Collins v. City of West Haven

• Citation: 210 Conn. 423,555 A.2d 981
• Decision Date: 21 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13465,13465
• Parties: Harold J. COLLINS v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN, et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 981

555 A.2d 981

210 Conn. 423

Harold J. COLLINS v. CITY OF WEST HAVEN, et al.

No. 13465.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 4, 1989.

Decided March 21, 1989.

Edward Gallant, with whom were Keith Bradoc Gallant and, on the brief, Betty G. Levy, New Haven, for appellant (named defendant).

W. Paul Flynn, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were Charles L. Flynn, Vandalia, and Howard A. Lawrence, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN and COVELLO, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The named defendant, the city of West Haven (city), appeals from the decision of the compensation review division of the workers' compensation commission dismissing its appeal and denying its motion to open and modify the award of the workers' compensation commissioner for the third district in favor of the plaintiff, Harold J. Collins. The sole issue on appeal is whether the commissioner had jurisdiction to award the plaintiff compensation benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c. ¹ Because the plaintiff's notice satisfied the requirements of § 31-294, ² we conclude that the commissioner had jurisdiction to award such benefits. There is, therefore, no error.

This case revolves around the interrelationship of the Workers' Compensation Act; General Statutes, tit. 31, c. 568; and General Statutes § 7-433c. The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to "provide compensation for any injury 'arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer.' Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 217, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979); Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886 (1968)." Bakelaar v. West Haven, 193 Conn. 59, 67, 475 A.2d 283 (1984). Heart disease and hypertension are just some of the many ailments compensable under the act. See, e.g., McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104, 111-16, 527 A.2d 664 (1987). In order to recover under chapter 568, however, " '[t]he employee has the burden of proving that the injury claimed arose out of the employment and occurred in the course of the employment.' McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 550, 398 A.2d 1161 (1979)." Bakelaar v. West Haven, supra, 193 Conn. at 67, 475 A.2d 283. Section 7-433c, on the other hand, was enacted to provide "special compensation" to qualifying policemen and firemen who die or become disabled as a result of hypertension or heart disease. Id. It requires the employer to pay compensation to those officers "who have successfully passed a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease and who subsequently die or are disabled as a result of such conditions" whether or not the " 'disease resulted from the employee's occupation or ... occurred in the line and scope of his employment.' " Id. at 68-69, 475 A.2d 283; Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 178 Conn. 664, 670, 425 A.2d 131 (1979). An employee may, if the facts so warrant elect to proceed under either chapter 568 or § 7-433c. Bakelaar v. West Haven, supra.

It is undisputed in the present case that the plaintiff was a regular, paid, uniformed member of the West Haven police department. Upon entry into the service of the city, the plaintiff underwent a physical examination that failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease. On May 2, 1973, while off duty, the plaintiff suffered a heart attack and has since been totally disabled.

On July 6, 1973, the plaintiff filed a "Form for Notice of Claim for Compensation" with the commissioner. The notice, which is a standardized form provided by the workers' compensation commission, required the plaintiff to fill in basic identification information and to state the nature of his injury. This line of the form reads: "Notice is hereby given that the undersigned, who while in the employ of ..... (Name of Employer) ..... at ... (Town) ... on the.... day of ....... 19 ... sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment as follows: (State nature of injury in ordinary language)." The plaintiff in this case typed the following response: "Acute myocardial infarction--hypertension, heart disease." A copy of the plaintiff's notice form was sent to the city and to its insurance carrier, Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial Union), with whom the city had contracted to insure itself against workers' compensation claims. The city was self-insured for claims brought under § 7-433c. See Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra.

It was not until July 16, 1975, that a hearing was held before the commissioner on the matter. At this hearing Commercial Union contested its liability to pay compensation under chapter 568 because it considered it doubtful that the plaintiff's illness resulted from his employment. ³ At that hearing the city did not make an appearance to contest its liability under § 7-433c and, therefore, the commissioner decided to delay the rendering of an award. The commissioner rescheduled a hearing for January 21, 1976, to address the claim under § 7-433c and notified the city that it should attend. After the hearing the commissioner issued a finding in favor of the plaintiff awarding him benefits under § 7-433c. In limiting its award to such benefits, the commissioner refused to make a ruling as to the responsibility of Commercial Union under chapter 568.

