Bowles v. Reed
| Citation | 913 S.W.2d 652 |
| Decision Date | 13 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-94-103-CV,10-94-103-CV |
| Parties | Jim BOWLES, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas, and Dallas County, Appellants, v. Diane REED, Trustee for Ralph Craig Black D/B/A Allied Bonding Agency, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
John Vance, Criminal District Attorney, Thomas F. Keever, Asst. District Attorney, Dallas, for appellants.
L. Kent Clay, Fort Worth, Kathryn J. Gilliam, Waco, for appellee.
Before THOMAS, C.J., and CUMMINGS and VANCE, JJ.
Appellants, Dallas County and Jim Bowles, Sheriff of Dallas County, appeal the trial court's award of actual and punitive damages in favor of appellee, Diane Reed, trustee. We affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and remand in part.
Reed, the trustee in bankruptcy for Craig Black d/b/a Allied Bonding Agency, a bail bondsman, filed suit against Bowles and Dallas County challenging two different bail bond processing fees levied by the Dallas County Commissioner's Court, and sought four times that sum as a penalty under former article 3909, 1 prejudgment interest, costs of court, and attorney's fees. 2 Bowles and Dallas County filed an equitable setoff claim in response. Following a trial before the bench on stipulated facts, the trial court rendered judgment against both Bowles and Dallas County. The court denied the defendants their requested setoff relief. Bowles and Dallas County were found to be jointly and severally liable for $316,387 in actual damages; $23,729.02 in prejudgment interest; court costs; $25,000 in attorneys' fees for trial work; additional compensation in the event of appeal; and postjudgment interest calculated at 10% per year. Bowles was found separately liable for $949,161 in damages, plus $71,187.08 in prejudgment interest.
On December 1, 1981, the Commissioner's Court began to charge a fee for every bail bond processed by the Dallas County Sheriff. The following chart indicates the amount of the fee for the relevant time periods:
Order No. Effective Date Fee Amount
81"1865 12"01"81 $13 per bond
82"1227 09"01"82 $14 per bond
83"1301 10"01"83 $15 per bond
85"1508 10"01"85 $18 per bond
86"120 02"01"86 $19 per bond
87"1500 01"01"88 $30 per bond
88"674 05"02"88 No fee
89"960 06"08"89 $30 per bond
Bowles also collected a $28 fee for filing an affidavit to go off bail (ATGOB) during the period of February 15, 1989, to June 17, 1992. The record indicates that, during the relevant time periods, Bowles collected from Black $471,999 in bond fees and $952 in ATGOB fees.
The orders for the bond fees were enacted pursuant to former article 3926(a), which provided that a commissioner's court could set reasonable fees to be charged by sheriffs and constables. 3 The ATGOB fees were neither authorized nor approved by the Commissioner's Court.
On May 6, 1992, the Texas Supreme Court held that a preconviction bail bond fee levied by the El Paso County Commissioner's Court (a fee similar to the one imposed by the Dallas County Commissioner's Court) was not authorized by any Texas statute. Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 815 (Tex.1992). Specifically, the Court found article 3926a, and its successor statute, section 118.131(a) of the Local Government Code, inapplicable to criminal law matters and held that no article of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a commissioner's court may order the sheriff to collect a fee for the execution of a bail bond. Id. at 814-15.
In accordance with Camacho, the trial court held the orders from the Dallas County Commissioner's Court mandating the collection of the bond fees to be unauthorized and assessed liability for the unlawfully collected fees against both Bowles and Dallas County.
In appellants' first point of error, they assert that both Bowles and Dallas County cannot be subject to liability because they are entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity. We sustain the point with regard to Bowles but overrule it with regard to Dallas County.
