Beals v. Pickerel Lake Sanitary Dist.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 20161,20161
• Citation: 1998 SD 42,578 N.W.2d 134
• Parties: Melva J. BEALS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. PICKEREL LAKE SANITARY DISTRICT, a Political Subdivision of the State of South Dakota, James Porter, Al Svare and Richard Beals, in their capacity as Trustees, Appellees. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 134

578 N.W.2d 134

1998 SD 42

Melva J. BEALS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. PICKEREL LAKE SANITARY DISTRICT, a Political Subdivision of the State of South Dakota, James Porter, Al Svare and Richard Beals, in their capacity as Trustees, Appellees.

No. 20161.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Feb. 18, 1998.

Decided April 29, 1998.

William E. Coester, Milbank, for Petitioner and Appellant.

Jerome B. Lammers of Lammers, Lammers & Kleibacker, Madison, for Appellees.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

¶1 Pickerel Lake Sanitary District enacted a resolution accepting the low bid of Dahme Construction Company to construct a sewer project within its boundaries. Melva Beals, a local resident, was opposed to the resolution and circulated referendum petitions seeking to place the decision to a vote of the electorate. The petitions were rejected by District. Beals sought a writ of mandamus to require District to set a referendum election. The circuit court denied the writ and Beals appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

¶2 Pickerel Lake Sanitary District was incorporated by the Day County Commissioners in 1993. Since its inception, District has been preparing to construct a sewer project within its boundaries.

¶3 After passing resolutions pertaining to financing of the sewer project, District opened bids on February 15, 1997, for the construction of Phase I of the project. Dahme Construction Company submitted the low bid, but because District was unsure of its own finances the meeting was adjourned until March 29, 1997.

¶4 When the meeting was reconvened on March 29, a resolution was adopted awarding the construction of Phase I to Dahme, based upon its low bid of approximately $1,194,000. Two of the three trustees of District voted in favor of the resolution. Construction on the project commenced two days later.

¶5 Beals was opposed to the resolution and subsequently circulated a referendum petition to request referral of the resolution accepting Dahme's bid to the electorate. She obtained the signatures of twenty-seven registered voters within the district, thus meeting the statutory requirements for such petitions. The petition was sent to District's clerk on April 24, 1997, and the trustees were so notified. At a subsequent District meeting, a motion was made that the referendum petitions be rejected and, once again, two trustees voted in favor and one was opposed.

¶6 On May 30, 1997, Beals sought a writ of mandamus from the circuit court attempting to require District's trustees to set a referendum election as requested in the petition. The circuit court denied the writ. Beals appeals, claiming that Article III, § 1, of the South Dakota Constitution applies to sanitary districts and that SDCL 9-1-1(6), which defines "municipal corporation" and "municipality," is unconstitutional. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The proper construction to be given to a provision of our constitution is a question of law and is, therefore, reviewed de novo. Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 897 (S.D.1995) (citing Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 241 (S.D.1994); Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 899 (S.D.1991)). Review of the constitutionality of a statute is also de novo. Id. at 897-98 (citing Brown v. Egan Consol. Sch. Dist. 50-2, 449 N.W.2d 259, 260 (S.D.1989)).

¶8 It is settled law that there is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 898 (citing Specht v. City of Sioux Falls, 526 N.W.2d 727, 729 (S.D.1995)).

DECISION

¶9 1. Whether Article III, § 1, of the South Dakota Constitution applies to sanitary districts.

¶10 2. Whether SDCL 9-1-1(6) is an unconstitutional restraint on the ability to submit a sanitary district's resolution to the initiative and referendum process.

¶11 Because both of Beals' arguments are so interrelated, they will be considered together. ¹

¶12 Beals argues that Article III, § 1, of the South Dakota Constitution contemplates and permits decisions of District to be subject to the initiative and referendum processes. That section of our constitution provides:

The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a Legislature which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. However, the people expressly reserve to themselves the right to propose measures, which shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state, and also the right to require that any laws which the Legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions[.]

... This section shall apply to municipalities. ... (Emphasis added.)

