Drake v. State
| Decision Date | 26 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 32035,32035 |
| Citation | 239 Ga. 232,236 S.E.2d 748 |
| Parties | Grady Patman DRAKE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
J. H. Affleck, Jr., J. W. Timmons, Athens, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, Dist. Atty., B. Thomas Cook, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Athens, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., G. Stephen Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
In November, 1976, Drake was convicted of forcible rape of his 9-year old daughter, and sentenced to 20 years. The indictment charged that Drake "did engage in sexual intercourse with . . . (victim) a female child under the age of 14 years, not his spouse, forcibly and against her will." It thus charged the elements of forcible rape (Code Ann. § 26-2001) and statutory rape (Code Ann. § 26-2018). The evidence showed that the victim yielded to the act sufficiently that no physical force was used; however, she testified that she did so out of fear that her father would beat her and her mother if she did not.
1. Drake enumerates error on the trial court's jury charge concerning forcible rape that lack of consent was conclusively shown by the victim's age. The trial court correctly charged that for forcible rape three elements must be shown sexual intercourse, lack of consent, and force. He charged that the victim's age here conclusively showed lack of consent; but that force must appear, if at all, from the evidence. He then charged on statutory rape, charging that whether or not consent was given and whether or not force was used were irrelevant. He then instructed the jury that (in addition to a verdict of not guilty) they could find Drake guilty of forcible rape or of statutory rape; in the first instance they should write merely " guilty" and in the second instance "guilty of statutory rape." The verdict rendered, "guilty," was then properly interpreted as a verdict of guilty of (forcible) rape.
Appellant argues that the court erred in charging that where the prosecutrix is under 14 years, lack of consent is conclusively proved. He urges that if lack of consent can be shown by the victim's age, then there is no difference between statutory rape and forcible rape. The argument totally overlooks the fact that force must be shown to convict of forcible rape, and incorrectly blends the wholly separate elements of force and lack of consent.
The new rape statute which was enacted with the 1968 Criminal Code does not use the term "consent" as such. It states, "A person commits rape when he has (1) carnal knowledge of a female, (2) forcibly and (3) against her will." Code Ann. § 26-2001. (Emphasis added.) These are the three elements of forcible rape. "Forcibly" and "against her will" are not synonymous. The phrase "against her will," which means without her consent, (Gore v. State, 119 Ga. 418, 419, 46 S.E. 671 (1903)) in our construction was included to avoid criminalizing sexual acts however accomplished if done with an adult female's consent: the law seeks only to prohibit an unconsented-to aggressive act against a female. Normally a rape prosecutrix is asked if she consented to the act, and she answers "no." She is asked about and testifies to elements of force, and the case of forcible rape is thus made out.
A female under 14 years of age is legally incapable of giving consent. This rule has been recognized, for example, in these fairly typical cases: Joiner v. State, 133 Ga. 433, 66 S.E. 251 (1909); Jones v. State, 106 Ga. 365, 34 S.E. 174 (1899); Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225, 238 (1851); Morrow v. State, 13 Ga.App. 189, 79 S.E. 63 (1913). The judge in this trial correctly charged that the element of "against her will" was automatically shown by her age. He also correctly charged that to convict of forcible rape, force must be shown by evidence.
The confusion which sometimes appears when an under-age victim is involved stems from the fact very old cases blended concepts of nonconsent and force (e. g., Gosha v. State, 56 Ga. 36 (1876)), and also from the fact that statutory rape is not really "rape" at all and somewhat muddles the issues in a rape trial. Statutory rape is merely an act of sexual intercourse with a forbidden partner a female under 14, not the offender's spouse. Force, consent, resistance all these elements are irrelevant; it is the act of sexual intercourse and the age of the female that constitute the crime.
After this brief discussion, it will perhaps seem plain that in McFall v. State, 235 Ga. 105, 218 S.E.2d 839 (1975) we erred in affirming a forcible rape conviction on a jury charge to the effect that when an act of sexual intercourse with a girl under 14 is shown, "the law supplies the essential element of force." Id. at 106, 218 S.E.2d at 841. That was incorrect. When an act of sexual intercourse with a girl under 14 is shown, statutory rape is shown. If the state desires to convict a defendant of forcible rape, it must prove the element of force by acts of force (or mental coercion) age has nothing to do with it. Considerations of "consent" and "force" and "against her will" are irrelevant in a statutory rape case, and the age of the victim is irrelevant in a forcible rape case except insofar as it may show her incapable of giving consent and thereby supply the "against her will" element. Force must also be shown, of course.
The view we take has been well expressed in 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 315 (1957):
Were the contrary true that the victim's age supplies the element of force then as a practical matter no one would be convicted of statutory rape because the state's case making out statutory rape also would make out forcible rape. As one of our number wrote recently, dissenting in McFall, the "charge removed the element of force in a forcible rape case and allowed a conviction of a crime requiring force without any proof of force." 235 Ga. 105 at 109, 218 S.E.2d at 842. (Ingram, J., dissenting.)
It is true that sometimes mere lack of consent imputes force, but this is true only where children are not involved. As Wharton has phrased it, Id. at § 307.
This discussion is adequate to show that McFall does not state the pertinent principles correctly. McFall is disapproved and will not be followed in the future.
Our discussion here is not only consistent with, but was heralded by, our case of Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123, 205 S.E.2d 210 (1974). In Robinson we considered a conviction of forcible rape of an under-age victim and said this about it: Id. at 128, 205 S.E.2d at 214. (Emphasis added.) Our affirmance of that...
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...element of force may be presumed as a matter of law to obtain a rape conviction when the victim is a minor. Adhering to our decision in Drake v. State,2 we hold that the state must prove the element of force to obtain a conviction for forcible rape of a victim under the age of consent. Ther......
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...App. 1995); see also Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Va. 2006).[127] . Falk, Note 123, supra, at 134.[128] . Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. 2977).[129] . Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470 (Va. 2006) (the victim had voluntarily ingested alcohol and a near-letha......
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§ 33.04 Rape: Actus Reus
...App. 1995); see also Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Va. 2006).[127] Falk, Note 123, supra, at 134.[128] Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (Ga. 2977).[129] Molina v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 470 (Va. 2006) (the victim had voluntarily ingested alcohol and a near-lethal dose......
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TABLE OF CASES
...(N.C. Ct. App. 1975), 373 Downey, State v., 476 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985), 44 Doyon, State v., 416 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1980), 346 Drake v. State, 236 S.E.2d 748, 561 Drum, Commonwealth v., 58 Pa. 9 (1868), 484 Dubarry People v., 31 N.E.3d 86 (N.Y. 2015) , 119 Duclos-Lasnier v. State, 192 So.3d 1234......