Bell v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.
| Decision Date | 30 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–14–0095–PR.,CV–14–0095–PR. |
| Citation | 341 P.3d 1149,705 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24,236 Ariz. 478 |
| Parties | Linda BELL, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, Maricopa County, Respondent Employer, Pinnacle Risk Management, Respondent Carrier. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
236 Ariz. 478
341 P.3d 1149
705 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24
Linda BELL, Petitioner
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent
Maricopa County, Respondent Employer
Pinnacle Risk Management, Respondent Carrier.
No. CV–14–0095–PR.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Jan. 30, 2015.
Brian I. Clymer (argued), Brian Clymer Attorney at Law; Matt C. Fendon, Janell Youtsey, J. Victor Stoffa, Fendon Law Firm, Phoenix, for Linda Bell.
Scott H. Houston (argued), Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C., Phoenix, for Maricopa County and Pinnacle Risk Management.
Toby Zimbalist, Phoenix, for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of Lawyers for Injured Workers.
Vice Chief Justice PELANDER authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice BALES, and Justices BERCH, BRUTINEL, and TIMMER joined.
Opinion
Vice Chief Justice PELANDER, opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 As part of Arizona's workers' compensation statutes, A.R.S. § 23–1062(B) directs when an injured employee becomes entitled to compensation for lost wages due to a work-related injury and how such compensation is payable thereafter. We hold that the waiting period for compensation set forth in § 23–1062(B) applies to claims for all types of disability, including both temporary partial disability (“TPD”) under A.R.S. § 23–1044(A) and temporary total disability (“TTD”) under A.R.S. § 23–1045 (A). We further hold that § 23–1062(B) does not require proof of an initial period of TTD, but does require proof of seven consecutive days of some type of work-related disability before an injured employee becomes entitled to compensation for any type of disability, including TPD.
I.
¶ 2 Linda Bell was injured at her job at the Maricopa County Public Defender's Office in February 2010. She continued working after her injury, but missed work intermittently over the next seventeen months to attend medical appointments and receive treatment. Bell used sick leave and vacation time during that time to avoid loss of income. In July 2011, she underwent surgery for her injury and thereafter was off work for several months.
¶ 3 Bell requested a hearing before the Industrial Commission of Arizona (“ICA”) on whether she was entitled to TPD compensation to reimburse her for the sick leave and vacation time she had used during the seventeen months following her injury. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Bell's request for TPD compensation after an evidentiary hearing, finding that she “ha [d] not submitted any medical evidence that she [had been] taken off work during the time period for which temporary compensation benefits are requested.” Although Bell testified that the aggregate time she missed from
work during the seventeen months amounted to more than seven days, the ALJ found that Bell “did not miss any period of time over one week,” and that her employer had accommodated all her medical restrictions. In addition, the ALJ concluded that § 23–1062(B) limits compensation to those employees who can demonstrate that their “injury cause[d] total disability for more than seven days.” The ALJ summarily affirmed the decision upon review.
¶ 4 The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ's award and decision upon review. Bell v. Indus. Comm'n, 234 Ariz. 113, 114 ¶ 1, 317 P.3d 654, 655 (App.2014). The court held that “the waiting period created by A.R.S. § 23–1062(B) must be satisfied by temporary total disability rather than temporary partial disability,” and “by temporary total disability on consecutive working days.” Id. at 115–16 ¶¶ 12, 16, 317 P.3d at 656–57. Thus, the court upheld the ALJ's findings that Bell was not entitled to TPD compensation because she failed to prove she had satisfied § 23–1062(B)'s waiting period. Id. at 117 ¶¶ 17, 19, 317 P.3d at 658.
¶ 5 We granted review because the legal issues presented are of statewide importance, potentially affecting other workers' compensation claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.
II.
¶ 6 The issues presented are (1) whether the waiting period of § 23–1062(B) precludes a claim for TPD compensation without prior total disability, and, if not, (2) whether consecutive days of lost time from work are required to prove entitlement to TPD compensation. We review de novo the meaning of § 23–1062(B) and its applicability to § 23–1044(A). See In re Estate of Riley, 231 Ariz. 330, 332 ¶ 9, 295 P.3d 428, 430 (2013).