Beals argues District should be considered a "municipality" or a "municipal corporation."

¶13 There are many general definitions of a "municipality" or a "municipal corporation."

A municipal corporation is a body politic created by organizing the inhabitants of a prescribed area, under the authority of the legislature, into a corporation with all the usual attributes of a corporate entity, but endowed with a public character by virtue of having been invested by the legislature with subordinate legislative powers to administer local and internal affairs of the community, and by virtue of its creation as a branch or agency of the state government to assist in the administration of the government of the state. Another definition of a municipal corporation is that it is the body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city, town, or village for the purposes of the local government thereof.

56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 4 (2dEd. 1971). Black's Law Dictionary has a similar definition for "municipality." It defines that term as:

A legally incorporated or duly authorized association of inhabitants of limited area for local governmental or other public purposes. A body politic created by the incorporation of the people of a prescribed locality invested with subordinate powers of legislation to assist in the civil government of the state and to regulate and administer local and internal affairs of the community.... A city, borough, town, township, or village.

Black's Law Dictionary 1018 (6thEd. 1990) (citation omitted).

¶14 A "district" is typically considered to be something less than a municipality, as it is created and organized by the legislature and given certain limited powers to carry out a particular public purpose. 56 AmJur2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 13 (2dEd. 1971). Districts are considered to be quasi corporations. See Frans v. Young, 30 Neb. 360, 46 N.W. 528, 529 (1890) (holding that a school district was a quasi corporation and not a municipal corporation); State v. Stewart, 74 Wis. 620, 43 N.W. 947, 948 (1889) (holding a drainage district is a quasi corporation); see also Town of Dell Rapids v. Irving, 7 S.D. 310, 315, 64 N.W. 149, 151 (1895) (describing a quasi corporation as: "Involuntary quasi corporations, such as counties, towns, and school districts, are created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the state at large, for the purposes of political organization and civil administration[.]") (citation and internal quotation omitted). It has even been specifically held that sanitary districts are quasi corporations and do not rise to the level of a municipal corporation. Brownbriar Enters., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 177 Colo. 198, 493 P.2d 352, 354 (1972); Martin Excavating, Inc. v. Tyrollean Terrace Water and Sanitation Dist., 671 P.2d 1329, 1330 (Colo.Ct.App.1983).

¶15 Beals argues the term "municipality" in Article III, § 1, of our constitution should be read broadly to cover entities such as sanitary districts. She cites to our case of Egan Indep. Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Minnehaha County, 65 S.D. 32, 270 N.W. 527 (1936), wherein we read the term "municipal corporation" broadly so as to include a school district. In Egan, it was recognized that the term "municipal corporation" is generally used in a strict sense, but that it can be interpreted broadly to embrace quasi corporations. Id., 65 S.D. at 36, 270 N.W. at 529. Article XI, § 5, of our constitution was being examined in Egan. It was decided that the term "municipal corporation" in that section was to be read broadly because, in § 10 of the same article, "cities, towns and villages" were referred to separately from "all municipal corporations." Id. The court reasoned that, because only "cities, towns and villages" were given the power to tax for local improvements and "all municipal corporations" were given authority to tax for all corporate purposes, the phrase "municipal corporations" was not to be read strictly, and was to include more than "cities, towns and villages." Id., 65 S.D. at 37, 270 N.W. at 530.

¶16 Beals claims that provisions of the constitution should be read harmoniously and, since "municipal corporation" has been interpreted broadly in Article XI, the term "municipalities" should also be read broadly in Article III.

¶17 Beals also claims that the definition in SDCL 9-1-1(6), which defines "municipal corporation" or "municipality," is unconstitutional because it conflicts with our interpretation in Egan. Title 9 of our codified laws pertains to municipal government and section 9-1-1(6) of that chapter provides:

Terms used in this title, unless the context otherwise plainly requires, shall mean:

. . . . .

(6) "Municipal corporation" or "municipality," all cities and towns organized under the laws of this state but shall not include any other political subdivisions[.]

¶18 In examining SDCL 9-1-1(6), we cannot say that it is unconstitutional....