Boss v. Town of Leverett

Citation142 N.E.3d 1113,484 Mass. 553
Decision Date23 April 2020
Docket NumberSJC-12780
Parties Susan BOSS v. TOWN OF LEVERETT.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Rosemary Crowley, Springfield, (Erin J. Meehan also present) for the defendant.

Ryan P. Dunn, Boston, for the plaintiff.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

CYPHER, J.

A retired town employee, Susan Boss, filed a complaint to obtain a declaration that the town of Leverett (town) was obligated to pay fifty percent of the full premium cost for health insurance for retired town employees and their dependent spouses. This is an appeal by the town from the grant of summary judgment in Boss's favor by a judge in the Superior Court. The town also appeals from the corresponding denial of the town's cross motion for summary judgment. We transferred this case sua sponte from the Appeals Court. There are two issues presented here: first, whether the town's adoption of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, obligated it to contribute toward the premiums associated with retirees' dependents; and second, if G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, is interpreted to include these premiums, whether it effectively was adopted at the town meeting on April 24, 2004.

We hold that by adopting G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, the town was required to cover fifty percent of the premiums for both retirees and the retirees' dependents. We further hold that the town successfully adopted G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, at the town meeting held on April 24, 2004. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Background. 1. Legislative proceedings of the local town meeting in 2004. The town is a municipal corporation located in Franklin County that, pursuant to G. L. c. 32B, provides access to group health insurance coverage for current and retired employees of the Leverett public schools.

On April 24, 2004, the town convened its annual town meeting, during which the town's citizens voted on proposed bylaws and amendments.1 In accordance with G. L. c. 39, § 10, a warrant was posted before the town meeting to inform the town's citizens of the matters on which to be voted.2 Two of the articles contained in the warrant, articles 2 and 4, concerned retirement benefits. Article 2 of the warrant proposed (1) the adoption of specific language regarding retiree health insurance premiums and (2) a budget appropriation for specified insurance premiums. It aimed "to raise and appropriate the sum of $23,500 to pay one-half the premium costs payable for life and medical insurances in [fiscal year] 2005 for retired [town] employees."3 Article 4 was a ballot question that used the language mandated by G. L. c. 32B, § 9A :

"Shall the town pay one-half the premium costs payable by a retired employee for group life insurance and for group general or blanket hospital, surgical, medical, dental and other health insurance?"4

At the town meeting, article 2 was moved for a vote as written. The motion for the vote was then seconded and carried unanimously. Because article 2's passage was contingent upon the affirmative vote of the ballot question presented in article 4, the polls were opened for voting on article 4. Attendees cast their ballot for article 4, which passed with 184 ballots in favor and twenty-one opposed. Therefore, both articles 2 and 4 passed.

2. Boss's employment history and health insurance coverage. Boss worked as a teacher for Leverett public schools from 1990 until her retirement in 2015. During her employment, she subscribed to health insurance coverage through a group plan. The "1+1" or "Employee Plus One" family group plan was offered to all Leverett public school employees pursuant to G. L. c. 32B. Before her retirement, the "1+1" plan covered Boss and her dependent spouse.

Nearing her retirement, Boss was informed that after retirement she would be able to continue with her family plan but that the town would not pay fifty percent of her husband's premium coverage. Boss consulted with the Leverett Education Association (association) about this issue.5 The association stressed to the town that the payments should be made for both the retiree and his or her dependents.

Boss opted to continue participating in the group health insurance plan offered by the town. However, since her retirement, the town has paid fifty percent of Boss's premium contribution based only on the premium cost for individual coverage. Because the town has covered only fifty percent of her contribution, Boss has been responsible for covering the balance for the "1+1" plan premium in order to continue coverage for her spouse. In November 2017, Boss became Medicare eligible, and began to receive Medicare coverage, pursuant to article 2 guidelines,6 with the town contributing one-half of the premium cost of that coverage. Since that time, Boss has continued to pay the full premium for her husband's individual plan.

3. Provisions of G. L. c. 32B previously adopted by the town. The town previously adopted G. L. c. 32B, §§ 7A, 9D, and 10, in 1968. Code of Leverett, Appendix, chapter A232, section A (Apr. 2011). According to G. L. c. 32B, § 10, once the local option or one of its sections is accepted, it cannot be rescinded or revoked. Municipal employees will be covered automatically unless they give written notice "indicating that [they are] not to be insured for such coverages." G. L. c. 32B, § 4. In addition, § 7A clarifies that once the local option is adopted, the municipal employee shall cover "fifty per cent of a premium for the insurance of the employee and his dependents and the government unit shall contribute the remaining fifty per cent of such premium." G. L. c. 32B, § 7A (a ). This includes additional premiums for an employee's dependent child who is nineteen years or older and is mentally or physically incapable of earning his or her own living. Id. Further, G. L. c. 32B, § 9D, provides for the town's contribution of one-half of the premiums payable by the surviving spouse of an employee or retiree.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 307, 28 N.E.3d 470 (2015). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). In addition, "[b]ecause this case involves questions of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo." Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737, 7 N.E.3d 459 (2014).

2. Interpretation of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A. We first address whether the adoption of G. L. c. 32B, § 9A, requires that municipal employers pay fifty percent of the premiums for both retired employees and their dependents. The town argues that the plain language of the statute does not include the word "dependents," and that therefore § 9A does not require it to contribute to the premium costs for a retired employee's dependents. The town distinguishes § 9A from other sections in c. 32B that do expressly include the word "dependents." See G. L. c. 32B, §§ 7, 7A, 9E.7 Boss emphasizes that a town's § 9A contributions encompass fifty percent of the total premium costs of the retiree's insurance plan, not just an individual's premium costs. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the adoption of § 9A requires municipal employers to pay fifty percent of the health insurance premiums for both retired employees and their dependents.

In Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001), we emphasized that "[a] fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning." If the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written. See Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872, 482 N.E.2d 818 (1985). We look at the statute in its entirety when determining how a single section should be construed. See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532, 23 N.E.3d 929 (2015) ; Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511, 961 N.E.2d 1083 (2012). In addition, when ambiguities are present, the principles of statutory construction require that we consider legislative intent when interpreting a statute. See Telesetsky, supra ; Commonwealth v. Galvin, 388 Mass. 326, 328, 446 N.E.2d 391 (1983). See also Chin, supra.

a. Plain meaning. We begin by examining the language of the statute. General Laws c. 32B, § 9A, states in relevant part: "[A town] may provide that it will pay one-half of the amount of the premium to be paid by a retired employee under the first sentence of [§] 9."8 The plain meaning of § 9A requires that once the town has adopted the section, it "pay one-half of the amount of the premium to be paid by a retired employee" (emphases added). The phrase is clear: the town must contribute fifty percent to that which the retired employee is required to pay. The section does not address what type of insurance plan it will cover; rather, it focuses on payment.9 Boss's premium payments are calculated based on her group family plan -- a plan she opted into prior to her retirement. The fact that this plan includes her husband is irrelevant to the amount the town must contribute toward Boss's premium. The town must cover fifty percent of the premium that Boss is to pay, not fifty percent of the cost to cover her individually. It also is clear in § 9A that the word "premium" refers to the total premium an insured individual pays toward his or her selected plan -- regardless of whether the plan is for individual or family coverage -- and therefore, the town is required to pay fifty percent of that total premium.

The town interprets the exclusion of the word "dependents" from § 9A as intentional silence and a deliberate omission by the Legislature. Based on our previous interpretations of similar sections under chapter 32B, we disagree. In Galenski, 471 Mass. at 310-311, 28 N.E.3d 470, we invalidated the town of...

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