Brown v. Burlington Coat Factory of Tex., Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 357119 |
| Parties | SHAUNTANIQUE BROWN, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF LORRAINE FAISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY OF TEXAS, INC., and BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE CORPORATION, doing business as BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 20-011978-NO
Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Murray and Borrello, JJ.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff, personal representative for the estate of Lorraine Faison, appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8). On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that she had failed to state a claim for an intentional tort under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq. And even if she did fail to state a claim plaintiff argues, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing her to amend her complaint. We conclude that plaintiff failed to state a claim for an intentional tort and affirm the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition. But we remand to the trial court to allow plaintiff to file a motion for leave to amend her complaint.
Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that defendants were liable for the shooting death of decedent Lorraine Faison, who was employed at a Burlington Coat Factory store and was shot at work by her coworker, Sandra Waller. Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that, on October 15, 2017, Waller and decedent "began to argue about the proper way to scan the aisles" of defendants' store. The argument escalated, and decedent alerted the assistant store manager, Nicole Good. Waller told Good that, about three months ago, she and decedent had a similar argument. Good instructed Waller to return to work but to move to another department away from decedent. But after Waller had returned to work, Waller "continued yelling at and engaging in otherwise belligerent behavior with [decedent]." In response to this, Good told Waller and decedent to go home for the day. "Good remained with [decedent] while Waller went to the back of [defendants'] store to punch out, intending to keep the two women separated and prevent further escalation of the altercation."
Plaintiff alleged that defendants scheduled decedent and Waller to work another shift together the following day, on October 16, 2017. During that shift, Waller resumed the argument from the day before. At some point, Waller pulled out a handgun and shot and killed decedent.
As a result of decedent's death, plaintiff sued defendants for wrongful death and alleged that the WDCA's exclusive remedy provision did not apply to her claim because defendants had committed an intentional tort as defined under MCL 418.131. According to plaintiff, defendants deliberately scheduled decedent to work with Waller the day after the argument, specifically intending for Waller to injure plaintiff. In support of her allegation that defendants had specific intent to injure, plaintiff alleged that defendants "possessed actual knowledge that the workplace environment created by Waller was extremely dangerous such that injury was certain to occur to one or more of its employees, especially decedent," and that defendants willfully disregarded this certain danger by requiring decedent to work with Waller anyway. In lieu of filing an answer, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for an intentional tort under the WDCA.
The trial court agreed with defendant. After a hearing on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claim, reasoning that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege facts to support a claim for an intentional tort under the WDCA. This appeal followed.
"This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition." Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich. 8, 12; 727 N.W.2d 132 (2007). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint." El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019) (citation omitted). "When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone." Id. at 160 (citation omitted). "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery." Id. (citation omitted). "[T]he mere statement of a pleader's conclusions, unsupported by allegations of fact, will not suffice to state a cause of action." ETT Ambulance Serv Corp v Rockford Ambulance, Inc, 204 Mich.App. 392, 395; 516 N.W.2d 498 (1994). In the context of the intentional tort exception under the WDCA, whether the facts alleged by plaintiff are enough to constitute an intentional tort is a question of law for the court, and whether the facts are as plaintiff alleges is a question for the jury. Gray v Morley, 460 Mich. 738, 742-743; 596 N.W.2d 922 (1999). This Court reviews de novo questions of law. See Carter v Ann Arbor City Attorney, 271 Mich.App. 425, 427; 722 N.W.2d 243 (2006) (citation omitted).
Under the WDCA, employers compensate employees for personal injuries suffered in the course of employment, regardless of fault. Herbolsheimer v SMS Holding Co, Inc, 239 Mich. App 236, 240; 608 N.W.2d 487 (2000) (citation omitted); MCL 418.301. "In return for this almost automatic liability, employees are limited in the amount of compensation they may collect from their employer, and, except in limited circumstances, may not bring a tort action against the employer." Clark v United Technologies Auto Inc, 459 Mich. 681, 687; 594 N.W.2d 447 (1999). One of these limited circumstances is when an employee can prove that the employer committed an intentional tort. Johnson v Detroit Edison Co, 288 Mich.App. 688, 696; 795 N.W.2d 161 (2010). MCL 418.131(1) defines what constitutes an intentional tort under the WDCA:
An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court. This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce rights under law.
Thus, to show that her employer has committed an intentional tort, a plaintiff must show that the employer acted deliberately and specifically intended to injure her. Johnson, 288 Mich.App. at 696. A deliberate act may be one of commission or omission, and an employer acts with specific intent when the employer had a purpose to bring about certain consequences. Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453 Mich. 149, 169, 170-171; 551 N.W.2d 132 (1996) (opinion by Boyle, J.).
Accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts in plaintiffs complaint show that defendants acted deliberately. Plaintiff alleged that defendants required decedent to work with Waller the day after decedent's and Waller's argument, and neither party contends that defendants' doing so was an unintentional act. So, the remaining issue is whether defendants required decedent to work with Waller with the specific intent to injure decedent.
"A plaintiff can prove that a defendant had an intent to injure through circumstantial evidence if he establishes that (1) the employer has actual knowledge (2) that an injury is certain to occur (3) yet disregards that knowledge." Luce v Kent Foundry Co, 316 Mich.App. 27, 33; 890 N.W.2d 908 (2016) (citations omitted). Plaintiff argues that Good had actual knowledge that requiring decedent to work with Waller after decedent's and Waller's argument would result in Waller's injuring decedent.
" '[A]ctual knowledge' cannot be constructive, implied, or imputed; rather, a plaintiff must show that the employer had actual knowledge that an injury would follow from the employer's act or omission." Johnson, 288 Mich.App. at 697 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In the case of a corporate employer, a plaintiff need only show that 'a supervisory or managerial employee had actual knowledge that an injury would follow from what the employer deliberately did or did not do.'" Id., quoting Fries v Mavrick Metal Stamping, Inc, 285 Mich.App. 706, 714; 777 N.W.2d 205 (2009). An employer's knowledge that an injury was certain to occur does not require the employer to know that an injury will occur in a specific way, on a certain date, or to a particular employee. Johnson, 288 Mich.App. at 699.
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts in plaintiff's complaint are insufficient to establish that defendants had actual knowledge that Waller would injure decedent. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that Waller and decedent had an argument about the proper way to scan aisles, that Waller and decedent had a similar argument about three months prior, that Waller continued the argument with decedent after Good had separated them, and that Good stood with decedent to keep her separated from Waller while Waller clocked out. Whether these facts are considered together or in isolation, they are insufficient. For starters, there are no allegations that Waller and decedent had any issues with each other in the three months between their first argument and the October 15, 2017, argument. Given that Waller and decedent...
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