stated that she had hidden cocaine for Barrow in her bra, at his request. She produced a 2.1–gram package of cocaine from inside her shirt near her bra.
In a subsequent taped statement, C.C. said that she and Barrow had driven to Rochester together, but that she had dropped him off, picked him up later, and was not involved with the purchase of cocaine. C.C. said that she agreed to hide the cocaine on her person because she is afraid of Barrow. In a statement of his own, Barrow confirmed that he bought cocaine in Rochester and that C.C. was not involved. He stated later, at the guilty plea hearing, that “[s]he didn't have nothing to do with it.”
The State subsequently charged Barrow with three controlled-substance crimes: third-degree sale of a narcotic drug, Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) ; third-degree possession of a narcotic drug with intent to sell, Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1 (1); and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, Minn.Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014). Barrow pleaded guilty to the third-degree sale charge.
To establish the factual basis for his guilty plea, Barrow admitted that he gave the cocaine to C.C. to hide the drugs for him when the police stopped the vehicle. The district court judge then asked, “Is it the agreement that that satisfies the definition of sale?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes,” and when the judge noted the long list of verbs contained in the definition of sale, see Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), defense counsel conceded that, “unfortunately, I believe it does cover this kind of a circumstance.” The prosecutor further asked Barrow if he understood that the definition of sale “includes giving drugs to somebody,” and Barrow responded affirmatively. The district court accepted Barrow's plea, convicted him of the third-degree sale count, and dismissed the other two counts.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court granted Barrow a downward durational departure from the presumptive sentence. The departure was based on the parties' agreement, as well as on the court's acknowledgement that though Barrow's conduct fell within the definition of “sale,” there was no remuneration involved and the cocaine was for personal use. The court sentenced Barrow to 15 months in prison.
On May 24, 2013, Barrow filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea because the record did not establish a proper factual basis for the plea. Specifically, Barrow argued that his testimony at the plea hearing did not support his conviction for a “sale,” because he did not admit that he relinquished his possessory interest in the controlled substance.
The postconviction court denied Barrow's petition without an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the definition of “sell” in Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a requires “only a physical transfer of the possession of the contraband.” The court distinguished Barrow's petition from the facts set forth in State v. Carithers, 490 N.W.2d 620 (Minn.1992), in which we held that a defendant cannot be convicted of selling drugs to a spouse who already had constructive possession of those drugs. Id. at 623. The postconviction court explained that, whereas the spouse in Carithers actively participated in the purchase of drugs, Barrow testified that his wife had nothing to do with the cocaine prior to his handing the drugs to her. The court therefore concluded that, had Barrow not pleaded guilty, he “could have easily been convicted of a Third Degree Controlled Substance Sale” based on his admission that he “transferred the drugs to his wife so that the police would not find them on his person.”
Barrow appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Barrow v. State, 845 N.W.2d 555 (Minn.App.2014). The court of appeals held that, “[o]n its face, th[e] broad definition [of ‘sell’] is met by the act of giving the cocaine to his wife to hide it from law enforcement.” Id. at 557. The court distinguished Carithers, noting that “Carithers assumes that the parties acquired the drugs jointly,” which contrasts with Barrow's statement that C.C. had nothing to do with acquiring the drugs. Id. The court of appeals also concluded that Barrow failed to establish that he maintained constructive possession of the cocaine, noting that the act of giving the cocaine to C.C. “terminated Barrow's immediate entitlement to physically possess it.” Id. at 558. The court, therefore, held that Barrow's conduct constituted a “sale” as defined by Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), and the district court did not err. Id. We granted Barrow's petition for review.
We review the summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Minn.2013). We review legal issues de novo, and our review of factual matters is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court's findings. Vance v. State, 752 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn.2008). Determining the validity of a guilty plea presents a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.2010). A defendant has the burden of proving his plea was invalid. Id.
Barrow argues that there was not an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea because the act of handing cocaine to C.C. to hide it from the police did not constitute a sale as defined by Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), and therefore Barrow admitted to an act that is not covered by the statute. The State argues that the postconviction court correctly denied Barrow's petition because Barrow's conduct falls within the meaning of “sell” in the statute. The parties' dispute requires us to interpret the meaning of “sell” in Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn.2013).
Barrow was convicted under Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1), which states that a person is guilty of a controlled substance crime in the third degree if “the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures containing a narcotic drug.” Minnesota Statutes § 152.01, subd. 15a(1), in turn, defines “sell” as “(1) to sell, give away, barter, deliver, exchange, distribute or dispose of to another, or to manufacture; or (2) to offer or agree to perform an act listed in clause (1); or (3) to possess with intent to perform an act listed in clause (1).” Only clause (1) of the definition is at issue in this case, and we must determine whether Barrow's conduct falls within one of the verbs included in that clause's definition of “sell.”
Barrow argues that his conduct does not fall within the plain meaning of any of the verbs in clause (1). The State generally argues that Barrow's conduct falls within the definition of “sell” and it specifically contends that Barrow's conduct falls under the verbs “give away” and “deliver” included within the statutory definition of “sell.”1
The statutory definition of “sell” in clause (1) begins by providing that “sell” means “to sell.” Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 15a(1). “Sell” commonly means “to give up (property) to another for money or other valuable consideration.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 2061 (2002); see State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn.2009) (). Barrow handed the cocaine to C.C., but he did not admit to receiving anything of value from her in exchange. Accordingly, the “sell” portion of the statute's definition is not satisfied.
The State contends, however,...
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