Brown v. State
Decision Date | 03 May 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 70241,70241 |
Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Wade C. Hoyt III, Rome, for appellant.
F. Larry Salmon, Dist. Atty., Deborah D. Haygood, Stephen F. Lanier, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
The appellant appeals the denial of his motion for new trial following his conviction of rape.
The factual setting of this case is unusual to the point of being bizarre. The appellant and the victim had been living together for approximately a year and a half, when she suffered a brain injury as the result of a motor vehicle accident and lapsed into a coma from which she has apparently never recovered. The appellant admits that one night several weeks after the accident he had sexual relations with the victim as she lay comatose in her hospital bed. His "defense" to the charge of rape was that because he and the victim had enjoyed a loving sexual relationship prior to her injury, it is reasonable to assume she would have consented had she been capable of doing so. Held:
Rape is defined by OCGA § 16-6-1(a) as "carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will." The phrase "against her will" has been interpreted to mean "without her consent." See Gore v. State, 119 Ga. 418, 419, 46 S.E. 671 (1903); Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232, 233, 236 S.E.2d 748 (1977). Also, it has been held that Paul v. State, 144 Ga.App. 106(2), 240 S.E.2d 600 (1977).
Based on these principles, we are constrained to hold that the evidence in this case was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89(1), 263 S.E.2d 131 (1980). Penetration was established by the unequivocal testimony of two hospital employees to the effect that they had observed the appellant in the act of "sexual intercourse" with the victim. Assuming arguendo that a legal presumption of consent might arise from proof that the appellant and the victim were united in a common law marriage, the evidence as to the existence of such a relationship was conflicting, and the jury was authorized to conclude that no such marriage relationship existed. Finally, the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the appellant acted without criminal intent. Mallette v. State, 119 Ga.App. 24, 27, 165 S.E.2d 870 (1969). See also Schwerdtfeger v. State, 167 Ga.App. 19, 20, 305 S.E.2d 834 (1983).
2. The trial court did not err in excluding as irrelevant the appellant's proffered testimony concerning the specifics of his prior sexual relationship with the victim, nor did the court err in refusing to...
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