Bethea v. State, 39915
| Decision Date | 07 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 39915,39915 |
| Citation | 251 Ga. 328,304 S.E.2d 713 |
| Parties | BETHEA v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
William O. Cox, G. Terry Jackson, Calhoun, Hubbard, Riddle, & Cox, P.C., Savannah, for Johnny Bethea.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., Savannah, David T. Lock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Johnny Bethea was convicted in Chatham County of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The victim, Keyvian Clowers, was the twenty-two month old son of Patricia Clowers, with whom Bethea was living at the time of the child's death.
1. Medical testimony indicated that the child had sustained injuries from blows to his head and abdomen which had been inflicted over a period of several days. The immediate cause of death was a blow to the stomach which ruptured his liver, causing bleeding into the abdominal cavity.
The investigating officer testified that he responded to a telephone call from Bethea indicating that the child was sick. When the officer arrived at Mrs. Clowers' apartment, Bethea motioned him upstairs, where the officer found the child dressed in a pullover shirt and diaper, lying face down in a crib. Although no vital signs were apparent, the officer rushed the child to the hospital by police car while Bethea, as instructed, attempted artificial respiration. An emergency medical team was assembled at the hospital to administer treatment.
Detective Rawls testified that before he was arrested, Bethea told her that he and some friends were watching television in Patricia Clowers' apartment; that he and a friend looked in on the child and found him sleeping in his crib; that Mrs. Clowers returned to her apartment and then left; Bethea later discovered that the child was cold, and called the police.
Bethea was in the United States Army at the time of the death. His commanding officer, Captain Barnard, testified that at Bethea's request he met with Bethea in the county jail approximately two and a half weeks after the death. There, Bethea said he was at home in Patricia Clowers' apartment watching a football game and drinking. The child was upstairs crying; Bethea struck him to keep him from crying. He started to bring him downstairs, but the child continued crying, and Bethea struck the child again, knocking him down the steps. Although he knew the child was seriously injured, he did not call the police immediately because he was fearful that the death would be viewed as intentional and not accidental, as he had been drinking at the time. Two hours later he called the police.
2. The evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense of felony murder (homicide committed during the commission of the felony of cruelty to children). Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
3. Bethea contends that his character was put into evidence unlawfully by the pathologist's testimony concerning certain injuries to the head and torso of the child which were not contributory to his death.
The pathologist was entitled to describe the condition of the child's body as observed during his examination, and, at the same time, to express his expert opinion that the laceration of the liver was the sole cause of death. OCGA § 24-9-67 (Code Ann. § 38-1710). His testimony was not inadmissible because it might possibly give rise to inferences adverse to Bethea. Further, there was no motion for a mistrial. Hughes v. State, 239 Ga. 393, 396(2), 236 S.E.2d 829 (1977).
4. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in overruling Bethea's objection to the state's closing argument that the jurors should "try to eliminate in [their] minds anything except this case and the evidence before [them]." Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 348(11), 276 S.E.2d 224 (1981). Even if this statement might suggest that the jurors should disregard Captain Barnard's testimony that Bethea was a good soldier, it is plainly within the bounds of proper argument, as either party is free to suggest to jurors that they place heavy weight, or that they disregard totally, any aspect of the evidence. Indeed, that is the very substance of argument.
5. Bethea contends that his statements to Detective Rawls were taken in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), because they were given while he was in custody and after his attorney had insisted that the police not question him.
At the Jackson-Denno hearing, Detective Rawls acknowleged that, at the preliminary hearing, she said that she took Bethea's statement after his arrest. She then explained that her prior testimony was in error, and that Bethea's statements in fact were taken during the preliminary investigation and before Bethea's arrest. The trial court admitted the statements, and we accept his factual determination, as supported by the evidence. Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713(1), 285 S.E.2d 687 (1982).
6. Bethea contends that Detective Rawls improperly commented on his right to remain silent by testifying that he refused to give a written statement, and to sign her written memorandum of his oral statement. Bethea signed a written waiver and made an oral statement, thereby waiving his right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Even were her testimony a "comment," this contention is inapposite to the circumstances of the case.
7. After arrest, Bethea asked his platoon sergeant to request that his captain come to see him in jail. Captain Barnard thereafter agreed to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield
...have been " 'beyond the ken of the average layman.' " Smith v. State, 247 Ga. at 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, supra. Accord, Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328 (10), 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of their opinions. See Coursey Bldg. Assoc. v. Baker, 1......
-
Thornton v. State
...in question were beyond the ken of the average jurors. Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851(3), 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987); Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328(10), 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983). Considering all these circumstances we find no 12. Thornton argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to require ......
-
Hill v. State
...pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and made an oral statement. Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328, 330(6), 304 S.E.2d 713 (1983). See also Moore v. State, 207 Ga.App. 802–803, 430 S.E.2d 115 (1993) (refusal to sign a waiver form or a confession does......
-
State v. Jones
...State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 495 A.2d 90, 105 (1985) (expert opinion that victim died of poisoning proper); Bethea v. State, 251 Ga. 328, 304 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1983) (expert testimony that victim's death caused by a blow to abdomen, and not by a fall down the stairs proper because medical c......