At the outset we note that the trial court rendered judgment against Dallas County and "Defendant Jim Bowles." Thus, the court does not make it clear that Bowles is liable only in his official, or representative, capacity and not his individual capacity. Such a distinction was not necessary, however, because Reed sued Bowles solely in his official capacity. By suing Bowles solely in his official capacity, Reed has, in effect, made her suit solely against the governmental entity on whose behalf Bowles acted, Dallas County. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 874 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.App.--Austin 1994, writ denied); Whitehead v. University of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, 854 S.W.2d 175, 179-80 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1993, no writ); Esparza v. Diaz, 802 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
The question before us, then, is whether Bowles is immune from suit in his official capacity. The doctrine of legislative immunity protects commissioner's courts from liability when they act in their legislative capacity. Merrill v. Carpenter, 867 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1993, writ denied). Sheriffs share in this legislative immunity when they enforce an order issued by a commissioner's court in its legislative capacity. 4 Id. Moreover, this immunity applies to the sheriff in both his individual and his official capacities. See id. Here, Bowles was enforcing an order of the Dallas County Commissioner's Court issued in its legislative capacity. Therefore, Bowles shares in that same legislative immunity in his official capacity.
Reed contends this case differs from Merrill because the trial court here found the bond fees not only to be unauthorized but also to constitute a taking in violation of the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. By raising the illegality to the constitutional level, argues Reed, Bowles cannot be protected by sovereign immunity. Article I, section 17, however, is inapplicable because the collection of the bond fees is not a taking as provided in that provision. Merrill, 867 S.W.2d at 68. Therefore, no constitutional violation occurred.
Reed also contends article 3909 waives Bowles' sovereign immunity; this argument need not be addressed because Bowles did not extort anything as provided in article 3909. Vannerson v. Klevenhagen, 908 S.W.2d 37, 40-41 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.],) (on rehearing); Merrill, 867 S.W.2d at 69. Bowles, in collecting the bond fee, was merely executing a legislative order issued by the Dallas County Commissioner's Court. As the Sheriff of Dallas County, he was obligated to execute the order. While the bond fee, itself, may have been illegal, Bowles did not unlawfully demand or receive it. Vannerson, at 40. Therefore, we need not decide whether article 3909 waived Bowles' sovereign immunity because Bowles did not violate the provisions of article 3909 in collecting the bond fee.
Reed argues that state agents are not immune from liability if they act outside the scope of their authority. See Hale v. Colorado River Mun. Water Dist., 818 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex.App.--Austin 1991, no writ). She contends that, because the collection of these bond fees was not authorized by law, they constituted an unlawful taking under the constitution and, since Bowles thereby violated constitutional rights in collecting the fees, he acted outside the scope of his authority.
Bowles, however, was acting within his authority in executing the orders of the commissioner's court. Merrill, 867 S.W.2d at 68. He bore no duty to examine the constitutionality or the legality of the statute. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Rains v. Crow, 601 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) Therefore, Bowles is protected by sovereign immunity because he did not act outside the scope of his authority.
Reed further asserts that Bowles is not entitled to official or quasi-judicial immunity because his actions were ministerial, not discretionary. Reed argues that only when a state agent's acts involve the exercise of discretion can he be entitled to the sovereign immunity defense. Her argument regarding official immunity is misplaced because Bowles need not claim official immunity. The official immunity doctrine applies only when a state agent is sued in his individual capacity. Bowles was sued only in his official or representative capacity; therefore, any reliance upon an official immunity argument is inapposite.
Concerning the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine, Reed similarly argues that Bowles is not entitled to protection under it because the doctrine only protects discretionary acts while his were ministerial. See Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.--Waco 1990, writ denied). We note, however, that Bowles is immune under the legislative immunity doctrine. Consequently, we need not address the question of whether Bowles is immune under the quasi-judicial immunity doctrine.
Our discussion thus far on Bowles' liability for the collection of the bond fees has centered exclusively on the bond fees, not the ATGOB fees. The ATGOB fees raise another question. As stated above, Bowles was legislatively immune in his representative capacity from incurring any liability as a result of his collection of the bond fees. Merrill, 867 S.W.2d at 68. He obtained this immunity because the Commissioner's Court, acting in its legislative capacity, ordered him to collect the fees. Id. The ATGOB fees, however, were collected by Bowles without any authorization from the Commissioner's Court. Accordingly, Bowles is liable for the ATGOB fees. However, as Bowles was sued solely in his...
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