Batten v. State, 2D03-963.
| Decision Date | 11 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D03-963.,2D03-963. |
| Citation | 895 So.2d 490 |
| Parties | Lebert F. BATTEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Celene Humphries, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sonya Roebuck Horbelt, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Lebert F. Batten challenges the judgments and concurrent sentences of five years' imprisonment on each count imposed on him after a jury found him guilty of grand theft, a violation of section 812.014(2)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), and odometer fraud, a violation of section 319.35(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1999). The State introduced Williams1 rule evidence at Batten's trial consisting of twenty-five classified ads he placed in The St. Petersburg Times for the sale of various automobiles. The State relied heavily on this evidence in its closing arguments to the jury as demonstrating Batten's intent to commit the charged offenses. Because Batten's placement of the newspaper ads did not tend to prove that he had the requisite criminal intent, we reverse the judgments and sentences, and we remand this case for a new trial.
On June 20, 2000, Batten, who was seventy-two years old at the time, sold a 1992 Lincoln Town Car to the alleged victim, Greg Marston. Although Batten was not a licensed motor vehicle dealer, he had purchased the car two months earlier at the St. Petersburg Auto Auction from Howard Gilmore of Gilmore Auto Brokers. At the time Gilmore sold Batten the car, its actual mileage was 139,293. Nevertheless, because the car had a five-digit odometer, the mileage indicated was only 39,293. The title clerk who had handled Gilmore's purchase of the car from the former owner failed to properly complete all of the necessary documentation involved in the vehicle title transfer. As a result, the papers Gilmore gave Batten concerning the car were ambiguous concerning its actual mileage.
In addition to the defective document package, the appearance of the car belied its true mileage. The witnesses at Batten's trial agreed that nothing about the car's appearance suggested that the odometer reading might be inaccurate. Gilmore testified that the car looked like "a cream puff." Marston, the alleged victim, testified that the car "was in beautiful shape."
Batten placed an ad in The St. Petersburg Times offering the car for sale. During a telephone call Marston made in response to the ad, Batten told Marston that the car had 42,000 miles. Marston arranged to inspect the car and paid Batten $7900 for it. When Marston received the title to the car about two months later, it reflected the mileage as 40,996. The title also indicated that the mileage "exceeds limits." Upon further investigation, Marston learned that the actual mileage on the vehicle was 140,996 miles.2 He contacted Batten about the discrepancy, but he did not receive a satisfactory response. Marston then contacted the authorities about pressing charges against Batten.
Proof of Batten's knowledge that the car's actual mileage was 100,000 miles greater than its odometer indicated was an essential element of the State's case on both the grand theft and the odometer fraud counts. In a pretrial notice of its intent to use Williams rule evidence, the State alleged that Batten had engaged in business as a motor vehicle dealer without first obtaining a license, a violation of section 320.27(2), (8) Florida Statutes (1999). At trial, the State's Williams rule evidence consisted of twenty-five classified ads Batten had placed in The St. Petersburg Times. Of the twenty-five ads placed, only twenty-one were for the sale of vehicles, and only fourteen of those actually ran in the newspaper. In the fourteen ads, Batten offered five vehicles for sale: a 1991 Lincoln Town Car, a 1992 Lincoln Town Car (the subject of the charged offenses), a 1993 Lincoln Town Car, a 1990 Mercury Grand Marquis, and a 1991 Mercury Grand Marquis. None of the ads stated the mileage of the vehicle being offered for sale. According to the State's expert witness, these five vehicles shared a common trait: all had five-digit mechanical odometers. Once the odometers reached 99,999 miles, they would roll over to zero and start again. On these and similar vehicles, there is no way to determine the actual mileage without a review of the car's documentation. The basis of the State's case against Batten was that he took advantage of the fact that the car had a five-digit odometer in order to misrepresent to Marston that the mileage showing on the odometer was the true mileage when, in fact, the true mileage was 100,000 miles more than the odometer indicated. The State argued that the classified ads demonstrating that Batten was dealing in vehicles with five-digit odometers were relevant to show absence of mistake because they established that Batten was familiar with selling this type of vehicle and with the paperwork associated with such sales. The trial court admitted the ads into evidence over Batten's timely objection.
The rule of admissibility for evidence of other crimes or bad acts, commonly known as the Williams rule, is codified at section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). That section provides:
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.
The test of the admissibility of Williams rule evidence is relevancy, and the test of its inadmissibility is its lack of relevancy. Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 192 (Fla.1997). A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the other crime evidence is relevant, and such a determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. White v. State, 817 So.2d 799 (Fla.2002).
The substantial similarity of crimes is a requirement for admitting evidence of a collateral crime when the evidence is sought to be admitted for the specific purpose of establishing the absence of mistake. Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901 (Fla.2002). Id. at 909 (quoting Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987)).
In this case, the State claimed that Batten committed the crimes charged by misrepresenting the mileage of a car that had a five-digit odometer. Although the collateral offense — engaging in business as a motor vehicle dealer without a license — involved automobiles that also had five-digit odometers, the State did not offer any evidence that Batten had previously misrepresented the mileage of these or any other vehicles. In fact, none of the ads referred to the mileage of the vehicle being offered for sale. Although the ads supported the State's claim that Batten was acting as a motor vehicle dealer without a license,3 the State did not offer any evidence that Batten actually sold any of the other advertised vehicles. Moreover, the placement of the classified ads in the newspaper did not establish that Batten had been personally involved with the paperwork with respect to any of the vehicles that might have been sold. Therefore, the ads did not, as the State contended, demonstrate Batten's familiarity with the sale of automobiles having five-digit odometers or the documentation associated with the sale of motor vehicles. Batten's placement of classified ads offering other vehicles for sale bore no similarity to the charged offenses, and thus this evidence was not relevant to the material fact of absence of mistake. The mere fact that Batten had offered similar vehicles for sale was not probative of his intent to misrepresent the mileage of the car sold to Marston. Because the collateral crimes evidence did not meet the strict standard of relevancy, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce this evidence.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that "the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes...
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