Bradford v. Davis Same

• Decision Date: 09 December 1947
• Citation: 56 A.2d 68
• Parties: BRADFORD v. DAVIS et al. SAME v. DRISKO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

56 A.2d 68

BRADFORD

v.DAVIS et al.

SAME

v.DRISKO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 9, 1947.

Exceptions for Superior Court, Washington County, at Law.

Two real actions by Doris Bradford against James M. Davis, also known as J. Martin Davis, and another, and by same plaintiff against Merrill F. Drisko. On plaintiff's exceptions to denial of her motion to fix time for filing report of evidence together with the bill of exceptions allowed at a former term and to granting of defendant's motion for executions to issue.

Exceptions overruled in both cases.

Blaisdell & Blaisdell, of Ellsworth, for plaintiff.

Dunbar & Vose, of Machias, for defendants.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, TOMPKINS, and FELLOWS, JJ.

FELLOWS, Justice.

These cases come before the Law Court on plaintiff's exceptions to the denial of the plaintiff's motion to fix a time for filing report of evidence to go with a bill of exceptions allowed at a former term; and also on plaintiff's exceptions to the granting of defendant's motion for executions to issue. The exceptions are overruled.

These two real actions were brought in the Superior Court for Washington County, and a referee returned to the Clerk's office in November 1946 the Rule of Reference in each case, with findings for the defendants. On the first day of the February term 1947 of the Superior Court, objections to the allowance of the report of the referee were filed by the plaintiff in each case, but the reports were accepted by the presiding justice and allowed. What the objections were does not appear in the record before us. Exceptions were then taken by the plaintiff, to the acceptance and allowance, and bills of exceptions to the acceptance of the reports were filed, allowed and signed. These two bills of exceptions, allowed and signed during the February term 1947, are not a part of this record, but from statements in this record and from the briefs and arguments, we are asked to assume that the report of the evidence heard by the referee was either, referred to in the bills of exceptions, or was made a part of each bill. No extension of time for filing evidence was made by the justice presiding at the February term 1947; and no request for extension was made by the plaintiff at this February term.

The clerk of the Superior Court for the County of Washington, at the February term 1947, marked both of the cases ‘Law’ on the docket, and the cases were transferred to the docket of the Law Court.

At the May term of the Law Court it was ordered that a law docket entry be made in each case, of ‘Misentry. Dismissed without prejudice,’ and the cases were thus remanded to the docket of the Washington County Superior Court.

At the June term 1947 of the Superior Court for Washington County, the plaintiff filed motions in both cases that a time be fixed for filing the evidence, which motions were denied by the then presiding justice, and the plaintiff excepts.

At the same June term 1947 of the Superior Court the defendants, on the other hand, filed in each case a motion that execution issue to the defendants for costs, on the grounds that during the previous February term no report of evidence was filed by the plaintiff, and no extension of time to file was asked for by the plaintiff, and no extension was granted by the presiding justice these motions for executions were granted and the plaintiff excepts.

The bills of exceptions now before the Court in these two cases, are alike in substance. They state that the cases were referred; that objections to referee's reports were made; that reports were accepted, and that exceptions were filed at the February term 1947, with no time fixed for filing evidence, and they make claim of error in that the presiding justice at the June term 1947 had no authority to order executions to issue for costs. These bills of exceptions also claim that the justice presiding at the June term 1947 should have fixed a time for filing the evidence, to go with the original bills allowed during the preceding February term. It does not appear, in these two bills of exceptions before us, that the report of the evidence was made a part of the previous two bills of exceptions that were filed and allowed at the preceding February term. It does not appear that these are cases wherein ‘a report of the evidence is required for the Law Court’ under Rule 19A, 138 Me. 367.

