Brennan v. Midwest Refining Company

Decision Date12 December 1922
Docket Number1125
PartiesBRENNAN v. MIDWEST REFINING COMPANY
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

ERROR to District Court, Natrona County; HON. CYRUS O. BROWN Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Edward P Brennan, claimant, against the Midwest Refining Company, for the recovery of an award. From an order awarding but a part of the amount claimed the claimant brings error.

Case remanded.

D Worth, E. H. Foster and W. L. Walls, Attorney General, for plaintiff in error.

A correct interpretation of clause (b) subdivision 3 of Section 4334 C. S. authorizes an award of $ 2500.00 for an injured workman, and an additional sum, not exceeding $ 5500.00 for dependent children under the age of sixteen years. In the present case claimant was entitled to $ 8000.00. The statute is so plain in its terms that it is difficult to observe how any question should arise as to its meaning. Workmen's Compensation Acts are remedial in nature and are to be liberally construed, and where occasion requires construction, the courts endeavor to carry out and give effect to the spirit of the law. (Hollard-St. Louis S Co. v. Shraluka, 116 N.E. 330; Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n. v. Behnken, 226 S.W. 154; Kennerson v. Company, 94 A. 372; Young v. Duncan, 106 N.E. 1.) The error of law complained of is apparent upon the face of the record. (Nichols v. Board of Comm., 13 Wyo. 1.)

John D. Clark, A. K. Barnes and John B. Barns, Jr., for defendants in error.

The language of the statute bears out the interpretation placed upon it by the trial court. Under the rule of liberal construction accorded the Workmen's Compensation Acts, courts cannot go to the extent of judicial legislation. (In re Martinelli (Mass.) 106 N.E. 557; State v. Cass Co. (Minn.) 151 N.W. 910; De Voe v. New York State R. Co., 155 N.Y.S. 12; In re Sickles, 156 N.Y.S. 854, 865.) The words employed must be given their ordinary meaning. (Tournequist v. Hannan (Mass.) 107 N.E. 443; In re Nichols (Mass.) 104 N.E. 566; Iron Co. v. Industrial Comm. (Wis.) 142 N.W. 271, L. R. A. 1916 A 366.) Where the language is plain it must be given its evident effect. (State v. Cass Co. (Minn.) 151 N.W. 910; Wendt v. Industrial Ins. Comm. (Wash.) 141 P. 311; Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm. (Wis.) 142 N.W. 187, L. R. A. 1916 A 374.) The statute provides a lump sum for the injured workman; if he has children the sum is increased not exceeding $ 5500. The statute primarily says that the increased sum shall not exceed in the aggregate a lump sum of $ 5500.00 in any case. "Aggregate" means a "total or gross amount" (2 C. J. 972.) "In any such case" means cases described in a preceding section or the preceding clause of the same section (Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa. (7 Barr.) 34.) Separate provisions of the statute must be construed in the light of the statute as a whole. (Sexton v. Newark Tel. Co. 86 N. J. 451; Kennerson v. Thames Towboar Co. (Conn.) 94 A. 372, L. R. A. 1916 A 436.)

KIMBALL, Justice. POTTER, Ch. J., and BLUME, J., concur.

OPINION

KIMBALL, Justice.

The Workmen's Compensation Law, after its amendment in 1919, provided for compensation in cases of permanent total disability by the following language found in clause (b), Sec. 4334, Wyo. C. S. 1920:

"* * * When permanent total disability results from the injury, the workman shall receive:

(1) * * *.

(2) If the workman had a wife or invalid husband, but no child under the age of sixteen (16) years, a lump sum of $ 2500.00.

(3) If the workman have a child or children under the age of sixteen (16) years, for any such child or children, the lump sum provided in the preceding paragraph shall be increased by adding thereto one hundred dollars ($ 100.00) per year for each year until such child shall be of the age of sixteen (16) years, but the total amount of such increased sum allowed for children under sixteen (16) years shall not exceed in the aggregate a lump sum of five thousand five hundred dollars ($ 5500.00) in any such case."

The right of plaintiff in error to the maximum compensation so authorized was not questioned. His family included nine children under the age of sixteen years. He claimed $ 2500 under paragraph (2) and $ 5500 under paragraph (3), a total of $ 8000. He was awarded $ 5500 only, the district court interpreting the statute to mean that the total sum paid the injured workman could not exceed $ 5500, or, in other words, that the total increase for children could not exceed $ 3000. In support of this view it is argued that the "increased sum," spoken of in paragraph (3), includes the sum of $ 2500 mentioned in paragraph (2). The plaintiff in error, contending for a different interpretation, which seems warranted by the statutory language, argues that the "increased sum" includes only the aggregate sum "allowed for children." The questioned statute was enacted in 1919 as an amendment of Section 19 of Chapter 124, S. L. 1915, as amended and reenacted by Section 6 of Chapter 69, S. L. 1917. Whatever ambiguity might be conceded to exist in the law of 1919, if it were to be considered as an original enactment, is removed by an examination of the earlier acts where the words which have given rise to this controversy are used in a sense not at all doubtful. The Act of 1915 was the original Workmen's Compensation Law. It provided that in cases of permanent total disability the injured workman should receive:

"(2) If the workman had a wife or invalid husband, but no child under the age of sixteen (16) years, a lump sum of $ 1,200.00.

(3) If the workman had a wife or husband and a child or children under the age of sixteen (16) years of age, or being a widow or widower, for any such child or children the lump sum provided in the preceding paragraph shall be increased by adding thereto a sum equal to Sixty ($ 60.00) Dollars, per year for each child for each year until each child shall be of the age of sixteen (16) years, but the total amount of such increased sum allowed for children under sixteen (16) years of age shall not exceed in the aggregate a sum equal to one and one-half the sum allowed to the widow or widower in any such case."

Paragraph (3), just quoted, would have expressed the legislative intention more clearly if in the last grammatical clause the words "injured workman" had been substituted for the words "widow or widower," and that change in phraseology was made by the act of ...

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    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
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    ... ... 113; 76 L.Ed. 261; In ... re Metcalf's Estate, 282 P. 27, 41 Wyo. 36; ... Brennan v. Midwest Ref. Co. 210 P. 939, 29 Wyo. 116, ... 120; Gale v. School Dist. No. 4, 54 P. 2d 811, ... November 30, 1940, was engaged in the business of producing ... and refining crude oil in the State of Wyoming, and in ... marketing gasoline and other refined products ... ...
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    ... ... The words ... used in Sec. 6832 are mandatory. Brennan v. Co., 29 ... Wyo. 116; Delfelder v. Bank, (Wyo.) 269 P. 418; ... for its findings. Empire Company v. Blanchard, 31 O ... S. 650. The exception taken to the court's ... ...
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    • November 12, 1929
    ... ... C. L. 957, ... 961, 963, 972, Sutherland (2d) Ed. Sec. 385; Midwest ... Company v. State of Wyo., 273 P. 963. If the general ... words of ... this court in Brennan ... [282 P. 28] ... v. Midwest Refining Co., 29 Wyo. 116, 120, 210 ... ...
  • In re Estate of Dixon
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