Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604, Intern. Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC v. City of Bellevue

• Decision Date: 12 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 49257-3,CLC,AFL-CI,49257-3
• Citation: 100 Wn.2d 748,675 P.2d 592
• Parties: BELLEVUE FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL 1604, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS,, an unincorporated voluntary association; Ron Pedee; and William P. Spieth, Appellants, v. CITY OF BELLEVUE, a municipal corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 748

100 Wn.2d 748

675 P.2d 592

BELLEVUE FIRE FIGHTERS LOCAL 1604, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, CLC, an unincorporated voluntary association; Ron Pedee; and William P. Spieth, Appellants, v. CITY OF BELLEVUE, a municipal corporation, Respondent.

No. 49257-3.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Jan. 12, 1984.

Durning, Webster & Lonnquist, James Webster, Judith Lonnquist, Lynn Weir, Seattle, for appellants.

Linda M. Youngs, Bellevue City Atty., Bellevue, for respondent.

Smyth & Van Siclen, Robert C. Van Siclen, Auburn, David Utevsky, Daniel Thieme, Seattle, amicus curiae for appellants.

Robert R. Hamilton, Tacoma City Atty., F.H. Chapin, Jr., Harding T. Roe, Asst. City Attys., Tacoma, amicus curiae for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

This case is a challenge to § 3.90.050(B) of the Bellevue City Code (BCC), which provides with respect to nonpartisan elections for positions on the Bellevue city council:

No city employee shall take an active part in the political management or political campaign of a candidate for a position on the Bellevue city council.

Pursuant to BCC 3.90.060, violation of BCC 3.90.050(B) is punishable by civil and criminal sanctions. The offender may also be suspended or discharged from city employment.

The Bellevue Fire Fighters Union, a Bellevue Fire Department captain, and a registered voter (appellants), filed suit against the City of Bellevue (City), contending that BCC 3.90.050(B) violated RCW 41.06.250 and the state and federal constitutions. The trial court upheld the ordinance, lifted a preliminary injunction against its enforcement, and dismissed the complaint. We reverse on the ground that RCW 41.06.250 preempts local regulation of employee participation in nonpartisan political campaigns.

RCW 41.06.250 provides in relevant part:

(2) Employees of the state or any political subdivision thereof shall have the right to vote and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates and to hold any political party office or participate in the management of a partisan, political campaign. Nothing in this section shall prohibit an employee of the state or any political subdivision thereof from participating fully in campaigns relating to constitutional amendments, referendums, initiatives, and issues of a similar character, and for nonpartisan offices.

* * *

(5) The provisions of this section shall supersede all statutes, charter provisions, ordinances, resolutions, regulations, and requirements promulgated by the state or any subdivision thereof, including any provision of any county charter, insofar as they may be in conflict with the provisions of this section.

(Italics ours.)

Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wash.2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163 (1982). Relying on this familiar rule, City contends RCW 41.06.250 plainly and unambiguously permits the political subdivisions of this state to prohibit employee participation in nonpartisan political campaigns. City's argument may be summarized as follows: the first sentence of RCW 41.06.250(2) affirms the right of employees of the state and its subdivisions to participate in partisan political campaigns. However, the second sentence does not affirm the right to participate in nonpartisan campaigns, but merely refrains from prohibiting such participation itself. Therefore, BCC 3.90.050(B), which prohibited City's employees from participating in the nonpartisan campaigns for Bellevue city council, did not conflict with RCW 41.06.250(2) and was not preempted by RCW 41.06.250(5). ¹

We are not persuaded. If, as City contends, the second sentence of RCW 41.06.250(2) serves only to give notice that the statute itself does not prohibit employee participation in nonpartisan campaigns, why include it at all? The first sentence of RCW 41.06.250(2) affirms the right of employees to participate in partisan campaigns; there is no need for a cautionary proviso that the statute does not prohibit participation in nonpartisan campaigns. On the other hand, the double negative contained in the second sentence ("nothing ... shall prohibit") could just as easily be read as an inartfully drawn attempt to affirm the right to participate in nonpartisan campaigns. Thus, we cannot say that the second sentence of RCW 41.06.250(2), when read in context, plainly and unambiguously permits local regulation of employee participation in nonpartisan campaigns.

The primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the Legislature. Where, as here, intent is not clear from the language of the statute, we may consider the legislative history. Department of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wash.2d 454, 458, 645 P.2d 1076 (1982).

When first enacted as part of the State Civil Service Law, RCW 41.06.250 provided in relevant part:

(2) Employees shall have the right to vote and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates, but shall not hold any political party office or participate in the management of a partisan, political campaign. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a classified employee from participating fully in campaigns relating to constitutional amendments, referendums, initiatives, and issues of a similar character, and for non-partisan offices.

Laws of 1961, ch. 1, § 25(2), p. 21.

In 1974, the Legislature added RCW 41.06.250(5), and amended RCW 41.06.250(2) as follows:

(2) Employees [ADDED:(of the state or any political subdivision thereof)] shall have the right to vote and to express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates [DELETED:(, but shall not)] [ADDED:(and to)] hold any political party office or participate in the management of a partisan, political campaign. Nothing in this section shall prohibit [DELETED:(a classified)] [ADDED:(an)] employee [ADDED:(of the state or any political subdivision thereof)] from participating fully in campaigns relating to constitutional amendments, referendums, initiatives, and issues of a similar character, and for non-partisan offices. ²

Laws of 1974, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 136, § 1, p. 400.

Thus, RCW 41.06.250 originally prohibited state employees from participating in partisan political campaigns; however, the right of state employees to participate fully in nonpartisan campaigns was protected by the proviso that nothing in the statute prohibited such participation. The 1974 amendments eliminated the ban on participation in partisan campaigns, extended the statute's protection to employees of the state's political subdivisions, and preempted conflicting law. The obvious legislative intent behind these amendments was to increase the ability of employees to engage in political activity.

Viewed in light of this intent, City's interpretation of RCW 41.06.250 breaks down. The second sentence of RCW 41.06.250(2) originally served as a proviso protecting the right to participate in nonpartisan campaigns. By affirming the right to participate in partisan campaigns, the Legislature surely did not intend to transform this protective proviso into superfluous verbiage providing only that the statute itself does not prohibit participation in nonpartisan campaigns. It is far more consistent with the manifest legislative intent to expand employee rights to interpret the proviso as an inelegantly drafted attempt to reaffirm the right of state and subdivision employees to participate in nonpartisan campaigns.

City insists that the Legislature intended to grant to political subdivisions of the state the authority to regulate the political activity of their own employees. However, the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to RCW 41.06.250 shows that the Legislature expressly rejected proposed provisions which would have granted such authority. Acting on the recommendation of its Committee on Constitution and Elections, the House amended House Bill 474 to include provisions which would have reserved to any county, city or town the authority to prohibit or restrict any employee from engaging in, as a candidate or in the management of, any partisan or nonpartisan campaign for public office of that county, city or town, or any instrumentality thereof. House Journal, 43rd Legislature (1973-74), at 678, 1757. In the Senate, however, these provisions were eliminated. The Senate proposed a new version of the bill which included the present language of RCW 41.06.250(2) and (5); the House then passed the bill as amended by the Senate. House Journal, 43rd Legislature (1973-74), at 4037-38.

Consideration of the legislative history of an enactment has long been held to be a legitimate method of determining the Legislature's intent. State v. Frampton, 95 Wash.2d 469, 477, 627 P.2d 922 (1981). Moreover, we have acknowledged the value in appropriate circumstances of considering sequential drafts of a bill. See The Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash.2d 441, 450, 536 P.2d 157 (1975). It is presumed that members of the Legislature were aware of prior drafts of the bill at the time the 1974 amendments to RCW 41.06.250 were enacted. See Frampton, 95 Wash. at 477-78, 627 P.2d 922. Therefore, it must be presumed that the Legislature did not intend to grant authority to political subdivisions of the state to prohibit or restrain their employees from participating in partisan or nonpartisan campaigns.

Nevertheless, City contends that, because the rejected provisions would have permitted regulation of participation in both partisan and nonpartisan campaigns, the fact that the Legislature eliminated them in favor of the present language of RCW 41.06.250 indicates only that the Legislature intended to draw a distinction between partisan and nonpartisan political activity. City suggests no reason why such a distinction should be drawn.

If all political subdivisions of the...