Brown Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton
| Decision Date | 15 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 54642,54642 |
| Citation | 192 N.W.2d 773 |
| Parties | BROWN ENTERPRISES, INC., and Troy Curtis Hames, Jr., d/b/a Homestead Mobile Home Sales, Appellees, v. Jack FULTON, Commissioner of Public Safety For the State of Iowa and Iowa Department of Public Safety, Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., John E. Beamer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.
James Jackson, Des Moines, and Lew Ells, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
This is an action for declaratory judgment; plaintiffs filed their petition in Polk County District Court seeking temporary injunction to enjoin the State of Iowa from enforcing the provisions of chapter 322.3(9), The Code 1966, and for a declaration of rights. Said section prohibits the sale of motor vehicles on the first day of the week, commonly known as Sunday. Following hearing, a temporary injunction was issued. Thereafter defendants answered. Trial court held adverse to defendants and decreed that that part of section 322.3(9), which prohibits sale of mobile homes on Sunday is unconstitutional, but that the remainder of said section is constitutional. We reverse the trial court.
In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs asked the trial court to determine and adjudge that prohibition of sales of motor vehicles on Sunday does not apply to the sale of mobile homes, and for the entry of such other declaratory decree as would settle and adjudicate the rights of the parties.
Plaintiff, Brown Enterprises, Inc., is a Missouri corporation licensed to do business in Iowa. Troy Curtis Hames, Jr., operating under the tradename and style of Homestead Mobile Home Sales, is the franchisee of plaintiff Brown Enterprises, Inc., in Linn County; and defendant Jack Fulton was, at the time of the institution of the suit and the entry of the decree, the commissioner of public safety for the State of Iowa, and was charged with the duty of administering and enforcing the provisions of chapters 321 and 322, The Code 1966.
Prior to the institution of the suit, the Linn County Attorney had requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to whether the sale of mobile homes was prohibited by the previsions of sec. 322.3(9), The Code 1966. On December 23, 1969 an opinion was rendered by the office of Attorney General to the effect that mobile homes did not come within the scope of the prohibition of the section, and therefore could be sold on Sundays. Subsequently, on January 22, 1970 the opinion referred to was withdrawn and a new opinion rendered by the Attorney General to the effect that mobile homes were included within the prohibition of sec. 322.3(9), The Code and could not be sold on Sundays. Suit was then instituted by plaintiffs, and pursuant to hearing the court ordered the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining defendants from enforcing the provisions of the statute insofar as the sale of mobile homes on Sundays was concerned. The issues were then made up and trial was had, culminating in the decree above referred to in which the trial court held mobile homes fell within the class of housing and that their inclusion in the prohibition as to Sunday sales worked an unconstitutional discrimination in violation of Article 1, § 6 of the Iowa Constitution. The trial court found, however, that mobile homes were embraced within the intendment and purview of sec. 322.3(9) of The Code, and but for the unconstitutional discrimination, sales of the same on Sundays were prohibited by statute.
The sole question before us urged by defendants is that the lower court erred in ruling that the part of sec. 322.3(9), The Code 1966, prohibiting sales of mobile homes on Sundays is in violation of Article 1, § 6 of the Iowa Constitution.
I. Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution of Iowa provides:
'All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.'
We must determine squarely whether a mobile home is properly included within in the definition of motor vehicles. Sec. 321.123, The Code 1966, requires that a mobile home, regardless whether it is used upon the public highway, must be registered. Section 321.1(2) provides:
"Motor vehicle' means very vehicle which is self-propelled but not including vehicles known as trackless trolleys which are propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails. The terms 'car', 'new car', 'used car' or 'automobile' shall be synonymous with the term 'motor vehicle".
Section 321.1(1), The Code 1966 provides that the term 'vehicle' means:
'every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.'
Section 321.1(69), The Code 1966 defines mobile homes as:
"Mobile home' means any vehicle without motive power used or so manufactured or constructed as to permit its being used as a conveyance upon the public streets and highways and so designed, constructed, or reconstructed as will permit the vehicle to be used as a place for human habitation by one or more persons.'
We are concerned here strictly with mobile homes and travel trailers of the type defined in sec. 321.1(68), The Code, and we do not consider herein that type of vehicle commonly called 'recreational vehicles' which have their own source of motive power.
Section 322.2(7) defines 'motor vehicle' for the purpose of chapter 322 as, '* * * any vehicle subject to registration under the laws of this state.' The context of sec. 322.3(9), The Code, with which we are principally concerned here, provides:
'No person licensed under this chapter shall, either directly or through an agent, salesman or employee, engage in this state, or represent or advertise that he is engaged or intends to engage in this state, in the business of buying or selling at retail new or used Motor vehicles on the first day of the week, commonly known and designated as Sunday.' (italics added).
The licensing of any person intending to engage in this state in the business of selling motor vehicles at retail or representing or advertising that he intends to enter such business, is required by sec. 322.4, The Code 1966.
For the purpose of Chapter 321, clearly a mobile home as defined in § 321.2(68) is not a motor vehicle since it lacks the capacity for self-propulsion. However, for the purposes of chapter 322, a mobile home Is a motor vehicle because it is required to be registered by §§ 321.123 and 322.2(7) of The Code, the requirement for registration being the only provision of our statute which brings mobile homes within the generic definition of motor vehicles.
In State v. Lindsey (Iowa 1969), 165 N.W.2d 807, this court held the sale of a motor vehicle (the motor vehicle involved was a mobile home) on Sunday constituted 'doing business' within the proscription of § 322.3(9), The Code. In Lindsey, however, the court was not called upon to consider whether a mobile home was a motor vehicle, but assumed it had that status. Therefore, while said case has some value to us inferentially, the very question involved here did not concern the court in Lindsey.
The Legislature is given wide discretion in defining the limits of classes when a statute involves classification of persons or things. Wessling v. Bennett (D.C.Iowa 1968), 290 F.Supp. 511, aff'd. 8 Cir., 410 F.2d 205, cert. den. 396 U.S. 945, 90 S.Ct. 384, 24 L.Ed.2d 248; Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 863, 146 N.W.2d 626, 638 (1966); Mason and Hanger--Silas Mason Co. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 258 Iowa 531, 539, 139 N.W.2d 437, 442 (1966); Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 401, 35 N.W.2d 66, 72 (1948). See also 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 495, pp. 862--863. Ordinarily statutes, with notable exceptions, regularly enacted by legislatures will be accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality. Davis v. Synhorst, 217 F.Supp. 492 (D.C.Iowa 1963)...
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