Beagan v. R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training
| Decision Date | 29 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-11-M.P.,A.A. 13-133,2019-11-M.P. |
| Citation | 253 A.3d 858 |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
| Parties | Michael J. BEAGAN v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, Board of Review et al. |
Richard A. Sinapi, Esq., for Petitioner.
Sean M. Fontes, Esq., for Respondent.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Long, for the Court.
This case came before the Supreme Court after we granted a request from the petitioner, Michael Beagan, for a writ of certiorari. Mr. Beagan seeks review of a District Court order that denied his request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 28-44-57(c) after he successfully appealed a denial of unemployment benefits. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the order of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts of this case may be familiar to the reader. These parties previously appeared before this Court when Mr. Beagan successfully challenged the denial of unemployment benefits by the respondent, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT). Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training , 162 A.3d 619 (R.I. 2017). We repeat the underlying facts necessary to give the reader context for this decision.
In 2013, one day after receiving a written warning for insubordinate behavior, Mr. Beagan posted disparaging comments on Facebook about his employer. Beagan , 162 A.3d at 622. His manager read the comments and concluded that Mr. Beagan had written the post while he was on his deliveries, a violation of company policy. Id. at 622-23. His employer terminated Mr. Beagan that same day. Id. at 623.
Mr. Beagan filed a claim for unemployment benefits with DLT. Through its director, DLT found that Mr. Beagan was disqualified from receiving benefits and thus denied his application for benefits.
Mr. Beagan unsuccessfully appealed the director's decision to the appeal tribunal at DLT and to the District Court. However, Mr. Beagan was undeterred and sought review in this Court. We granted certiorari and determined that "the record does not contain legally competent evidence to support a finding that [Mr.] Beagan's conduct was connected to his work[.]" Beagan , 162 A.3d at 627.1 We therefore quashed the decision of the District Court and directed that court to enter judgment "reversing the board and ordering that [Mr.] Beagan be awarded unemployment benefits." Id. at 629.
On remand, the District Court duly entered an order consistent with our decision. Mr. Beagan filed a motion in this Court for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred related to the review of DLT's denial of benefits in this Court; we awarded his attorney $25,000 plus costs for his work on that matter by order dated September 25, 2017.
Mr. Beagan had also filed a petition for counsel fees in the District Court pursuant to § 28-44-57 for work performed in the appeal to that court from DLT. In the District Court, Mr. Beagan argued that, because his appeal of the District Court's decision to this Court resulted in an award of benefits, his counsel was entitled to reasonable fees and costs incurred in presenting the appeal to the District Court. He also argued that his attorney should be compensated at a rate in excess of the $175-per-hour rate set by the District Court for unemployment benefits appeals.
After a conference in the District Court regarding the petition for fees, Mr. Beagan submitted a supplemental memorandum in support of his contention that § 28-44-57 entitled him to fees for his appeal to that court. Specifically, he argued that he was, in fact, awarded benefits in the District Court because a judgment ultimately entered in his favor there. Mr. Beagan then submitted a supplemental petition for fees for the time his attorney had spent on the supplemental memorandum.
DLT objected, arguing that, pursuant to § 28-44-57(c)(2)(iii), Mr. Beagan's counsel would be entitled to fees and costs in litigating before the District Court only if Mr. Beagan had been awarded benefits by that court. DLT also argued that the entry of judgment pursuant to this Court's opinion was "merely * * * ministerial * * * for which no fee should be allowed[.]" Alternatively, DLT argued that if the magistrate judge decided to award fees, it should be at the $175-per-hour rate set by the District Court.
The chief judge of the District Court denied Mr. Beagan's motion to "exceed the billing parameters previously set forth" by the District Court and referred the remaining issue to a magistrate judge for consideration.
The magistrate judge analyzed the plain meaning of § 28-44-57(c)(2)(iii) and concluded that Mr. Beagan was not entitled to attorneys’ fees for work performed by his attorney in the District Court. The chief judge adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations and denied Mr. Beagan's petition for attorneys’ fees. Thereafter, Mr. Beagan filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, which we granted on September 6, 2019.
This case presents the following principal question for consideration: Where an attorney represents an unemployment benefits claimant in an unsuccessful appeal to the District Court, but subsequently prevails in this Court, does § 28-44-57(c)(2)(iii) entitle the attorney to fees and costs for the proceedings in the District Court?2
"We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo ." Park v. Ford Motor Company , 844 A.2d 687, 692 (R.I. 2004). "When this Court engages in statutory construction, ‘our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.’ " Powers v. Warwick Public Schools , 204 A.3d 1078, 1085 (R.I. 2019) (quoting State v. Whiting , 115 A.3d 956, 958 (R.I. 2015) ). "In that pursuit, this Court has stated that ‘it is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.’ " Id. at 1086 (brackets omitted) (quoting Whittemore v. Thompson , 139 A.3d 530, 540 (R.I. 2016) ). "[W]e must ‘consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.’ "
Id. (quoting Ryan v. City of Providence , 11 A.3d 68, 71 (R.I. 2011) ). Moreover, when construing a statute that is remedial in nature, "we will construe the statute liberally to effectuate its purposes." In re Tavares , 885 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 2005).
The applicable statute, titled "Fees and costs chargeable[,]" states:
DLT asserts that the "clear and unambiguous language" of § 28-44-57(c)(2)(iii) does not permit Mr. Beagan to collect for time and expenses devoted to proceedings "other than the proceedings at ‘which the claimant is awarded benefits.’ " (Quoting § 28-44-57(c)(2)(iii).) DLT contends that, looking at the statute in its entirety, the General Assembly intended attorneys’ fees to be paid "per proceeding and not for all or some proceedings in furtherance of obtaining an ultimate victory[.]" Furthermore, DLT points out, Rhode Island has other fee-shifting statutes; therefore, DLT argues that if the General Assembly desired § 28-44-57(c)(2)(iii) to permit the award of fees and costs for unsuccessful lower court appeals, the General Assembly would have drafted this statute as it did those other statutes. Finally, DLT makes a policy argument that, should this Court adopt Mr. Beagan's reading of the statute, attorneys would be "incentivized" to file petitions for a writ of certiorari because they would receive fees for all of their "losing efforts" before reaching this Court, which would "create a financial hardship to Rhode Island's unemployment system[.]"
Interpretation of §...
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