Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 16 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 985S376,985S376 |
| Parties | Joe L. BROWN, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jay Rodia, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Following a bench trial, Defendant-Appellant Joe L. Brown was convicted upon a charge of robbery, a class B felony, I.C. Sec. 35-42-5-1, and sentenced to fourteen (14) years imprisonment. The sole issue presented in this direct appeal is whether the defendant personally waived trial by jury.
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to American jurisprudence, and as such guaranteed by the federal and State Constitutions. See U.S. Const.Amend. VI; Ind.Const. Art. I, Sec. 13; see generally, Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. However, trial by jury is subject to knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant, provided the record demonstrates such waiver was made in a voluntary manner with sufficient awareness of the surrounding circumstances and the consequences. Doughty v. State (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 and authorities cited; see also, Good v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 29, 366 N.E.2d 1169.
In Doughty and Good this Court concluded that the records did not sufficiently demonstrate the defendants' personal assents to waiver of jury trial. Both cases interpreted the criminal jury trial statute, I.C. Sec. 35-1-34-1 (Burns Code Ed., 1975), subsequently recodified at I.C. Sec. 35-37-1-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.), to require that the defendant's personal waiver of trial by jury be shown on the record.
In the present case, the defendant erroneously contends that the record fails to demonstrate his personal assent to waiver of trial by jury. However, the record of a pretrial conference, which defendant personally attended, includes the following:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Horton v. State
...v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind.1997) ; Patton v. State, 495 N.E.2d 534, 535 (Ind.1986) ; Perkins, 541 N.E.2d at 928 ; Brown v. State, 495 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind.1986) ; Doughty v. State, 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind.1984) ; Clay v. State, 457 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ind.1983) ; Rodgers v. State, 275 I......
-
Kellems v. State
...in writing or in open court of appellant's right to a trial by jury. We have no choice but to reverse. . . ." Cases like Brown v. State, 495 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind.1986), and O'Connor set forth explicit colloquy between judge and defendant in order to demonstrate waiver. Still other Indiana c......
-
Gonzalez v. State
...and voluntary manner, with sufficient awareness of the surrounding circumstances and consequences.") (citing Perry); Brown v. State, 495 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind.1986) ("However, trial by jury is subject to knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant, provided the record demonstrates such w......
-
Jones v. State
...wish to waive his right to a jury trial and that he was adequately informed about that waiver, the waiver is proper. Brown v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 178. We find that Jones' waiver was proper Jones claims his due process rights were violated because he was charged with a Class A fel......