Battista v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1982
• Citation: 454 A.2d 286
• Parties: Elio BATTISTA and Neiva Battista, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 286

454 A.2d 286

Elio BATTISTA and Neiva Battista, his wife, Plaintiffs, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

Superior Court of Delaware,

New Castle County.

Submitted Oct. 7, 1982.

Decided Oct. 22, 1982.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss. Granted.

Robert P. Lobue and John T. Owens, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.

Richard Galperin of Flanzer & Isaacs, Wilmington, for defendant.

O'HARA, Judge.

The issue presented in this action is whether or not claims of defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress are solely within the ambit of the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act, thus barring the common law actions filed in this Court by employee Elio Battista ("Employee") against employer Chrysler Corporation ("Chrysler"). In addition to refuting the merits of Employee's tort claims, Chrysler asserts that Employee's exclusive remedy lies in a claim under the Workmen's Compensation law. The Court agrees that such Act precludes a common law suit for intentional infliction of mental distress; however, a separate action in defamation will lie against an employer, the Workmen's Compensation statute notwithstanding.

In judging the merits of Chrysler's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are assumed to be true. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, Del.Supr., 372 A.2d 168 (1976). A complaint will not be dismissed unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof. Diamond State Tel. Co. v. University of Delaware, Del.Supr., 269 A.2d 52 (1970).

The complaint details the following facts: Employee entered Chrysler's employ on January 30, 1976, assuming the job classification of "Assembler-major." A month later he was promoted to the position of "Repairman-welder," a position he remained in until October, 1977, at which point he took an electrician position until his demotion back to the assembly line on October 24, 1977.

Following a grievance hearing in June, 1979, Employee was reinstated to the position of "Repairman-welder." However, he was again demoted to the "Assembler-major" classification in September, 1979. He voluntarily left Chrysler's employ a month later and was subsequently hospitalized suffering from fainting, chest pains, and various other ailments.

Employee's claims of intentional infliction of mental distress and defamation both arise from his allegedly wrongful demotion. With respect to the alleged defamation, he asserts that his supervisors orally, and via intra-corporate memoranda, falsely represented to other Chrysler personnel that he "did not and could not adequately perform the job of repairman-welder."

Chrysler argues that Employee's injuries are compensable under the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act and that the statute provides the exclusive remedy. 19 Del.C. § 2304. ¹ Chrysler asserts that Employee was in its employ at the time of his alleged injuries; that his injuries arose "out of and in the course of employment"; and that his injuries constitute a "personal injury" within the meaning of the Compensation Act.

The exclusivity provision of § 2304 bars common law actions against an employer where: 1) plaintiff is an employee; 2) his condition is shown to be a "personal injury" within the meaning of the statute; and 3) the injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. 19 Del.C. § 2304. See also L. Locke, Workmen's Compensation, § 651 at 763 (1968). The presence of the first and third requisites being uncontroverted herein, consideration must be then given to the issue of whether the damage sustained by Employee constitutes a personal injury as contemplated by the statute.

Chrysler relies upon Kofron v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., Del.Supr., 441 A.2d 226 (1982) for the proposition that the Workmen's Compensation Act insulates an employer from suit at common law for any tort. While the Court does not agree that the decision in Kofron bars any tort claim, it does find the Supreme Court's analysis therein appropriate to the instant case.

The plaintiffs in Kofron were industrial workers who contracted certain diseases as a result of overexposure to excessive levels of asbestos found in their working environments. Their claim against their employer arose from allegations that their employer, among other things, concealed and affirmatively misrepresented the danger of working in close proximity to asbestos materials. In an attempt to circumvent the exclusivity provision of § 2304 and secure a remedy at common law, the plaintiffs characterized the employer's conduct as intentional and grossly negligent. However, the Superior Court granted the employer's motion to dismiss; its decision was upheld by our Supreme Court on appeal.

