Bosnak v. State, No. A03A0861.

Decision Date22 September 2003
Docket NumberNo. A03A0861.
Citation263 Ga. App. 313,587 S.E.2d 814
PartiesBOSNAK v. THE STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bernadette C. Crucilla, Macon, for Appellant.

Howard Z. Simms, District Attorney, Nancy S. Moskaly, Myra H. Kline, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

Angela Marie Bosnak appeals from denial of her motion for new trial following her conviction of one count of cruelty to a child, her son R'M, contending that the trial court violated her federal Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by refusing to allow discussion of a potential sentence a witness could have received but for cooperating.

1. Viewed with all inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the evidence was that two-month-old R'M was admitted to the emergency room on April 30, 2001. The child presented with sunken eyeballs, delayed capillary refill, increased turgor of the skin, and poor reaction to his environment. Dr. Herrington diagnosed extreme malnourishment and dehydration and administered therapy. R'M had no baby fat and was suffering from muscle wasting. In Dr. Herrington's opinion, if R'M had been of normal birth weight, it would have taken about two weeks to lose this weight. Dr. Herrington also said the child had not been adequately fed within the last six or seven days and there was no indication of vomiting.

A bottle of sugar water was given to R'M, who "actually looked thirsty." After Dr. Herrington watched R'M consume the first bottle, he advised the nurses to continue to give him bottles as long as he would drink. It was one of the worst cases of malnutrition the doctor had ever seen.

Bosnak left for work every day and left R'M with her live-in boyfriend, Harper. He told Bosnak that occasionally R'M would not take food, but Bosnak told him not to worry because either R'M was full or did not want it right then. Harper also saw Bosnak feed R'M Gerber baby food with a spoon, which the doctor said was inappropriate for a two-month-old. Harper noticed when he was bathing R'M that his skin was sagging and told Bosnak to take the child to a doctor. Bosnak, however, refused because she did not want her other two children taken from her.

On April 30, Harper showed R'M to his grandmother, Clark, who had taken care of and successfully fed R'M in the past. According to Clark, R'M would leave her home with a full belly and return skinny. On April 30, because of the child's condition, an ambulance was called. Bosnak became upset because she thought she would be in trouble and left, leaving Harper a note saying she was going to Florida and leaving everything to him.

Dr. Hutchings, R'M's family doctor, testified that R'M had no feeding problems and none had been mentioned to him.

Bosnak contended that she fed R'M the morning of April 30 and he was fine and did not look like he did in the photos taken that day at the emergency room.

The evidence was legally sufficient. Jackson, supra; Straker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 904, 578 S.E.2d 568 (2003).

2. Bosnak contends her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the State's objection to her cross-examination of Harper was sustained.

The detective who interviewed Harper stated that, although Harper was not in custody, he was advised of his Miranda rights, as was the detective's standard procedure. While, initially, Harper said he wanted an attorney, as the detective was getting up to take him out of the interview, Harper changed his mind, signed the form, and was interviewed.

On cross-examination, Harper was asked why he changed his mind and stated

A. I changed my mind because I changed it. That's all. I changed it.
Q. It didn't have anything to do with the fact that the police told you that you were facing between five and twenty years in jail—.
A. No.
Q.—for that charge?
A. No.

The State objected on the ground that Harper had never been charged in connection with R'M and no such potential sentence had been discussed. The trial court ruled that, while there could not be questions about the potential sentence, Harper could be questioned about whether he was charged, whether he thought he was going to be prosecuted, and whether he gave his statement under any coercion. No curative instructions were given to the jury, which was excused during the discussion of the objection, and questioning along the permitted lines continued.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by so ruling. As stated in Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 275(4), 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000), "[t]he mere fact that [Bosnak] was unable to ask [Harper] to conjecture about possible punishment did not diminish [Bosnak's] attempt to show [Harper's] motive for testifying on behalf of the State, and did not amount to an abuse of the trial...

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4 cases
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 29 Aprile 2013
    ...time of trial that might have led Cheru to offer evidence against Williams to curry favor with the State.2 See Bosnak v. State, 263 Ga.App. 313, 315(2), 587 S.E.2d 814 (2003). Moreover, even if no charges were pending against a witness when he was interviewed or testified, a defendant must ......
  • Sanders v. the State.Thomas v. the State.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 12 Settembre 2011
    ...to die, was saved by emergency treatment). See also Copeland v. State, supra at 777–780(1), 589 S.E.2d 319; Bosnak v. State, 263 Ga.App. 313, 314(1), 587 S.E.2d 814 (2003); Knight v. State, 233 Ga.App. 819, 821–822(2), 505 S.E.2d 796 (1998). Although Thomas does not contend that the evidenc......
  • Pitts v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 22 Settembre 2003
  • Perkins v. State, A07A2007.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 7 Dicembre 2007
    ...only during cross-examination of a State's witness who strikes a deal with the State to avoid prison time. See Bosnak v. State, 263 Ga.App. 313, 315-316(2), 587 S.E.2d 814 (2003) (trial court did not abuse discretion by ruling that defendant could not question witness about a potential sent......

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