Sheehan v. Weaver

• Decision Date: 10 April 2014
• Docket Number: SJC–11395.
• Citation: 7 N.E.3d 459,467 Mass. 734
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: William SHEEHAN v. David B. WEAVER & another.

467 Mass. 734
7 N.E.3d 459

William SHEEHAN
v.
David B. WEAVER & another.¹

SJC–11395.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Essex.

Submitted Dec. 2, 2013.
Decided April 10, 2014.

[7 N.E.3d 461]

Peter C. Kober, Boston, for the defendants.

Louis J. Muggeo, Salem, (Stephen M. Zolotas with him) for the plaintiff.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

John F. Brosnan, Boston, for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association.

J. Michael Conley, Braintree, Thomas R. Murphy, Salem, & Jeffrey Petrucelly, Boston, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys.

Carol A. Kelly, Woburn, for Property Casualty Insurers Association of America.

Martin J. Rooney, Braintree, for Boston Housing Authority.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

After spending an evening drinking with a friend, the plaintiff, William Sheehan, returned to his apartment on Rantoul Street in Beverly, which he rented from the defendants, Jean C. Weaver and David B. Weaver, the owner and manager of the

[7 N.E.3d 462]

property, respectively. Sheehan ascended an exterior staircase leading to an outer door on the second floor landing, where he leaned against the staircase guardrail. The guardrail broke, and Sheehan fell to the pavement below, suffering serious injuries as a result. Sheehan filed a complaint against the Weavers in the Housing Court. A jury found both parties negligent and apportioned to Sheehan forty per cent of the comparative negligence. The jury found also that, pursuant to G.L. c. 143, § 51 (§ 51), the Weavers were strictly liable for Sheehan's injuries because they were caused by various violations of the State building code. Section 51 imposes strict liability on an owner, or other party, in control of “a place of assembly, theatre, special hall, public hall, factory, workshop, manufacturing establishment or building” for damages caused by a violation of “the provisions of [G.L. c. 143] and the state building code.” The Weavers filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, arguing in part that § 51 did not apply in the circumstances. This motion was denied, and the Weavers appealed. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. The Weavers do not challenge the verdict of negligence but argue that the judge erred in permitting Sheehan's claim under § 51. ²

This case once again presents questions regarding the scope and meaning of § 51, which have confronted our courts since the statute was enacted in its current form in 1972. See St. 1972, c. 802, § 35. The issues we address in this appeal are, first, whether § 51 applies to all State building code violations or, as stated in McAllister v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 300, 304 n. 5, 708 N.E.2d 95 (1999)( McAllister ), only those concerning fire safety; and second, whether the property involved in this case qualifies as a “building” within the meaning of the statute. Overruling our holding in McAllister, supra, we conclude that § 51 applies to all violations of the State building code. We conclude also that “building” as used in the statute is a narrowly defined term that does not encompass within its ambit of strict liability a small-scale residential structure like that occupied by Sheehan, notwithstanding that the structure had some commercial characteristics. Therefore, so much of the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as relates to the § 51 claim must be reversed.

Background. We recite the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Situation Mgt. Sys., Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 430 Mass. 875, 876, 724 N.E.2d 699 (2000). Sheehan resided alone in the third-floor apartment of a three-story mixed-use business-residential structure on Rantoul Street (Rantoul structure). In addition to his apartment, there were two residential apartments on the second floor, one in the front and one in the back, each occupied by a single tenant, and a chiropractor's office occupied the first floor. Other than the fire escape, the only access to Sheehan's apartment was by way of the exterior wooden staircase on the side of the Rantoul structure. The staircase led to a landing in front of an exterior door located on the second floor. That door opened into a foyer shared by Sheehan and the resident of the second-floor front apartment. The staircase did not serve the second-floor rear apartment, which had a separate entrance, or the chiropractor's office. Only Sheehan and the resident of the second-floor front

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apartment, and their guests, used the staircase.³ The Weavers never resided in the Rantoul structure.

At the time of Sheehan's fall, the sixth edition of the State building code was in effect. As Sheehan's expert testified, the Rantoul structure had eighteen building code violations, including defects in the strength, height, and condition of the guardrail. See, e.g., 780 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1014.9.1, 1022.2.2, 1028.2 (1997). The jury determined that these violations caused Sheehan's injuries.

