Beattie v. Beattie

• Decision Date: 06 April 1993
• Citation: 630 A.2d 1096
• Parties: Margaret S. BEATTIE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Michael C. BEATTIE, Defendant Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1096

630 A.2d 1096

Margaret S. BEATTIE, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. Michael C. BEATTIE, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: April 6, 1993.

Decided: July 29, 1993.

Corrected: Sept. 21, 1993.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

John G. Mulford (argued), and Richard L. Abbott, Theisen, Lank Mulford & Goldberg, P.A., Wilmington, for appellant.

Susan L. Parker (argued), and Kathleen M. Miller, Smith, Katzenstein & Furlow, Wilmington, for appellee.

James J. Woods, Jr. (argued), Wilmington, amicus curiae on behalf of the Delaware Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Barbara J. Gadbois (argued), Wilmington, amicus curiae on behalf of the Women and the Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Ass'n.

Wayne A. Marvel (argued), Wilmington, amicus curiae on behalf of the Defense Counsel of Delaware.

Before VEASEY, C.J., HORSEY, MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, JJ., constituting the Court en Banc.

VEASEY, Chief Justice:

In this case we review a decision of the Superior Court granting defendant husband's motion for summary judgment in a negligence action initiated by his plaintiff wife. She is seeking damages for paralyzing injuries she sustained in an automobile accident where her husband was the driver. The trial court properly followed the prior precedents of this Court and relied on the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity ("the Doctrine") which prevents one spouse from suing the other in tort. We have concluded, however, that the Doctrine is no longer a viable concept and no longer meets the needs of modern society. Accordingly, we hereby overrule our prior precedents and REVERSE and REMAND to the Superior Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS

On July 15, 1991 defendant-appellee, Michael Beattie ("Husband"), struck the back of a slow moving truck engaged in weed spraying operations on the median of Route 1 near Milford, Delaware. At the time of the collision he was driving a 1991 Oldsmobile Cutlass in which his wife, plaintiff-appellant, Margaret Beattie ("Wife"), was a passenger. His wife sustained serious injuries in the accident which have rendered her a quadriplegic. Her medical bills and expenses are in excess of $286,000. On December 17, 1991, Wife filed a negligence action against her Husband. ¹ At the time of the accident, he was covered by a substantial liability insurance policy on the vehicle. Despite the suit, the Beatties have remained married and have no plans to divorce.

II. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

On February 25, 1992, Husband filed a motion for summary judgment against his wife claiming that the Doctrine barred her negligence claim. The trial court granted the motion, but requested that an amended motion for summary judgment be filed. On June 23, 1992, the Superior Court issued an order granting the amended motion for summary judgment. ² Thereafter, the wife appealed the decision. Following oral argument before a panel of three justices, the matter was scheduled for re-hearing en Banc and amicus curiae briefing was permitted. The sole issue before this Court is whether the Doctrine should be abrogated and, if so, to what extent.

III. RATIONALE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION

The trial court's decision granting summary judgment is based upon the Doctrine. This antiquated doctrine was first applied by Delaware courts in the seminal case of Plotkin v. Plotkin, Del.Super., 32 Del. 455, 125 A. 455 (1924). In Plotkin, the Superior Court adopted the Doctrine primarily on the belief that upon marriage, the identity of the wife merged with that of the husband. The Doctrine's continued existence in Delaware since 1924 has been justified as a means of promoting family harmony and discouraging collusion and fraud upon insurance companies. Saunders v. Hill, Del.Supr., 57 Del. 519, 202 A.2d 807, 808 (1964) (the "absolute legal unity of husband and wife has been substantially eroded by the Married Women's Property Acts" and instead the Doctrine is justified as a means to promote family harmony and discourage collusion and fraud). After most recently reviewing the Doctrine in 1979, this Court held that "it retains sufficient merit to warrant continued adherence." Alfree v. Alfree, Del.Supr., 410 A.2d 161, 162 (1979).

IV. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

The issue is whether the Doctrine remains a viable concept in Delaware jurisprudence. The trial court's decision is supported by existing Delaware case law which recognizes the antiquated Doctrine. The validity of the Doctrine has been called into question. Accordingly, this issue poses a legal question which is subject to de novo review. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927, 930 (1982); Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1132 (1989).