The city appealed the commissioner's award to the Court of Common Pleas in April, 1976. Prior to a decision by the court, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand the matter to the commissioner for further proceedings. The plaintiff's motion was granted by the court on December 22, 1977. The remand remained pending before the commissioner until November 30, 1981, when the city filed a motion to open and modify the commissioner's award pursuant to General Statutes § 31-315 "to eliminate all references to § 7-433c, and to provide for liability, if any, based solely on Chapter 568." On April 23, 1986, the commissioner denied the city's motion.

On April 30, 1986, the city filed a petition with the compensation review division for reconsideration of the commissioner's denial of its motion. The review division refused to find that the commissioner had abused her discretion and upheld her decision denying the city's motion stating that "the use by Claimant of the words 'heart' and 'hypertension' in his own description of his injury certainly justified the Commissioner's interpretation of that choice [of remedies] to be one under Sec. 7-433c." It thereafter dismissed the city's appeal. ⁴ On April 22, 1988, the city filed an appeal from the review division's decision in the Appellate Court. We transferred the matter to ourselves, pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

On appeal, the city argues that the review division erred in refusing to find that the commissioner had abused her discretion when she denied its motion to open and modify the 1976 award in favor of the plaintiff. According to the city, the commissioner lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award the plaintiff benefits under § 7-433c because the plaintiff had failed specifically to notify the city of his intent to proceed under that section within one year from the date of the accident as required by § 31-294. Although the plaintiff filed a notice within weeks of his injury, the city contends that notice was notice only of a workers' compensation claim. The city argues that because " § 7-433c" was not typed in the notice and not adverted to until the hearing before the commissioner in 1976, there was no timely notice of the § 7-433c claim. We disagree.

As we have stated on numerous occasions, while the Workers' Compensation Act and § 7-433c are separate pieces of legislation, "[t]he procedure for determining recovery under § 7-433c is the same as that outlined in chapter 568, presumably because 'the legislature saw fit to limit the "procedural avenue" for bringing claims under § 7-433c to that already existing under chapter 568 rather than require the duplication of the administrative machinery available [under the Workers' Compensation Act] and further burden the courts and the municipalities [with additional litigation from claims by firemen and policemen pursuant to this legislation].' " Bakelaar v. West Haven, supra, 193 Conn. at 68, 475 A.2d 283, quoting Plainville v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra, 178 Conn. at 671-72, 425 A.2d 131; see Grover v. Manchester, 165 Conn. 615, 617-18, 353 A.2d 719 (1973); Cuccuro v. West Haven, 6 Conn.App. 265, 267, 505 A.2d 1 cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 508 A.2d 31, 199 Conn. 805, 508 A.2d 32 (1986); Janco v. Fairfield, 39 Conn.Sup. 403, 405, 466 A.2d 1 (1983). Section 7-433c, therefore, directs claimants to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act; General Statutes, tit. 31, c. 568; to determine how to proceed with a claim for compensation.

Section 31-294 states that "[n]o proceedings for compensation ... shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident...." That section also requires that a claimant's form of notice "state, in simple language, the date and place of the accident and the nature of the injury resulting therefrom ... and the name and address of the employee and of the person in whose interest compensation is claimed." (Emphasis added.) Compliance with § 31-294 is essential to maintaining a claim for compensation under chapter 568 and therefore under § 7-433c because timely notice is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. Cuccuro v. West Haven, supra; Janco v. Fairfield, supra at 406, 466 A.2d 1; see also Walsh v. Waldron & Sons, 112 Conn. 579, 584, 153 A. 298 (1931). ⁵

The plaintiff in the present case provided the city with written notification of his intent to seek compensation within weeks of his injury as required by § 31-294 and his form of notice contained all of...