Brown v. State
| Citation | 579 So.2d 898 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1693,90-1693 |
| Parties | David BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 579 So.2d 898, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1457 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Robert Friedman, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Patricia G. Lampert, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
We affirm Brown's conviction for attempted manslaughter with a firearm, simple assault and shooting into an occupied vehicle. We find no error in permitting the impeachment evidence that Brown was fired from his job as a correctional officer after he had previously testified that he had quit. The trial judge obviously saw the original testimony as an attempt to enhance Brown's credibility by his testimony that he himself had been a law enforcement officer, and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion in that conclusion.
We do find error, however, in sentencing Brown to a minimum mandatory three year sentence for attempted manslaughter with a firearm under Sec. 775.087(2), Fla.Stat. (1989). The supreme court has authoritatively construed that statute as not extending to manslaughter. Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1986); see also Whitehead v. State, 446 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). On remand the trial court is instructed to delete the minimum mandatory three year part of the sentence.
We also reverse the conviction for criminal contempt. This conviction was based on Brown's denial on cross-examination that he had been fired from the correctional officer position. While the records of the state agency indisputably showed that the state thought he had been fired rather than quitting, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to establish that Brown himself knew that he had been fired or why. Intent is an essential element of perjury, and here there was no evidence that he intended to lie.
AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REVERSED IN PART WITH DIRECTIONS.
I agree with the majority that the trial court reversibly erred in sentencing Brown to a three year mandatory minimum for attempted manslaughter with a firearm. As the state concedes, the trial court erred in imposing the sentence because section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes, the statute which imposes a three-year...
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Robertson v. State
...the state was properly allowed to introduce evidence of an episode wherein the defendant used a firearm recklessly); Brown v. State, 579 So.2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (where defendant tried to enhance his credibility by telling the jury that he had been a law enforcement officer, the trial ......
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Robertson v. State
...the state was properly allowed to introduce evidence of an episode wherein the defendant used a firearm recklessly); Brown v. State, 579 So.2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(where defendant tried to enhance his credibility by telling the jury that he had been a law enforcement officer, the trial c......
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Mosley v. State, 98-1502.
...or make a specific factual assertion which the state has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled. See Brown v. State, 579 So.2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Dodson v. State, 356 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hernandez v. State, 569 So.2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Davis v. State, ......
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Bozeman v. State, 96-0822
...or make a specific factual assertion which the state has the right to correct so that the jury will not be misled. See Brown v. State, 579 So.2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Dodson v. State, 356 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Hernandez v. State, 569 So.2d 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Davis v. State, ......