A.
1.
¶ 7 If a statute's language is subject to only one reasonable meaning, we apply that meaning. J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 40–41 ¶ 6, 335 P.3d 1118, 1119–20 (2014). When the language can reasonably be read more than one way, however, we may consider the statute's subject matter, legislative history, and purpose, as well as the effect of different interpretations, to derive its meaning. See Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383 ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013). Moreover, when statutes such as §§ 23–1044 and –1062 “relate to the same subject ... they should be construed together ... as though they constituted one law” and interpretively reconciled “whenever possible, in such a way so as to give effect to all the statutes involved.” Pima County v. Maya Constr. Co., 158 Ariz. 151, 155, 761 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1988). Because the text of §§ 23–1044 and –1062 does not itself resolve the issues presented, we consider other factors to guide our analysis.
¶ 8 Section 23–1044(A), entitled “Compensation for partial disability; computation,” in pertinent part provides: “For temporary partial disability there shall be paid during the period thereof sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the difference between the wages earned before the injury and the wages which the injured person is able to earn thereafter.” Only § 23–1044, and no other statute, “provides the method of determining the amount of compensation for partial disability.” Alsbrooks v. Indus. Comm'n, 118 Ariz. 480, 481, 578 P.2d 159, 160 (1978) ; see A.R.S. tit. 23, ch. 6.
¶ 9 Section 23–1062(B), under the heading “commencement of compensation,” directs the commencement of payments to an injured employee:
The first installment of compensation is to be paid no later than the twenty-first day after written notification by the commission to the carrier of the filing of a claim except where the right to compensation is denied. Thereafter, compensation shall be paid at least once each two weeks during the period of temporary total disability and at least monthly thereafter. Compensation shall not be paid for the first seven days after the injury. If the incapacity extends beyond the period of seven days, compensation shall begin on the eighth day
after the injury, but if the disability continues for one week beyond such seven days, compensation shall be computed from the date of the injury.
Section 23–1062(B) is the only provision in the workers' compensation statutes that addresses timing of payments. See A.R.S. tit. 23, ch. 6. While it determines when compensation is payable, § 23–1044(A) determines the amount of compensation owed for periods of TPD.
¶ 10 “The word ‘disability,’ as used in our Compensation Act, does not mean disablement to perform the particular work [the employee] was doing at the time of [the] injury, but refers to injuries which result in impairment of earning power generally.”Savich v. Indus. Comm'n, 39 Ariz. 266, 270, 5 P.2d 779, 780 (1931) ; see also Time, D.C. Freight Lines v. Indus. Comm'n, 148 Ariz. 117, 119, 713 P.2d 318, 320 (App.1985) (“[T]he common denominator for disability compensation during each stage is the claimant's reduced earning capacity and the fundamental point is that whether temporary or permanent, the claimant is being compensated for a loss of earning capacity.”). “[W]hen [A.R.S. § 23–1044 ] says ‘disability,’ it means earning capacity disability even though the effect upon the work[er]'s earning capacity may be minimal,” Alsbrooks, 118 Ariz. at 484, 578 P.2d at 163, and likewise “[t]he terms ‘incapacity’ and ‘disability’ in A.R.S. § 23–1062(B) refer to loss in earning capacity, as opposed to loss of actual earnings,” Tartaglia v. Indus. Comm'n, 177 Ariz. 199, 201, 866 P.2d 867, 869 (1994). Thus, the compensation at issue in this case is for a claimed loss in earning capacity resulting from a work-related injury, as distinguished from “medical, surgical, and hospital benefits” to which an injured employee is generally entitled under § 23–1062(A).
2.
¶ 11 The parties conceded two significant points during oral argument in this Court. Bell conceded, as she did in the court of appeals, that the seven-day waiting period prescribed in § 23–1062(B)'s third sentence applies to claims for both TTD and TPD. See Bell, 234 Ariz. at 114–15 ¶ 8,...
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