In dismissing the plaintiffs' claim in Kofron, the Supreme Court focused solely on the nature of the injury alleged and found that asbestosis was indeed an occupational disease as contemplated by the statute. 19 Del.C. §§ 2301(4) & (11), ² 2304. The Court examined the legislative history of the term "personal injury" from its inception, noting that in 1937 ³ the Legislature amended the statute to include specifically listed occupational diseases, 41 Del.Laws, c. 241 (1937), and eventually extended coverage under the statute to all occupational diseases. 47 Del.Laws, c. 270 (1949). In sum, the Court discerned a legislative intent in occupational disease cases to make the Workmen's Compensation law an exclusive remedy and to bar common law claims.

This injury-oriented analysis, coupled with the Court's summary rejection of the allegations of grossly negligent and intentional employer conduct, as bearing on the remedy, evidences an approach which is articulated in Foley v. Polaroid Corp., Mass.Supr., 381 Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980):

[T]he key to whether the Workmen's Compensation Act precludes a common law right of action lies in the nature of the injury for which plaintiff makes claim, not the nature of the defendant's act which plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury. 413 N.E.2d at 716, citing Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., Mo.App., 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (1978).

Accordingly, the Court will consider Employee's claims of intentional infliction of mental distress and defamation respectively, applying the Kofron-Foley analysis. ⁴

With respect to Employee's allegation of intentional infliction of mental distress, the Court finds that the claim precipitated by Employee's allegedly wrongful demotion falls within the exclusive province of the Workmen's Compensation law. Focusing on the nature of the injury, one concludes that mental harm is the essence as well as an indispensable element of the tort. Another case similarly involving claims of intentional infliction of mental distress and defamation, Foley v. Polaroid Corp., supra, determined with respect to the former charge:

We conclude that Foley's severe emotional distress resulting from the defendant's conduct relative to the charges of rape and assault is compensable under the act [Workmen's Compensation] as a "personal injury arising out of and in the course of ... employment." 413 N.E.2d 711 at 715.

This conclusion gains support in our own jurisdiction from Ramey v. Delaware Materials, Inc., Del.Supr., 399 A.2d 205 (1979), holding that mental trauma is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. See also Fiorucci v. C.F. Braun & Co., Del.Super., 173 A.2d 635 (1961). Therefore, no action for intentional infliction of mental distress may be maintained and the motion to dismiss is granted with respect to this claim.

Turning to the defamation claim, the harm flowing therefrom is not a "personal injury" within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation law. In fact, an injury to reputation affects a proprietary interest and as such is not a personal injury at all, any concommitant physical or mental injury notwithstanding.

Other jurisdictions have recognized that not all harms occasioned by the employment relationship qualify as compensable injuries under the Act. Such harm includes: injuries to reputation resulting from libel, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and false arrest. Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 413 N.E.2d at 715 citing Madden's Case, Mass.Supr., 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379, 381 (1916).

In sum, there is no relation between the kind of injuries envisioned by the Workmen's Compensation law and the injury alleged here. Workmen's Compensation encompasses physical and mental injuries arising out of employment, whereas the gravamen of a defamation action is injury to reputation, irrespective of any physical or mental harm. See Annot., "Workmen's Compensation Provision as Precluding Employee's Action against Employer for Fraud, False Imprisonment, Defamation or the Like," 46 A.L.R.3d 1279 (1972). See also Braman v. Walthall, Ark.Supr., 215 Ark. 582, 225 S.W.2d 342 (1949) (employee's action for defamation); Moore v. Federal Dept. Stores, Mich.App., 33 Mich.App. 556, 190 N.W.2d 262 (1971) (employee's action for false imprisonment).

Moreover, in the absence of any accompanying physical or mental damage, the inappropriateness of the Workmen's Compensation remedy becomes even clearer. As in the instant case, however, the Foley Court was confronted with allegations of physical and mental injury which seemingly overshadowed any injury to reputation. The Court concluded:

[T]o block the main thrust of this action because of peripheral items of damage, when a compensation claim could not purport to give relief for the main wrong of injury to reputation, would be congruous, and outside the obvious intent of the exclusiveness clause. 413 N.E.2d at 715.

Therefore, persuaded by the rationale in Foley v. Polaroid Corp., supra, and satisfied that it is indeed consistent with the analysis in Kofron v. Amoco...