Boranian v. Richer
| Decision Date | 20 November 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008-324-Appeal.,2008-324-Appeal. |
| Parties | Peter BORANIAN v. Elaine RICHER et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Ronald J. Resmini, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.
Kevin J. Flannery, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, JJ., and WILLIAMS, C.J. (ret.).
The plaintiff, Peter Boranian, appeals from a Superior Court order allowing the defendants, Elaine Richer and C. Real Richer1 (defendants) to file a rejection of a court-annexed arbitration award out of time. Mr. Boranian contends that defendants failed to demonstrate excusable neglect with respect to their failure to reject the arbitration award within twenty days as prescribed by Rule 5 of the Superior Court Rules Governing Arbitration of Civil Actions. This matter came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on September 29, 2009, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that this appeal may be decided at this time, without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order of the Superior Court.
The underlying facts leading up to arbitration are not in dispute. On April 26, 2006, Mr. Boranian filed suit against defendants for injuries suffered in a rear-end automobile collision. The defendants did not dispute liability, and on March 18, 2008, the parties were referred to court-annexed arbitration. On April 21, 2008, an arbitrator awarded Mr. Boranian $45,000, plus interest and costs for injuries suffered as a result of the accident. The arbitrator filed the award with the Superior Court on April 22, 2008. On May 13, 2008, defendants filed a rejection of the arbitrator's award under Rule 5(a). That same day, the Superior Court Arbitration Office notified defendants that they had filed their rejection one day past the twenty-day filing deadline. Thereafter, defendants moved for leave to file their rejection of the court-annexed arbitration award out of time, which motion was heard on June 27, 2008. The hearing justice found that defendants' late rejection was caused by their attorney's miscalculation of the rejection deadline, in that counsel's secretary had miscounted the days and entered the deadline on the calendar as falling on May 13, 2008, rather than the actual date of May 12, 2008.
In their memorandum to support their motion to file a rejection out of time, defendants argued that the Superior Court, in its discretion, could grant relief due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants averred that the error in entering the incorrect deadline date was the product of an "inadvertence" and that, therefore, they were entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). The hearing justice did not determine whether the one-day miscalculation qualified as an "inadvertence;" rather he found that it was "excusable neglect," stating, "if the present case doesn't fit the meaning of excusable neglect, I don't know what case would." The hearing justice then entered an order allowing defendants to file their rejection out of time, and Mr. Boranian appealed.
On appeal, Mr. Boranian argues that the hearing justice abused his discretion by allowing defendants to file their rejection of the arbitrator's award out of time. Mr. Boranian contends that the failure of defendants' counsel to properly calendar the rejection deadline date did not fit within this Court's definition of "excusable neglect." In response, defendants argue that Mr. Boranian's appeal is not properly before this Court because it is interlocutory, that their late rejection of the arbitrator's award was excusable neglect, and that Rule 6(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides an additional day to file a rejection, making their rejection timely.
Motions to enlarge time are confided to the sound discretion of the trial justice. Astors' Beechwood v. People Coal Co., 659 A.2d 1109, 1115 (R.I.1995). Rule 6(b)(1) states that "the court may at any time in its discretion * * * order the period enlarged." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, this Court reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion or error of law. Astors' Beechwood, 659 A.2d at 1115 (citing Iddings v. McBurney, 657 A.2d 550, 553 (R.I.1995)). "The burden of proof is on the moving party * * * and although our review must be deferential, `deferential review cannot be equated with no review at all.'" Id. (quoting In re Scheri, 51 F.3d 71, 75 (7th Cir.1995)).
We must first determine whether this appeal is properly before this Court. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that appeals from interlocutory orders are not permitted unless they fall within certain well-defined exceptions. DeMaria v. Sabetta, 121 R.I. 648, 649, 402 A.2d 738, 739 (1979). There are two exceptions to this general rule: the first is statutory, and the second is judicial in origin. See G.L. 1956 § 9-24-7; McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 472, 83 A. 837, 841 (1912). The first exception allows an appeal from an interlocutory decree that grants or continues an injunction, or orders a receiver, or orders a sale of real or personal property. Section 9-24-7. The second exception, first announced in McAuslan, 34 R.I. at 472, 83 A. at 841, permits appellate review of an "order or decree which, although in a strict sense interlocutory, does possess such an element of finality that action is called for before the case is finally terminated in order to prevent clearly imminent and irreparable harm." Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 118 R.I. 644, 648, 375 A.2d 410, 412-13 (1977).
We have previously held that when an arbitrator's jurisdiction is in question, a Superior Court order compelling arbitration has an element of finality that may be heard on appeal. Forte Brothers, Inc. v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation, 541 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I.1988). In the present case, plaintiff challenges the Superior Court order allowing defendants to reject the arbitration award out of time and proceed with a trial in Superior Court. We view such an order, compelling parties to litigate in Superior Court after the twenty-day period in which to reject has expired, as analogous to the facts presented in Forte. Accordingly, we shall address the issues raised in this appeal.
Although defendants failed to point to the proper rule in their motion, a motion to reject an arbitrator's award out of time is governed by Rule 6(b). Rule 6(b)(2) allows a party to act after a time period has expired, if the failure to act was the result of "excusable neglect."2 Instead, defendants argued that their deadline miscalculation was the product of an "inadvertence" under Rule 60(b), and should, therefore, be excused.3 Rule 6(b) does not provide a party relief due to an "inadvertence." Rather, such relief is provided for under Rule 60(b). In the present case, upon notification that the twenty-day deadline to reject had expired, defendants moved for leave to reject the arbitrator's award out of time. At no time was a judgment or a final order entered, from which defendants could seek relief under Rule 60(b). Because defendants sought additional time to reject the award beyond the twenty-day period specified in Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules Governing Arbitration of Civil Actions,4 they could not avail themselves to the Rule 60(b) "inadvertence" provision. Accordingly, defendants may obtain relief only if they satisfy the "excusable neglect" standard set forth in Rule 6(b).
"It is well settled that unexplained neglect, whether by a party or its counsel, standing alone, will not automatically excuse noncompliance with orderly procedural requirements." Astors' Beechwood, 659 A.2d at 1115 (citing Iddings, 657 A.2d at 553; Vitale v. Elliott 120 R.I. 328, 331, 387 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1978)). We have defined "excusable neglect" as "[a] failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party." Pleasant Management LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216, 224-25 (R.I.2008) (quoting Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 584 (R.I.2005)). "Relief from a counsel's failure to comply with procedural requirements will not be granted `unless it is first factually established that his [or her] neglect was occasioned by some extenuating circumstance of sufficient significance to render it excusable.'" Astors' Beechwood, 659 A.2d at 1115 (quoting King v. Brown, 103 R.I. 154, 157, 235 A.2d 874, 875 (1967)).
This Court has been steadfast in its resolve to adhere to the "established rules of procedure, `adherence to which is necessary [so] that parties may know their rights, that the real issues in controversy may be presented and determined, and that the business of the courts may be carried on with reasonable dispatch.'" Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I.1987) (quoting O'Connor v. Solomon, 103 Conn. 744, 131 A. 736, 736 (1926)). Therefore, "[e]xcusable neglect that would qualify for relief from judgment is generally that course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances." Astors' Beechwood, 659 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Pari v. Pari, 558 A.2d 632, 635 (R.I. 1989)). Moreover, "[t]he determination of excusable neglect `is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the...
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