Weitzel v. State, A14–1186.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. A14–1186.,A14–1186.
• Citation: 883 N.W.2d 553
• Parties: Lane Francis WEITZEL, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

883 N.W.2d 553

Lane Francis WEITZEL, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A14–1186.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 10, 2016.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and, Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney, Debra J. Hilstrom, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

In 2007, appellant Lane Francis Weitzel pleaded guilty and was convicted of one count of failure to register as a predatory offender in violation of Minn.Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2014). In 2014, he filed a petition for postconviction relief under Minn.Stat. § 590.01 (2014), alleging his guilty plea was inaccurate and should be withdrawn in the interests of justice. The postconviction court denied the petition on the ground that it was untimely under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). On appeal, Weitzel argued the postconviction court was required to consider his petition on the merits because the State forfeited its right to assert subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense.¹ The court of appeals affirmed. Weitzel v. State, 868 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn.App.2015). We conclude that a postconviction court may raise the subdivision 4(c) time limit on its own motion to control its docket, so long as the court gives notice to the parties and affords them an opportunity to be heard. Because the postconviction court failed to provide the required notice and opportunity to be heard, we reverse and remand.

Weitzel was obligated to register as a predatory offender due to a 1992 conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In September 2006, the State charged Weitzel with failure to register, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a). The complaint alleged that around May 24, 2006, Weitzel knowingly violated the statute by failing to notify the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) of an address change within 5 days. Weitzel submitted a verification letter to the BCA listing an address in the City of Ramsey, Minnesota. Seven months later, the BCA sent an address verification letter to the Ramsey address. When the letter was returned to the post office as undeliverable, the police began an investigation. The police went to the Ramsey address and spoke with the homeowner, who stated that she had evicted Weitzel in October 2005. A records check revealed that the BCA had not received a change of address form as required by statute.

In April 2007, Weitzel and the State reached a plea agreement. Weitzel agreed to plead guilty to the offense in exchange for the State agreeing to support a sentence at the lower end of the presumptive range and a dispositional departure of probation. As part of his factual basis, Weitzel admitted that he did not tell any law enforcement agency or the BCA that he had moved from Ramsey to Fridley. The district court accepted Weitzel's guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction of failure to register as a predatory offender, and imposed a sentence of 17 months, but stayed execution of the sentence and placed Weitzel on probation for 5 years. Weitzel did not appeal. The district court discharged Weitzel from probation in March 2010.

In March 2014, Weitzel filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his plea was inaccurate and invalid because it lacked an adequate factual basis. Specifically, Weitzel argued that his statement in the plea colloquy, in which he admitted that he provided the Ramsey address to Anoka County Corrections, satisfied his reporting requirement and was incompatible with a finding of guilt. Weitzel alleged his petition was timely filed under Minn.Stat. § 590.01 because his interests-of-justice claim under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5), arose less than 2 years before he filed the petition. See Id., subd. 4(c). The State denied the allegations in the petition and claimed the petition failed to state a claim entitling Weitzel to relief under the postconviction statute. The State did not raise the untimeliness of Weitzel's petition to the postconviction court.

The postconviction court denied the petition, concluding that Weitzel's claim arose no later than September 7, 2011, when Weitzel learned he had a right to appeal and requested that the State Public Defender's Office review his case. Accordingly, the court held that the petition was filed after the expiration of the time limit in section 590.01, subdivision 4(c) (requiring that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises”). Alternatively, the court concluded that Weitzel had failed to establish that his claim had substantive merit.

The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a postconviction court may raise subdivision 4(c) on its own motion, even if the State forfeited its right to assert subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense, provided that the court first gives the parties notice of its intent to consider the issue and an opportunity to present their respective positions. Weitzel, 868 N.W.2d at 277, 279–81. Although the court of appeals acknowledged that the postconviction court erred when it failed to provide the parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the applicability of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), the court of appeals concluded the error was harmless. Weitzel, 868 N.W.2d at 281.

I.

Weitzel argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition as untimely under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). According to Weitzel, the postconviction court was required to consider his petition on the merits because the State forfeited its right to assert subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense.

We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn.2015). Our review of legal issues is de novo, but our review of factual matters is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the postconviction court's findings. Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn.2015) ; see also Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.2012).

When a petitioner seeks to withdraw a guilty plea made after sentencing the request must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief. James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn.2005). A defendant does not have an automatic right to withdraw a valid guilty plea. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn.2007). The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure do allow, however, a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs when the record, including the factual basis for the plea, fails to satisfy the accuracy requirement for a valid guilty plea. Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 646–49. A defendant bears the burden of proving his plea was invalid. Barrow v. State, 862 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn.2015).

The postconviction statute provides that “[n]o petition for postconviction relief may be filed more than two years after the later of: (1) the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an appellate court's disposition of petitioner's direct appeal.” Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a). Section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(5), provides that the court may hear a petition outside of the 2–year limitation period if “the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” But a petition invoking an exception under subdivision 4(b) must be filed within 2 years of the date the interests-of-justice claim arises. Id., subd. 4(c) ; Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Minn.2012) ; Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Minn.2011). A petitioner's claim “arises when the petitioner knew or should have known that he had a claim.” Id. at 560. This is an objective, rather than a “subjective, actual knowledge standard.” Id. at 558.

Previously, we have considered whether the limitation periods in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), (c), are jurisdictional. Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775 (Minn.2013) ; Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590 (Minn.2012). In Carlton, we concluded that the time limit contained in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), did not operate as a jurisdictional bar, but was comparable to a statute of limitations that could be asserted as an affirmative defense by the State. 816 N.W.2d at 600–02. We further concluded that the State forfeits its right to raise subdivision 4(c) as an affirmative defense when it fails to make a timely assertion of that right. Id. at 606. In Hooper, we considered the related question of whether the 2–year limitation period in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), operates as a jurisdictional bar. 838 N.W.2d at 780–82. We concluded that the limitation period in subdivision 4(a) does not restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the postconviction court. Id. at 782. We reasoned that because the State had failed to raise subdivision 4(a) as an affirmative defense, the State forfeited its right to assert the defense for the first time on appeal. Id. at 780–82. We reaffirm our decisions in Carlton and Hooper that the limitation periods in section 590.01, subdivision 4(a), (c), are not jurisdictional bars that restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of the postconviction court. Instead, they are statutes of limitations that the State may assert as an affirmative defense. We also reaffirm that the State forfeits its right to raise subdivision 4(a) or 4(c) as an affirmative defense when it fails to make a timely assertion of that right.

Carlton and Hooper do not address the question of whether a forfeiture of the State's right to raise subdivision 4(a) or 4(c) as an affirmative defense...