V. ABROGATION OF THE DOCTRINE

It is well settled that the judiciary has the power to overturn judicially-created doctrine, so long as that doctrine has not been codified in a statute. Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1132 (1989); Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Lake, Del.Supr., 594 A.2d 38 (1991). Furthermore, it is the duty of this Court to review common law rules to ensure that the conditions and policy objectives that justify the rules remain relevant and valid. ³ Relying on the case of Saunders v. Hill, Husband argues, conversely, that changes in well-settled public policy must be effected by the General Assembly. 202 A.2d at 810. This reliance is misplaced, however, because the case is factually distinguishable. In Saunders the General Assembly had enacted controlling legislation. ⁴ In the present case, there is no statute that directly applies to the Doctrine. Therefore, it is within the authority of this Court to abrogate the common law doctrine if it no longer merits recognition.

This Court refused to abrogate the Doctrine in Alfree, 410 A.2d at 162, despite the renunciation of the parental immunity doctrine in Williams v. Williams, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 669 (1976). Williams held that the promotion of family harmony and the discouragement of collusive and fraudulent claims were unacceptable justifications for the parental immunity doctrine "in light of contemporary conditions and modern concepts of fairness." Id. at 671. The Alfree Court declined to abrogate the Doctrine because it was then perceived that the effects would be far-reaching and the problem was "more appropriate for legislative solution than for judicial determination." Alfree, 410 A.2d at 163 (citation omitted).

The Alfree Court's rationale for retaining the Doctrine included: 1) the preservation of family harmony and 2) the prevention of fraud and collusion. Id. at 162. These were the same rationales that were rejected with regard to parental immunity in Williams. It is inconceivable that suits between children and parents are less likely to disrupt family harmony than interspousal suits. This is also true with respect to property claims and actions for breach of contract, which are actionable in the family context.

In our view, the Doctrine is more likely to have the effect of disrupting family harmony rather than preserving it. Denying a person compensation for injuries arising from the negligence of his or her spouse can be very disruptive (e.g., large medical bills and loss of wages often result from serious accidents). Under the Doctrine, the married couple will have to pay these huge expenses, instead of relying on insurance proceeds. This added financial burden could well promote marital discord. Hack v. Hack, Pa.Supr., 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981). Any destruction of family harmony that is prevented by the Doctrine is likely to be minimal due to the prevalence of liability insurance. In addition, the Doctrine may actually promote divorces because a person who suffers an injury at the hands of his or her spouse, but who has since divorced the spouse, may maintain a tort action against the former spouse. Hudson v. Hudson, Del.Super., 532 A.2d 620, 624, appeal refused, Del.Supr., 527 A.2d 281 (1987). Accordingly, it is conceivable that spouses may decide to divorce solely to bypass the restrictions of a Doctrine which putatively is designed to preserve marital harmony. Such a result is repugnant to public policy.

Because of the prevalence of liability insurance, Husband argues that collusion and fraud will increase if spouses are able to sue each other. It is true that the adversarial system may be subject to tension because it is in the defendant spouse's interest for his or her injured spouse to receive some compensation, especially when the insurance company is the "real" party being sued. Such tension could potentially lead to a threat of corruption. Although the possibility of collusion exists in various situations such as intrafamily cases and suits between friends, the judicial system is adept at ferreting out frivolous and unfounded cases. ⁵ It is unnecessary and unwise to deny legitimate claims in order to prevent fraudulent and collusive suits because the judicial system contains numerous safeguards and deterrents against fraudulent claims such as perjury charges and modern discovery procedures. ⁶ Luna v. Clayton, Tenn.Supr., 655 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (1983). Cf., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supersedes the "general acceptance" rule regarding scientific evidence, and that the adversarial process, including "vigorous cross-examination," provides safeguards against admission of "junk science" evidence).

The conclusion that the abrogation of the Doctrine will not lead to the destruction of family harmony or the proliferation of fraudulent suits is amply supported by empirical evidence. ⁷ Delaware is the only state in the nation which recognizes the doctrine solely on common law grounds. ⁸ Four other states also recognize the Doctrine, ⁹ but do so pursuant to a statute...