Discussion. Because this case involves questions of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 456 Mass. 463, 467, 924 N.E.2d 260 (2010).

“Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is ‘to effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.’ ” Water Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 740, 744, 920 N.E.2d 33 (2010), quoting International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots Atl. & Gulf Maritime Region, AFL–CIO v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 813, 467 N.E.2d 1331 (1984). “We begin with the language of the statute itself and ‘presume, as we must, that the Legislature intended what the words of the statute say.’ ” Commonwealth v. Young, 453 Mass. 707, 713, 905 N.E.2d 90 (2009), quoting Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 687, 488 N.E.2d 401 (1986). “In construing the Legislature's intent, we may also enlist the aid of other reliable guideposts, such as the statute's ‘progression through the legislative body, the history of the times, prior legislation, contemporary customs and conditions and the system of positive law of which they are part.’ ” Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 454, 870 N.E.2d 33 (2007), quoting EMC Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 433 Mass. 568, 570, 744 N.E.2d 55 (2001).

a. Scope of building code violations. In relevant part, § 51 in its current form provides:

“The owner, lessee, mortgagee in possession or occupant, being the party in control, of a place of assembly, theatre, special hall, public hall, factory, workshop, manufacturing establishment or building shall comply with the provisions of this chapter and the state building code relative thereto, and such person shall be liable to any person injured for all damages caused by a violation of any of said provisions.” ⁴

Prior to 1972, § 51 imposed strict liability for violations of “sections twenty-one, twenty-four to twenty-eight, inclusive, and thirty,” St. 1945, c. 510,⁵ which concerned

[7 N.E.3d 464]

various fire safety issues. See St. 1913, c. 655, §§ 20–25, 27, as amended prior to 1972. Based on this language, in our decisions interpreting the pre–1972 version of § 51, we stated that “none of the benefits of G.L. c. 143, §§ 21 and 51, is available to persons using stairways and egresses for purposes other than escape from danger from fire.” ⁶Festa v. Piemonte, 349 Mass. 761, 761, 207 N.E.2d 535 (1965). See Repucci v. Exchange Realty Co., 321 Mass. 571, 575, 74 N.E.2d 14 (1947), citing Stevens, Landowner, 228 Mass. 368, 373, 374, 117 N.E. 588 (1917) (“The statute was designed for the protection of human life against fire”).

In 1972, as part its enactment of a comprehensive State building code, the Legislature repealed the then-existing version of § 51, as well as the sections referenced therein, and replaced it with the current version. ⁷ St. 1972, c. 802, §§ 28, 35. The language of the new version omitted the reference to the particular sections dealing with fire safety and, in its place, inserted language imposing strict liability for violations of “any” of the “provisions of [G.L. c. 143] and the state building code.” St. 1972, c. 802, § 35. The plain meaning of this language, and the fact that it replaced a narrower reference to particular statutory provisions, suggests that the Legislature intended the current version of § 51 to apply to all violations of the State building code, not just those pertaining to fire safety.

The Appeals Court also has reached this view in several of its decisions, which interpreted the 1972 changes to § 51 as requiring notice before an individual may be criminally prosecuted for violating “any provisions of the State building code and related codes.” Commonwealth v. Porrazzo, 25 Mass.App.Ct. 169, 177, 516 N.E.2d 1182 (1987). See Commonwealth v. Eakin, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 693, 697–698, 685 N.E.2d 1195 (1997), S.C.,427 Mass. 590, 696 N.E.2d 499 (1998) (requiring notice where violations related generally to conditions affecting habitability); Commonwealth v. Duda, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 922, 923 & n. 1, 597 N.E.2d 1382 (1992), quoting 780 Code Mass. Regs. § 121.1 (1980) (“[§ 51's] statutory notification in writing is a condition precedent to criminal prosecutions for violations of the State Building Code,” including use of structure “in violation of any of the provision[s] of this code”).

However, in a decision issued in 1999, we relied upon our 1965 decision, Festa v. Piemonte, 349 Mass. at 761, 207 N.E.2d 535, for the proposition that “none of the benefits of G.L. c. 143, [§ 51,] is ‘available to persons using stairways and egresses for purposes other than escape from danger from fire.’ ” See McAllister, supra at 304 n. 5, 708 N.E.2d 95.McAllister involved

[7 N.E.3d 465]

a tenant who had slipped on ice that had accumulated on the exterior stairs of the defendant's...