The purpose of a bill of exceptions is to put the decision objected to upon record for the information of the Law Court. Dodge v. Bardsley, 132 Me. 230, 169 A. 306. Bills must be presented ‘during the term’, to the justice presiding, stating each issue of law in a clear, distinct, and ‘summary’ manner as required by statute, ‘and when found true’ they are allowed and signed by the presiding justice, ‘provided however, that in all cases, such exceptions shall be presented within 30 days.’ Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 94, Section 14. The statute requires that bills be presented ‘during the term’, and if the term shall be a long one, ‘within 30 days' of the ruling complained of. ‘The substance must be reduced to writing while the thing is transacting, because it is to become a record.’ McKown v. Powers, 86 Me. 291, 294, 29 A. 1079, 1080. It is customary in practice, however, because of time necessary to prepare a formal bill, to note upon the term docket that exceptions have been ‘filed and allowed.’ Then if the exception believes that he will not have sufficient time or opportunity to write out and to prepare a complete bill of exceptions before adjournment, or if there will be an unavoidable delay due to transcription of evidence by the Court reporter, it is also the practice for the exceptant to ask the presiding justice for an extension, by making further docket entry that the completed bill may be filed on or before a certain date. In this manner the statute has been complied with, the exceptions are filed and allowed ‘during the term’, leaving only mechanical details for some future time. The certificate of the justice who presided, that the exceptions are allowed, is conclusive as to regularity, unless he makes some qualification. Colby v. Tarr, 140 Me. 128, 34 A.2d 621; Fish v. Baker, 74 Me. 107; Royal Insurance Co. v. Nelke, 117 Me. 366, 104 A. 626; Dunn v. Auburn Electric Motor Co., 92 Me. 165, 42 A. 389; Borneman v. Milliken, 118 Me. 168, 106 A. 345; Mann v. Homestead Realty Co., 134 Me. 37, 180 A. 807; McKown v. Powers, 86 Me. 291, 29 A. 1079.

‘The excepting party is bound to see that the bill of exceptions includes all that is necessary to enable the court to decide whether the rulings of which he complains were or were not erroneous. Failing to do so, his exceptions must fail.’ Appeal of Bronson, 136 Me. 401, 402, 11 A.2d 613; Small v. Sacramento Nav. & Min. Co., 40 Me. 274. If a true bill of exceptions is presented to the presiding justice and he does not allow the same, the disallowance does not deprive the excepting party of his rights. He can proceed under Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 94, Section 14 and Rule of Court 40, 129 Me. 518, to establish the truth of the exceptions before the Law Court.

The complete report of evidence taken in any case is not necessarily a part of a bill of exceptions unless the bill of exceptions states that it is a part. Doylestown Agr. Co. v. Brackett Shaw & Lunt Co., 109 Me. 301, 84 A. 146; Jones v. Jones, 101 Me. 447, 64 A. 815, 115 Am.St.Rep. 328. The Court cannot go outside the bill itself to determine that rulings are erroneous and prejudicial, even if the evidence accompanies the bill. The bill itself must state the grounds of exception in a summary manner. The bill must be ‘able to stand alone.’ Dennis v. Waterford Packing Co., 113 Me. 159, 93 A. 58, Ann.Cas.1917D, 788; State v. Belanger, 127 Me. 327, 143 A. 170; Jones v. Jones, 101 Me. 447, 64 A. 815, 115 Am.St.Rep. 328; Dodge v. Bardsley, 132 Me. 230, 169 A. 306; Gerrish v. Chambers, 135 Me. 70, 79, 189 A. 187. There are some departures from this general rule, such as in cases of exceptions to a directed verdict, Brown v. Sanborn, 131 Me. 53, 158 A. 855, or to a nonsuit, People's Bank v. Nickerson, 108 Me. 341, 80 A. 849; Bouchles v. Tibbetts, 117 Me. 192, 193, 103 A. 71.

If all the evidence is ‘made a part’ of the bill of exceptions, or if for any reason the complete evidence is to be a necessary part of the printed case, it must be filed within the term or within thirty days, unless there is an extension of time shown by docket entry. The burden of securing the order of Court for an extension is on the party who desires it. There is no duty on the part of the presiding justice to seek out parties to ascertain if extra time is necessary. Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 94, Section 14. If an entry on the docket is made granting an extension, it is ‘conditioned upon a performance of that requirement within the time prescribed.’ Goodwin v. Small, 92 Me. 588, 589, 43 A. 507. In motions for new trials also, the evidence must be filed within thirty days, unless the time is extended, or the Clerk may be directed to enter judgment, Rule 17, 129 Me. 509.

The justice who presides over the term at which the exceptions are taken is the only justice who has authority over the bill of exceptions. He is the one who certifies to the truth of the facts stated in the bill. Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 94, Section 14. The statute permits another justice to act in those instances only where there is death, disability, resignation or removal of the one who presided. Revised Statutes 1944, Chapter 95, Section 51. ‘The right to establish exceptions is * * * statutory.’ Nissen v. Flaherty, 117 Me. 534, 105 A. 127; Borneman v. Milliken, 118 Me. 168, 106 A. 345.

There are three parties to a bill of exceptions-the parties to the suit and the justice who is presiding. Neither the parties, nor their counsel, can agree, without the consent of the presiding justice, to make material alterations in a bill...