Bohannon v. State (Ex parte Bohannon)

Decision Date30 September 2016
Docket Number1150640
Citation222 So.3d 525
Parties EX PARTE Jerry BOHANNON (In re Jerry Bohannon v. State of Alabama)
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Bryan A. Stevenson, Randy S. Susskind, and John W. Dalton, Equal Justice Initiative, Montgomery, for petitioner.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Andrew Brasher, deputy atty. gen., and J. Clayton Crenshaw and Lauren A. Simpson, asst. attys. gen., for respondent.

STUART, Justice.

This Court granted certiorari review of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Jerry Bohannon's conviction for capital murder and his sentence of death. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

The evidence presented at trial established the following. Around 7:30 a.m. on December 11, 2010, Jerry Bohannon, Anthony Harvey, and Jerry DuBoise were in the parking lot of the Paradise Lounge, a nightclub in Mobile. The security cameras in the parking lot recorded DuBoise and Harvey talking with Bohannon. After DuBoise and Harvey had turned and walked several feet away from him, Bohannon reached for a pistol. Apparently, when they heard Bohannon cock the hammer of the pistol, DuBoise and Harvey turned to look at Bohannon. DuBoise and Harvey then ran; Bohannon pursued them, shooting several times. DuBoise and Harvey ran around the corner of the building and when they reappeared they had guns. A gunfight ensued. Harvey was shot in the upper left chest; DuBoise was shot three times in the abdomen. The testimony indicated that, in addition to shooting DuBoise and Harvey, Bohannon pistol-whipped them. Both DuBoise and Harvey died of injuries inflicted by Bohannon.

In June 2011, Bohannon was charged with two counts of capital murder in connection with the deaths. The murders were made capital because two or more persons were killed "by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct." § 13A–5–40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. Following a jury trial, Bohannon was convicted of two counts of capital murder. During the penalty phase, the jury recommended by a vote of 11-1 that Bohannon be sentenced to death; the circuit court sentenced Bohannon to death for each capital-murder conviction. Bohannon appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed one of Bohannon's capital-murder convictions but remanded the case, in light of a double-jeopardy violation, for the circuit court to set aside one of Bohannon's capital-murder convictions and its sentence. Bohannon v. State , 222 So.3d 457 (Ala.Crim.App.2015). The circuit court vacated one conviction and sentence, and, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Bohannon's death sentence. Bohannon v. State , 222 So.3d 457, 523 (Ala.Crim.App.2015). Bohannon petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. This Court granted Bohannon's petition to consider four grounds:

—Whether Bohannon's death sentence must be vacated in light of Hurst v. Florida , 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) ;
—Whether the circuit court's characterization of the jury's penalty-phase determination as a recommendation and as advisory conflicts with Hurst ;
—Whether the circuit court committed plain error by allowing the State to question defense character witnesses about Bohannon's alleged acts on the night of the shooting; and
—Whether the circuit court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the victims' intoxication?
Standard of Review

Bohannon's case involves only issues of law and the application of the law to the undisputed facts; therefore, our review is de novo. Ex parte Key , 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003) ("This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo."), and State v. Hill , 690 So.2d 1201, 1203–04 (Ala.1996).

Discussion

First, Bohannon contends that his death sentence must be vacated in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst .

In 2000, in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime above the statutory maximum must be presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the United States Supreme Court, applying its decision in Apprendi to a capital-murder case, stated that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a "jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." 536 U.S. at 589. Specifically, the Court held that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment required that a jury "find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Ring , 536 U.S. at 585. Thus, Ring held that, in a capital case, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires that the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance that would make the defendant eligible for a death sentence.

In Ex parte Waldrop , 859 So.2d 1181 (Ala.2002), this Court considered the constitutionality of Alabama's capital-sentencing scheme in light of Apprendi and Ring , stating:

"Waldrop argues that under Alabama law a defendant cannot be sentenced to death unless, after an initial finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, there is a second finding: (1) that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, see Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(f), and (2) that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, see Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–46(e)(3). Those determinations, Waldrop argues, are factual findings that under Ring must be made by the jury and not the trial court. Because, Waldrop argues, the trial judge in his case, and not the jury, found that two aggravating circumstances existed and that those aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, Waldrop claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated. We disagree.
"It is true that under Alabama law at least one statutory aggravating circumstance under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–4–49, must exist in order for a defendant convicted of a capital offense to be sentenced to death. See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(f) (‘Unless at least one aggravating circumstance as defined in Section 13A–5–49 exists, the sentence shall be life imprisonment without parole.’); Johnson v. State , 823 So.2d 1, 52 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) (holding that in order to sentence a capital defendant to death, the sentencer "must determine the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in [Ala. Code 1975,] § 13A–5–49" (quoting Ex parte Woodard , 631 So.2d 1065, 1070 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) )). Many capital offenses listed in Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–40, include conduct that clearly corresponds to certain aggravating circumstances found in § 13A–5–49:
" ‘For example, the capital offenses of intentional murder during a rape, § 13A–5–40(a)(3), intentional murder during a robbery, § 13A–5–40(a)(2), intentional murder during a burglary, § 13A–5–40(a)(4), and intentional murder during a kidnapping, § 13A–5–40(a)(1), parallel the aggravating circumstance that "[t]he capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged ... [in a] rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping," § 13A–5–49(4).’
" Ex parte Woodard , 631 So.2d at 1070–71 (alterations and omission in original).
"Furthermore, when a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, ‘any aggravating circumstance which the verdict convicting the defendant establishes was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial shall be considered as proven beyond a reasonable doubt for purposes of the sentencing hearing.’ Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(e) ; see also Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–50 (‘The fact that a particular capital offense as defined in Section 13A–5–40(a) necessarily includes one or more aggravating circumstances as specified in Section 13A–5–49 shall not be construed to preclude the finding and consideration of that relevant circumstance or circumstances in determining sentence.’). This is known as ‘double-counting’ or ‘overlap,’ and Alabama courts ‘have repeatedly upheld death sentences where the only aggravating circumstance supporting the death sentence overlaps with an element of the capital offense.’ Ex parte Trawick , 698 So.2d 162, 178 (Ala.1997) ; see also Coral v. State , 628 So.2d 954, 965 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
"Because the jury convicted Waldrop of two counts of murder during a robbery in the first degree, a violation of Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–40(a)(2), the statutory aggravating circumstance of committing a capital offense while engaged in the commission of a robbery, Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–49(4), was ‘proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(e) ; Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–50. Only one aggravating circumstance must exist in order to impose a sentence of death. Ala. Code 1975, § 13A–5–45(f). Thus, in Waldrop's case, the jury, and not the trial judge, determined the existence of the ‘aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.’ Ring , 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. Therefore, the findings reflected in the jury's verdict alone exposed Waldrop to a range of punishment that had as its maximum the death penalty. This is all Ring and Apprendi require.
"....
"Waldrop also claims that Ring and Apprendi require that the jury, and not the trial court, determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 13A–5–46(e), 13A–5–47(e), and 13A–5–48. Specifically, Waldrop claims that the weighing process is a ‘finding of fact’ that raises the authorized maximum punishment to the death penalty. Waldrop and several of the amici curiae claim that, after Ring , this determination must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. Because in the instant case the trial judge, and not the jury, made this determination, Waldrop claims his
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